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Citation of Unpublished Opinions as Precedent
MARTHA DRAGICH PEARSON*

INTRODUCTION

Responding to a well-documented "crisis of volume,"' the United
States courts of appeals have adopted measures to reduce the time
judges must spend on each case.' These measures include using staff attorneys to screen cases,3 eliminating oral argument in many cases,4 rely-

ing on law clerks to draft opinions,5 and reducing the publication of
opinions. 6 To free judges of the task of preparing publication-worthy
opinions in every case, the circuits adopted two sets of rules: one outlin* Associate Dean for Library & Information Resources and Associate Professor of Law, University of Missouri-Columbia. B.A. (1978),
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I. The term apparently originated in DANIEL J. MEADOR, APPELLATE COURTS: STAFF AND PROCESS
IN THE CRISIS OF VOLUME (1974). If a crisis existed in 1974, it has steadily worsened. According to the
Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts of Appeals (also known as the White
Commission), in 1978 there were i9,657 appeals filed, or 137 per authorized circuit judge; by 1997 filings had risen to 53,688 or 300 per authorized judgeship. COMMISSION ON STRUCTURAL ALTERNATIVES
FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS, FINAL REPORT 14 tbl.2- 3 (1998) [hereinafter STRUCTURAL ALTERNATIVES REPORT]. Two earlier studies also mandated by Congress are the REPORT OF THE FEDERAL
COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE (1990)

[hereinafter FCSC

REPORT]

and the COMMISSION

ON REVISION OF THE

FEDERAL COURT APPELLATE SYSTEM, STRUCTURE AND INTERNAL PROCEDURES: RECOMMENDATIONS

CHANGE (1975)

(also known as the Hruska Commission) [hereinafter

HRUSKA COMMISSION].

FOR

Some offi-

cial studies avoid using the term "crisis." The FCSC REPORT, however, discusses the dimensions of the
"long-expected crisis" and concludes that it "is at last upon us." FCSC REPORT at 6.
2. See, e.g., STRUCTURAL ALTERNATIVES REPORT, supra note I, at 21-25 (discussing "differentiated

decisional processes"); see also THOMAS E. BAKER, RATIONING JUSTICE ON APPEAL-THE PROBLEMS OF
THE U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS (1994) (discussing "intramural" (procedural) and "extramural" (structural) reforms);

RESTRUCTURING JUSTICE -THE

THE FEDERAL COURTS

INNOVATIONS OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT AND THE FUTURE OF

(Arthur D. Hellman ed., 199o) [hereinafter

RESTRUCTURING JUSTICE]

(discussing

measures adopted in the Ninth Circuit).
3. STRUCTURAL ALTERNATIVES REPORT, supranote i, at 23-24, tbl.2-8.
4. Id. at 22, tbl.2-6.
5. See, e.g., Alex Kozinski & Stephen Reinhardt, Please Don't Cite This! Why We Don't Allow
Citation to Unpublished Dispositions,CAL. LAW., June 2000, at 43, 44 (stating that most memorandum
dispositions are drafted by law clerks); see also Jeffrey 0. Cooper & Douglas A. Berman, Passive Virtues and Casual Vices in the FederalCourts of Appeals, 66 BROOK. L. REV. 685, 697 (2ooo).
6. STRUCTURAL ALTERNATIVES REPORT, supra note I, at 22 tbl.2- 7 .
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ing the circumstances under which opinions should be published,7 and the
other defining the "precedential value" of unpublished opinions and limiting or forbidding their citation in future cases. The latter set of rules,
adopted on the grounds that they are necessary to effectuate the selective
publication rules, explicitly invoke the notion of precedent.'
The conception of precedent reflected in the no-citation rules appears incomplete or distorted. The circuits' rules, for example, deny in
varying degrees the "precedential value"" of unpublished opinions.
These rules forbid the citation of unpublished opinions "as precedent,""
as if precedent were an all-or-nothing proposition. Yet the ability to draw
compelling analogies to non-binding precedents, or to distinguish away
apparently binding precedents, is the "hallmark"" of the lawyer's art.
One of the primary objectives of law schools in the first-year curriculum
is to develop students' understanding of an entire spectrum of "precedential value" and the sophisticated use of authority.'3 These practices
7. D.C. CIR. R. 36; FED. CIR. R. 47.6: IST CIR. R. 36; 3D CIR. R. App. I lOP 6; 4TH CIR. R. 36; 5TH
CIR. R. 47.5; 6TH CIR. R. 2o6; 7TH CIR. R. 53; 8TH CIR. R. 1OP IV.B, APP. I; 9TH CIR. R. 36-2; 10TH CIR.
R. 36.1-36.2; 1ITH CIR. R. 36. The Second Circuit's rule does not mention unpublished opinions but
allows disposition in open court or by summary order rather than by "written opinion." 2D CIR. R.
§ 0.23.
8. D.C. CIR. R. 36(c)(2), 28(c)(i); FED. CIR. R. 47.6; IST CIR. R. 36(B)(2)(F); 2D CIR. R. § 0.23; 3D
CIR. R. App. I 1OP 5.7; 4TH CIR. R. 36(c); 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4; 6TH CIR. R. 28(g); 7TH CIR. R. 5 3 (b)(2)(iv);
8TH CIR. R. 28A; 9TH CIR. R. 36-3(b); 1OTH CIR. R. 36.3(B); IITH Cm. R. 36-2. This Article deals only
with the practices of the federal courts of appeals. According to a recent article, however, the "majority of states ban citation of unpublished opinions in their appellate courts" as well. Richard B. Cappalli, The Common Law's Case Against Non-Precedential Opinions, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 755, 758 (2003).
9. See, e.g., D.C. CIR. R. 36(c)(2) (stating that panel sees "no precedential value" in unpublished
decisions); FED. CIR. R. 47.6(b) (stating that certain dispositions "must not be employed or cited as
precedent"); 3D CIR. R. App. I lOP 5.2 (stating that an opinion is published when it has "precedential"
value); 5TH C1R. R. 47.5.4 (stating that certain unpublished opinions "are not precedent"); 7th CIR. R.
53(b)(2)(iv) (stating that unpublished orders "shall not be cited or used as precedent"); 8TH CIR. R.
28A(i) (stating that unpublished opinions "are not precedent"); 9TH CIR. R. 36-3(a) (stating that unpublished dispositions "are not binding precedent"); IOTH CIR. R. 36.3(A) (stating that unpublished
opinions "are not binding precedent"); IITH CIR. R. 36-2 (stating that unpublished opinions "are not
considered binding precedent"). The Fourth Circuit allows counsel to cite an unpublished decision if
she believes that it "has precedential value ... and that there is no published opinion that would serve
as well." 4th CIR. R. 36(c). The Sixth Circuit's rule is very similar. See 6th CIR. R. 28(g).
so. See, e.g., D.C. CIR. R. 36(c)(2); 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4; 8TH CIR. R. 28(i); 9TH CIR. R. 36-3; 10TH CIR.
R. 36.3; 1I1TH CIR. R. 36-2.
ii. See, e.g., FED. Cm. R. 47.6(b); 7TH CIR. R. 53(b)(2). The position of the District of Columbia
Circuit is somewhat confusing. See D.C. CIR. R. 28(c)(i)(B) (stating that unpublished decisions entered on or after January 1, 2002 "may be cited as precedent"); D.C. CIR. R. 36(c)(2) (stating that the
panel sees "no precedential value" in unpublished decisions).
12. Cf. William L. Reynolds & William M. Richman, The Non-Precedential Precedent-Limited
Publication and No-Citation Rules in the United States Courts of Appeals, 78 COLUM. L. REV. i167,
1186 (1978) (quoting testimony of Judge Robert A. Sprecher of the Seventh Circuit before the Hruska
Commission).
13. Larry Alexander, Constrainedby Precedent, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. I, 3 (1989).
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reflect a nuanced understanding of precedent not found in the no-

citation rules.
The history of the selective publication and non-citation rules is well
known' 4 and need not be recounted here. A substantial body of literature
considers various aspects of unpublished opinions and no-citation rules. 56
A 1978 article by Professors William Reynolds and William Richman"
led the way, publicizing a term that suggests the murkiness of the underlying concepts: "non-precedential precedent."'1 7 Subsequent academic
commentary on these practices has been overwhelmingly negative,
whether examining the rules' unfairness to one-time litigants,' 9 deleterious effects on the development of federal law," possible constitutional
violations,2 ' or other issues." Several circuit judges have also commented
on these practices; their commentary has been mixed. 3 The reaction of
14. See, e.g., Martha J. Dragich, Will the Federal Courts of Appeals Perish If They Publish? Or
Does the Declining Use of Opinions to Explain and Justify JudicialDecisions Pose a Greater Threat?,
44 Am. U. L. REV. 757, 76o-62 (1995); Salem M. Katsh & Alex V. Chachkes, Constitutionalityof "NoCitation" Rules, 3 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 287, 290-94 (2001); Reynolds & Richman, supra note 12, at
1168-72, and sources cited therein.
15. See, e.g., Cooper & Berman, supra note 5, at 704 n.48 (citing sources): Deborah Jones Merritt
& James J. Brudney, Stalking Secret Law: What Predicts Publication in the United States Courts of Appeals, 54 VAND. L. REV. 71, 73 nn.5-6 (2oo0) (citing sources).
I6. Reynolds & Richman, supra note 12.
17. The term comes from the testimony of Judge Robert A. Sprecher of the Seventh Circuit before the Hruska Commission. Id. at i 167 n.I.
18. See Lauren Robel, The Practice of Precedent: Anastasoff, Noncitation Rules, and the Meaning
of Precedentin an Interpretive Community, 35 IND. L. REV. 399, 410 (2002). A recent exception is the
work of Professors Cooper and Berman. See Cooper & Berman, supra note 5, at 690, 727 (suggesting
that such reforms may be advantageous in that they allow the courts of appeals to avoid engaging in
"premature law-making"); Douglas A. Berman & Jeffrey 0. Cooper, In Defense of Less Precedential
Opinions:A Reply to ChiefJudge Martin, 6o OHIo ST. L.J. 2025, 2025 (1999); see also Richard W. Murphy, Separation of Powers and the Horizontal Force of Precedent, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. IO75, 1078
(2003) (citing scholarly commentary critical of Anastasoff's constitutional analysis of Anastasoff v.
United States, 223 F.3d 898 (8th Cir. 2ooo)).
59. See, e.g., Lauren K. Robel, The Myth of the Disposable Opinion: Unpublished Opinions and
Government Litigants in the United States Courts of Appeals, 87 MICH. L. REV. 94o (1989).
20. See, e.g., Dragich, supra note 14.
21. See, e.g., David Greenwald & Frederick A. 0. Schwartz, Jr., The CensorialJudiciary,35 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 1133 (2002) (discussing First Amendment issues); Katsh & Chachkes, supra note 14
(discussing First Amendment and separation of powers issues).
22. See, e.g., Merritt & Brudney, supra note 15 (studying variation of publication rates among
circuits).
23. Judge-written articles defending the rules include: Kozinski & Reinhardt, supra note 5; The
Honorable Boyce F. Martin, Jr., In Defense of Unpublished Opinions, 6o OHIO ST. L.J. 177 (1999);
Philip Nichols, Jr., Selective Publicationof Opinions: One Judge's View, 35 AM. U. L. REV. 909 (1986);
Hon. Bruce M. Selya, Publish and Perish: The Fate of the FederalAppeals Judge in the Information
Age, 55 OHIo ST. L.J. 405 (1994). Statements by judges criticizing the rules include: Williams v. Dallas
Area Rapid Transit, 256 F.3d 26o, 26o (5th Cir. 2ooi) (Smith, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en
bane) (calling upon court to "revisit the questionable practice of denying precedential status to unpublished opinions); Richard S. Arnold, Unpublished Opinions: A Comment, I J. App. PRAC. & PROCESS
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the bar has tended to be critical. 4 Professor Lauren Robel notes that
criticism of the rules has recently extended to political and popular

spheres. 5 None of these commentaries includes an in-depth analysis of
the rules in light of the doctrine of precedent. 6
The limited publication and no-citation rules have also been chal-

lenged in court, though that, too, has failed to resolve the matter of their
precedential value. 7 The Eighth Circuit's rule became the subject of liti-

gation when a party urged the court to ignore an unpublished opinion in
a factually indistinguishable case under the rule permitting citation of an
unpublished opinion only for preclusive effect or as persuasive authority.2s In the Ninth Circuit, attorneys in two cases were ordered to show
cause why they should not be sanctioned for citing unpublished cases in
contravention of the rule. Attorneys may well find themselves in an im-

219, 222 (1999); Re Rules of the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, adopted Nov.

18, 1986, 955 F.2d 36, 38 (xoth Cir. 1992) (statement of Chief Judge Holloway); Patricia M. Wald, The
Problem with the Courts: Black-Robed Bureaucracy or Collegiality Under Challenge?,42 MD. L. REV.
766,768 (1983).
24. See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS
(adopted Feb. 2000) [hereinafter ABA MINIMUM STANDARDS]; William T. Hangley, Opinions Hidden,
CitationsForbidden:A Report and Recommendations of the American College of Trial Lawyers on the
Publicationand Citation of Nonbinding Federal Circuit Court Opinions, 208 F.R.D. 645 (2002) [hereinafter ACTL Report].
25. Robel, supra note 18, at 410-II.
26. Some articles include detailed discussions of the historical evolution of the doctrine of precedent, primarily by way of assessing Judge Arnold's account of that history (and its implications for
courts today) in Anastasoff. See, e.g., Thomas R. Lee & Lance S. Lehnhof, The Anastasoff Case and
the JudicialPower to "Unpublish" Opinions, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 135 (2001). A brief discussion of
the modem operation of precedent appears in Danny J. Boggs & Brian P. Brooks, Unpublished Opinions and the Nature of Precedent. 4 GREEN BAG 2d 17 (2002). Robel, supra note i8, analyzes the ways
lawyers and judges actually use published and unpublished opinions but does not focus on the doctrine
of precedent. Cappalli, supra note 8, at 759, looks at unpublished opinions and no-citation rules
"through the lens of the common law tradition," but focuses on the common law methodology of interpreting and applying precedents rather than on the doctrine of precedent. See also Michael B. W.
Sinclair, Anastasoff versus Hart: The Constitutionality and Wisdom of Denying PrecedentialAuthority
to Circuit Court Decisions, 64 U. Plrr. L. REV. 695 (2003) (analyzing no-citation rules in light of "enactment theory" and "standard theory" of precedent).
27. Soon after the rules were adopted, a challenge was filed seeking a writ of mandamus against
the Seventh Circuit's action in striking citation of an unpublished opinion from petitioner's appellate
brief, but the Supreme Court denied the writ. Do-Right Auto Sales v. United States Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit, 429 U.S. 917 (1976). Two years later, a litigant challenged the Seventh Circuit's authority to issue non-precedential opinions; on review the Supreme Court resolved the case on
jurisdictional grounds and did not reach the issue of the Seventh Circuit's rule. Browder v. Dir., Dept.
of Corr., 434 U.S. 257 (1978). Much more recently, a challenge to the Ninth Circuit's rule was dismissed for lack of standing. Schmier v. United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 136 F.
Supp. 2d IO48 (N.D. Cal. 2001), aff'd, 279 F.3d 817 (9th Cir. 2002).
28. Anastasoff v. United States, 223 F. 3d 898, 899 (8th Cir. 2000).
29. Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d I155, 1159 (9th Cir. 2001); Sorchini v. City of Covina, 250 F.3 d
706, 708 (9th Cir. 2oo).
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possible position if they believe that diligent representation,3" compliance
3 or the duty to call relevant adverse
with the requirements of Rule i 1,
32
authority to the court's attention requires citation of an unpublished decision.
This Article examines the no-citation rules in light of the purpose
and operation of the doctrine of precedent. Part I compares the deep
disagreement on five fundamental issues of appellate process in recent
opinions of the Eighth and Ninth Circuits involving limited publication
and no-citation rules. Part II turns to the doctrine of precedent and
summarizes current thought about how precedent constrains judicial decisionmaking. This Part concludes with a discussion of the powers and
obligations of the precedent court and subsequent courts with respect to
the creation, shaping and use of precedent. Part III considers the operation of the system of precedent in the courts of appeals specifically, examining the functions and structure of these courts against the
assumptions of the doctrine of precedent. In particular, this Part discusses two issues: the relationship between the courts of appeals' mandatory jurisdiction and the extent of their lawmaking (i.e., precedentcreating) role, and the relationship between the courts of appeals' internal decisional structures and their obligation to maintain the law of the
circuit. Part IV examines the current status of unpublished opinions as
"precedent," measuring them against fundamental questions about
precedent outlined in Part II. Part V considers whether limited publication and no-citation rules, even if incompatible with our system of precedent, can be justified on economy grounds. Part VI discusses how the
30. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.3 provides that "[a] lawyer shall act with reasonable
diligence and promptness in representing a client." See also GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W. WILLIAM

HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING § 6.2 (3d ed.) (discussing relationship of duty of diligence to requirement of "zealous advocacy" under Model Code of Professional Responsibility).
31. FED. R. CIv. P. i(b)(2) requires attorneys to certify that, to the best of their knowledge, the
claims, defenses, and other legal contentions [in a pleading or other filing] are warranted by existing
law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law or the
establishment of new law." See also HAZARD & HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING, supra note 30, § 27.2-

27.7 (discussing attorneys' obligations under Rule iI); Dragich, supra note 14, at 786-87 (discussing
impact of unpublished decisions on compliance with Rule i i obligations).
32. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a)(2) provides that "[a] lawyer shall not knowingly: ...fail to disclose to the tribunal legal authority in the controlling jurisdiction known to the lawyer to be directly adverse to the position of the client and not disclosed by opposing counsel." See also
HAZARD & HODES, supra note 30, §29. I1 (discussing duty to disclose adverse authority and noting that
it is especially important for lawyers to disclose authorities that are "less likely to be discovered by the
tribunal itself"). This discussion includes caveats about the nature of authorities to be disclosed, suggesting that "the standard should be whether the omitted authorities would be considered important
by the judge sitting on the case." Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). This statement
may cast doubt on the obligation to disclose adverse-but unpublished-decisions, depending on the
circuit.
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courts of appeals might recast limited publication and no-citation rules in
light of the dictates of a system of precedent. This Part examines possible
modifications to the selective publication and no-citation rules. I suggest
an alternative way of thinking about the content and format of abbreviated opinions in easy or redundant cases. If a decision adds nothing new
to the law, its opinion need only state and cite the controlling law. The
opinion should summarize the relevant facts, and the decision should be
confined to its facts. Abbreviated opinions of this sort would be precedential, but their precedential value would be minimal because their ambit is narrow. I further suggest a return to the "free market" of prior
decisions, in which the value of prior decisions is measured by consumers
(not creators) of precedent against the criteria that govern the strength of
any precedent.
This Article concludes that limited publication and, especially, nocitation rules are fundamentally incompatible with a system based on the
rule of precedent. The economy arguments typically advanced in support
of the rules are weak, particularly in light of recent technological developments. More importantly, these economy arguments themselves reflect
a flawed understanding of precedent. Thus, the limited publication and
no-citation rules cannot be justified on grounds of economy or efficiency.
The courts of appeals can, by rethinking the format and content of abbreviated opinions, circumscribe the future effect of selected decisions.
But these courts cannot legitimately declare decisions "nonprecedential" for the future, and must not continue to forbid their citation.
I. ANASTASOFF AND HART

In 2000, the Eighth Circuit panel deciding Anastasoffv. United States
held unconstitutional the portion of the circuit's limited publication rule
allowing the court to declare certain opinions "not precedential."33 The
court en banc later vacated the panel decision as moot after the parties
reached a settlement.34 The Anastasoff panel's ruling created quite a
stir.35 More recently, a Ninth Circuit panel in Hart v. Massanariaddressed

33. 223 F.3d at 899.
34. 235 F.3d 1054, 1o56 (8th Cir. 2000).
35. Dozens of articles have commented on the Anastasoff case. See, e.g., Stephen R. Barnett,
From Anastasoff to Hart to West's FederalAppendix: The Ground Shifts UnderNo-Citation Rules, 4 J.
App. PRAC.& PROCESS I (2002); Boggs & Brooks, supra note 26; John P. Borger & Chad M. Oldfather,
Anastasoff v. United States and the Debate over UnpublishedOpinions, 36 TORT & INS. L.J. 899 (2ooi);
Katsh & Chachkes, supra note 14; Lee & Lehnhof, supra note 26; Polly J. Price, Precedentand Judicial
Power After the Founding, 42 B.C. L. REV. 81 (2000); Robel, supra note i8; Carl Tobias, Anastasoff,
Unpublished Opinions, and Federal Appellate Justice, 25 HARV. J.L. & PuB. POL'Y. 1171 (2o02); Sebrina
A. Mason, Note, Citing Unpublished Opinions: The Eighth Circuit Holds It Violates the Constitution to
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the propriety of sanctioning attorneys for citing unpublished opinions in
circumstances not permitted by the no-citation rule. 6 In Hart, the attorney ordered to show cause as to why he should not be sanctioned relied
on Anastasoff s ruling of unconstitutionality.37 The Hart court declined to
impose sanctions,: but "la[id] to rest" the "mistaken impression that [the
Ninth Circuit's rule] is unconstitutional.39 It is difficult to reconcile these
two cases. Though many differences exist among the federal circuits,4' all
of the federal courts of appeals are governed by the same statutes 4' and
by the same overall rules of appellate procedure. 4' Beyond that, the circuits share a long history; 43 their evolution has been largely shaped by
central policy development' and by congressionally mandated studies of
the whole system.45 Despite these significant gravitational forces, the poIgnore the PrecedentialValue of Unpublished Opinions: Anastasoff v. United States, 223 F.3 d 898 (8th
Cir. 2000), vacated on other grounds, 235 F.3d 1054 (8th Cir. 2000), 26 S. ILL. U. L.J. II9 (2001); Suzanne 0. Snowden, Note, "That's My Holding and I'm Not Sticking to It!" Court Rules that Deprive
Unpublished Opinions of PrecedentialAuthority Distort the Common Law, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 1253
(2001); Lance A. Wade, Note, Honda Meets Anastasoft- The Procedural Due Process Argument
Against Rules ProhibitingCitation to Unpublished JudicialDecisions,42 B.C. L. REV. 695 (2001).
36. 266 F.3d 1155, 1159 (9th Cir. 2001). See also Sorchini v. City of Covina, 250 F. 3 d 706, 708-09
(9th Cir. 2001).
37. 266 F.3d at 1159. Schmier's challenge to the Ninth Circuit's rule likewise "place[d] great
weight" on the Anastasoff ruling. Schmier v. United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 136
F. Supp. 2d at 1052. In a similar case, another attorney ordered to show cause why sanctions should
not be imposed for citation of an unpublished opinion claimed to have believed the citation was permissible under the "notice" exception to the Ninth Circuit's rule. Sorchini, 250 F.3d at 708-09.
38. 266 F.3d at Ii8o.
39. Id. at 1159. The Federal Circuit has stated its agreement with Hart. See Symbol Tech., Inc. v.
Lemelson Med., 277 F.3d 1361, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
40. One difference is size. The circuits range from a low of six authorized judges in the First Circuit to a high of twenty-eight authorized judges in the Ninth Circuit. STRUCTURAL ALTERNATIVES REPORT, supra note I, at 27 tbl.2-9. Another difference is in caseload management techniques. See
RESTRUCTURING JUSTICE, supra note 2 (discussing many "innovations" adopted by the Ninth Circuit
under Chief Judge James R. Browning).
41. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 establishes the jurisdiction of all the federal courts of appeal except the Federal Circuit, whose jurisdiction is set out in 28 U.S.C. §§ 1292(c) and 1295. 28 U.S.C. § 46 governs the
manner in which all the circuits hear and determine cases.
42. The Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure apply to all the circuits. Each circuit supplements
these rules with its own local rules, however.
43. Tracey E. George, The Dynamics and Determinantsof the Decision to Grant En Banc Review,
74 WASH. L. REV. 213, 224-26 (1999) (tracing the development of the courts of appeals and noting that
all essential elements of the courts' present design were in place by 1925).
44. Cf. STRUCTURAL ALTERNATIVES REPORT, supra note I, at 25 (describing gradual "emergence of
the circuit itself as an important administrative entity of the federal judicial system"); id. at 26 (noting
that until nearly the end of the twentieth century, the circuits "were not major participants in federal
judicial administration"). Until the circuits took on that role, administration and policy development
took place primarily through the Judicial Conference of the United States and the Administrative Office of the United States Courts. Id. at 25-26.
45. E.g., HRUSKA COMMISSION, supra note x;FCSC REPORT, supra note I; STRUCTURAL ALTERNATIVES REPORT, supra note i.
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sitions of the Eighth and Ninth Circuits, as articulated in Anastasoff and
Hart, diverge sharply on fundamental questions of appellate justice.
These questions include the extent of the lawmaking obligation of the
courts of appeals, the manner in which precedents are created, the scope
of precedent, the court's duty vis-d-vis precedent, and the application of
the "prior panel" rule.4 6 The divergence of views in Anastasoff and Hart
is not attributable to minor differences in the two circuits' no-citation
rules.47
A.

THE LAW-MAKING RESPONSIBILITY OF THE COURTS OF APPEALS

Discussions of the federal courts of appeals typically start from the
obvious but important premise that these courts exercise dual functions:
error correction and lawmaking) Many commentators have described
the tension between these two functions. 49 The duality of function plays a
major role both in creating the "crisis of volume" in the courts of appeals" and in evaluating possible solutions.5 One might assume that the
circuits share a common understanding of the extent of their lawmaking
responsibility. But the Anastasoff and Hart opinions dash that assumption.
The statutory jurisdiction of the courts of appeals makes clear that
the courts' error-correction function arises in every appeal filed. The
point of disagreement between Anastasoff and Hart is whether the law-

making function, too, arises in every appeal. Judge Richard Arnold's
analysis in Anastasoff begins with this statement: "Inherent in every judi-

cial decision is a declaration and interpretation of a general principle or
46. Also called the rule of intra-circuit stare decisis or the rule of interpanel accord, the "rule"
provides that later panels within a circuit will not overturn the decision of an earlier panel on the same
point. See Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155, 1171 (9th Cir. 2001). Each circuit has adopted this "rule"
in caselaw. See Cooper & Berman, supra note 5,at 721; id. at 721 n.91 (citing cases adopting such
rules). The rules vary in their application. See infra Part I.E.
47. See 266 F.3d at 1159 n.2 (noting minor differences in the rules but concluding that "both rules
free later panels of the court.., to disregard earlier rulings that are designated as non-precedential").
Judge Kozinski's interpretation of the Eighth Circuit's rule conflicts with that court's own interpretation of its rule in Anastasoff, as explained in Part I.E of this Article, but he is correct that the text of
the two rules is similar. EIGHTH CIR. R. 28A(i) provides that "unpublished opinions ...are not precedent." NINTH CIR. R. 36-3(a) provides that "[u]npublished dispositions and orders of this Court are not
binding precedent."
48. See, e.g., Cooper & Berman, supra note 5, at 712-14.
49. Id. at713.
50. See, e.g., Martha J. Dragich, Once a Century: Time for a Structural Overhaul of the Federal
Courts, 1996 Wis. L. REv. Ix,14-15.
51. Id. at 45.
52. "The courts of appeals (other than the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit) shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts ....
" 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291 (emphasis added). See also Cooper & Berman, supra note 5, at 716 (discussing mandatory jurisdiction).
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rule of law."53 Likewise, "each exercise of the 'judicial power' requires
judges 'to determine the law' arising upon the facts of the case. 5 4 Thus,
Judge Arnold appears to hold the view that the two functions, while distinct, are indivisible.5 As one recent article puts it, the error-correction
function sets the agenda and the parameters for the lawmaking function.56 But when an appeal is filed, both functions are invoked by virtue
of the courts' mandatory jurisdiction.
Judge Alex Kozinski, writing in Hart,takes a different view. Though
Judge Kozinski acknowledges that the courts of appeals "lack discretionary review authority"57 similar to that of the Supreme Court, he approves
the courts of appeals' use of differential appellate processes," such as
non-publication of opinions, "to achieve the same end"59 of discretionary
exercise of the lawmaking power. By way of example, Judge Kozinski
notes that if the lawmaking power must be exercised in every case, rather
than only at the court's discretion, "undue weight" is given to the "first
case to raise a particular issue ...whether or not the lawyers have done
an adequate job of developing and arguing the issue."'" Better, he implies, for the court to await a suitable case. Under this view, then, the
lawmaking obligation of the federal courts of appeals is invoked not
through mandatory jurisdiction but as the result of a process to "separat[e] the cases" that call for the exercise of the lawmaking power from
those that do not. 6' Failure to separate the cases in this fashion is tanta-6
mount to "abdicating [an] important aspect of judicial responsibility., 1
In other words, the error-correction aspect of the judicial power can be
divorced from the lawmaking aspect.
B.

THE CREATION OF PRECEDENT

The Anastasoff and Hart opinions also differ on the question of how
a court creates a precedent. As noted above, the Anastasoff opinion pro53. Anastasoff v. United States, 223 F.3d 898, 899 (9th Cir. 2000) (emphasis added). Judge Kozinski reads Anastasoff this way, describing Anastasoff as requiring federal judges "to make law in every
case." Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155 , s i6o (9th Cir. 2001) (emphasis added).
54. Anastasoff, 223 F.3 d at 9oI (emphasis added) (quoting 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES*25).

55. Id. (discussing Blackstone's view that "each exercise of the 'judicial power' requires judges 'to
determine the law' arising upon the facts of the case"); id. (discussing views of Sir Edward Coke and
Sir Matthew Hale on "derivation of precedential authority from the law-declaring nature of the judicial power").
56. Cooper & Berman, supra note 5,at 722.
57. Hart, 266 F.3d at 1177.
58. Id. at 1177-78.

59.
6o.
61.
62.

Id. at 1177.
Id. at 1175.
Id. at 118o.

Id.
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ceeds from the premise that the declaration of law is an inherent part of
every judicial decision; this "declaration of law is authoritative to the extent necessary for the decision. ' ' Thus, the nature of the dispute itselfthe issues it presents within a particular factual context-marks the
boundaries of the precedent set by the decision of the case. Precedent is
an inevitable by-product of decision. Judge Arnold explicitly disavows
the notion that "courts have the ... power[] to choose for themselves,
from among all the cases they decide, those [in which they will create
precedent] .64

Judge Kozinski's view, by contrast, is that the creation of precedent
is an intentional act.6" The "principle of binding authority" is not "inevitable., 66 To the contrary, precedential opinions are those "meant to govern not merely the cases for which they are written, but future cases as
well., 6, Judge Kozinski suggests that if the creation of precedent were an
inevitable consequence of deciding a case, "the first circuit to rule on a
legal issue would then bind not only itself and the courts within its own
circuit, but all inferior federal courts" 68 and the courts of appeals could6
,
no longer choose "to adopt a body of circuit law on a wholesale basis,
as did the Eleventh70 and Federal" Circuits upon their creation. These
objections illustrate the intentional character of the creation of precedent
72
articulated in Hart.

63. Anastasoff v. United States, 223 F.3d 898, 9oo (8th Cir. 2000).
64. Id. at 904.
65. Hart,266 F.3d at 1177 (judges "select ... cases in which to publish precedential opinions"); id.
at i i8o (inherent aspect of judges' function is "managing precedent"); id. at 116o (rules that "empower
courts of appeal to issue nonprecedential decisions" allow judges to "determine whether future panels . .. will be bound by particular rulings").
66. Id. at 1175.
67. Id. at 1176 (emphasis added).
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d I27 (iith Cir. I98i) (en banc) (adopting as binding
precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Circuit before its division into the new Fifth and Eleventh
Circuits).
7 I . South Corp. v. United States, 69o F.2d 1368, 1370-71 (Fed. Cir. 1982) (en banc) (adopting as
binding precedent all decisions of the Federal Circuit's predecessor courts).
72. These objections are puzzling. The decision of a panel in one circuit would not bind "all inferior federal courts," given the widely accepted "law of the circuit" doctrine, under which the courts
within one circuit are under no obligation to follow the decisions of another circuit. See infra notes
304-308 and accompanying text; see also Dragich, supra note 50, at 36-37 n.146 and sources cited
therein. As for the wholesale adoption of a body of law as precedent, that decision (at least in the context of the creation of a new circuit) is simply different from the decision of any single case. The decisions in Bonner and South Corp. are akin to the adoption of a court rule and would not seem to be
precluded by changes to the publication or citation rules.

UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS

May 2004]

C.

THE SCOPE OF PRECEDENT

Another issue on which Anastasoff and Hart differ is the question of
how much of the court's decision constitutes the precedent set by the decision. Professor Alexander considers at length whether precedent inheres generally in the result of a decision, the rule established by the
decision, or the reasons offered in support of the result of the decision.73
On this question, it is not easy to determine Judge Arnold's view. Some
indications point toward the result. For example, Judge Arnold says that
the effect of no-citation rules is to "say[] to the bar: 'we may have decided this question the opposite way yesterday, but this does not bind us
today, and, what's more, you cannot even tell us what we did yesterday."'74 What the court "did"-the "way" it decided-suggests it is the
result that constitutes the precedent.75 Furthermore, much of Judge Arnold's analysis is grounded in the so-called "declaratory theory" of law,
which held sway in the Framers' era. 6 If the law has an independent existence, needing only to be found and declared (not made) by judges,77
then it would seem that the relevant action of the court would be to order a particular result. On the other hand, Judge Arnold quotes authorities that speak of "the principles of the decision [that] are held [] as
precedents and authority""' and denounce the idea that courts are "at
liberty to disregard all former rules and decisions."79 Even under the de-

73. Alexander, supra note 13, at 29-33 and 44-45 (discussing versions of the result model); id. at
17-19 (discussing rule model); id. at 20 (discussing a version of the rule model that "really amount[s]
to... constraint by the reasons of the precedent court"); id. at 32-33 (discussing a version of the result
model in which the precedent court's reasons, rather than its result, constrain). Application of these
models is well beyond the scope of this Article.
74. Anastasoff v. United States, 223 F. 3d 898, 904 (8th Cir. 2000). Judge Arnold's comment is
vaguely reminiscent of the writing of then-Judge Cardozo:
It will not do to decide the same question one way between one set of litigants and the opposite way between another. "If a group of cases involves the same point, the parties expect
the same decision.... If a case was decided against me yesterday when I was defendant, I
shall look for the same judgment today if I am plaintiff. To decide differently would raise a
feeling of resentment and wrong in my breast; it would be an infringement, material and
moral, of my rights.".. . Adherence to precedent must then be the rule rather than the exception if litigants are to have faith in the even-handed administration of justice in the
courts.
BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 33-34 (1921) (quoting W.G. MILLER,
THE DATA OF JURISPRUDENCE

335 (19o3)).

75. For a related discussion, see Arthur D. Hellman, Breaking the Banc: The Common-Law Process in the Large Appellate Court, 23 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 915, 925 (1991) (explaining that the rule of a case
"derives its binding force from the result in the case" and arguing that a mere difference in rationale.,
without a different result, cannot create an intra-circuit conflict).
76. Anastasoff,223 F.3d at 901-02.
77. Id. at 9o (citing I COKE, INSTITUTES 51 (5642)).
78. Id. at 903 (quoting

JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES

§§ 377-78 (1833)) (emphasis added).
79. Id. at 904 (quoting STORY, supra note 78, §§ 377-78).
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claratory theory, it is judges' "pronounce[ments] "8-precedents-that
are "the 'best and most authoritative' guide of what the law is."''. Accordingly, the precedent may encompass more than the simple result.
Judge Kozinski is somewhat clearer on this point. His discussion in
Hart of the process of writing a precedential opinion makes clear that it
is more than the mere result that matters. "Writing a precedential opinion.., involves much more than deciding who wins and who loses in a
particular case. ' ' "2For example, the authoring judge carefully selects both
the relevant facts and the rule of decision "after due consideration of the
relevant legal and policy considerations. '' 83 Moreover, "[w]here more
than one rule could be followed ... the court must explain why it is selecting one and rejecting the others. ''8' Elsewhere, Judge Kozinski writes
that "precedent" entails "not merely... the result but also ... the phrasing of the disposition."5 In contrast, an unpublished disposition is akin to
"a letter from the court to [the] parties ... announcing the result" using
languae "adequate to inform the parties how their case has been decided." In these cases, it suffices for the three panel judges to "agree on
the outcome of the case," even if not on "the precise reasoning or the
rule to be applied to future cases." ' In other words, when an opinion sets
precedent, it does so not merely by ordering a result but by articulating a
rationale. The result itself (something that exists in every case that is
seen through to decision) is not the "precedent." 88

D.

THE COURT'S

DuTY vis-A-vis

PRECEDENT

The Anastasoff and Hart opinions present differing theories of the
court's obligations with respect to precedent. In considering the court's
duty to follow precedent, it is important to bear in mind the differing
definitions of precedent described above.

8o. Id. at 902 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 81, at 531 (Alexander Hamilton) (Modern Library
1938)).
81. Id. at 9oi (quoting I WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *69).
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Hart v. Massanari, 266 F. 3d 1155, 1177 (9th Cir. 2001).
Id. at 1176.
Id.
Kozinski & Reinhardt, supra note 5, at 44.
Hart, 266 F.3d at 1178.

87. Id. (discussing consequences of allowing parties to cite unpublished dispositions, including
need for judges "to clarify their differences with the majority, even when those differences had no
bearing on the case before them").
88. According to Professor Cappalli, Judge Kozinski "reverses" the common law maxim that "it is
not what a court says, but what it does" that matters. See Cappalli, supra note 8, at 775.

May 20041

UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS

In Anastasoff, Judge Arnold speaks of the court's duty to follow
binding precedents, 89 defined as any "prior decisions"' of the court, so
long as they are "directly on point."9 ' These statements confirm Judge
Arnold's view that precedent is created by each decision of the court92
(not only when the court intends that effect) and that the result of the
prior decision significantly, if not exclusively, determines the scope of the
precedent.93 Under this view, there are a large number of "precedents"
(i.e., prior decisions), but relatively few "binding precedents"-cases indistinguishable from the case at bar.9 The court's duty is to follow binding precedent, but not blindly or "eternal[ly]." 95 Judge Arnold
acknowledges the court's prerogative to depart from precedent. Implicit
in his reference to cases "directly on point" is the notion that when cases
can be meaningfully distinguished, they are not "binding." 6 The Anastasoff opinion explicitly describes the conditions under which courts can
overrule even binding precedent. They may do so when "the reasoning of
a case is exposed as faulty, or [when] other exigent circumstances justify
it,"' but the court operates under a "burden of justification" that requires it to "ma[ke] convincingly clear" the "reasons for rejecting" the
precedent.'
In Hart, on the other hand, Judge Kozinski states that the courts discharge their obligations within the system of precedent when they "acknowledge[] and consider[]" "earlier authority."'" Further, "in the
absence of binding precedent," the court "may forge a different path
than suggested by prior authorities."'0 ' By virtue of his use of the term
89. Cf. 223 F.3d 898, 904 (8th Cir. 2000) (describing contrary argument that what the court did
"yesterday ... does not bind us today").
90. Id. at 905.
91. Id.

92. See supra text accompanying notes 53-55.

93. See supra text accompanying notes 74-81.
94. It is worth noting that Anastasoff involved precisely this situation: a prior decision, Christie v.
United States, No. 91-2375MN, 1992 U.S. App. Lexis 38446 (8th Cir. Mar. 20, 1992) (per curiam), was

indistinguishable, but the court's rule allowed, and Ms. Anastasoff urged, the court to disregard it. Anastasoff v. United States, 223 F. 3d 898, 899 (8th Cir. 2000). The court notes that Ms. Anastasoff made
no attempt to distinguish Christieand characterizes the two cases as involving "precisely the same legal
argument." Id. Christie is the "only case directly in point." Id.
95. Anastasoff, 223 F.3 d at 904 (emphasizing that Anastasoffdoes not create a "rigid doctrine of
eternal adherence" to precedent).
96. Cf. Frederick Schauer, Precedent,39 STAN. L. REV. 571, 594 (1987) (discussing process of distinguishing cases and noting that when the prior case is "simply different" there is "no relevant precedent to follow").
97. 223 F.3d at 904-05.
98. Id. at 905; see also Robel, supra note 18, at 400.
99. Anastasoff, 223 F.3 d at 905.
ioo. Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155, 1170 (9th Cit. 2001).
ioi. Id.
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"authorities," Judge Kozinski's view seems at once broader and narrower
than Judge Arnold's. In speaking of "prior" (but not necessarily "binding") "authorities," Judge Kozinski suggests that the court should consider a wide range of writings, including, perhaps, decisions of inferior or
unrelated courts 1"2 and "even ...non-case authorities, such as treatises

and law review articles.'. 3 This process is extensive, but discretionary. 4
Conversely, "caselaw on point is the law"'0" and such "binding authority
must be followed unless and until overruled by a body competent to do
so.' ',i 6 If prior decisions create "binding precedent" only when the deciding court intends them to do so,"'° and when the court intends that result
in only some sixteen percent of its merits decisions,"'" the narrow ambit
of binding precedent in Judge Kozinski's view becomes clear. It is only
this relative handful of cases to which subsequent courts must defer.
Prior decisions of the court, even if indistinguishable, do not bind the
court unless the deciding court labeled them "precedential."

at 1 169-7o.
lO3. Id. at 1170. In Anastasoff, Judge Arnold does not discuss other authorities, only judicial decisions, and implicitly only those of the court itself. The Committee Note of the Advisory Committee on
Appellate Rules, accompanying proposed new Rule 32.1 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure,
states that "[p]arties have long been able to cite in the courts of appeals an infinite variety of sources
solely for their persuasive value." See attachment to Memorandum from Judge Samuel A. Alito, Jr., to
Judge Anthony J. Sirica 32 (May 22, 2003), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/appo8o3.pdf.
The Committee further notes that "it is difficult to justify a system that permits parties to bring to a
court's attention virtually every written or spoken word in existence except those contained in the
court's own 'unpublished' opinions." Id. at 33. Judges opposed to adoption of the proposed rule maintain that unpublished opinions cannot be likened to other persuasive authorities. See, e.g., Letter from
Judge Diarmuid F. O'Scannlain, to Peter G. McCabe, Sec'y, Comm. on Rules of Prac. & Proc. 3 (Feb.
5, 2004), available at http://www.secretjustice.org/new proposedjfrap-32-1.htm#complete-list-public
-comments (stating that the "only reason litigants have any interest in citing an unpublished opinion is
because such authorities bear the imprimatur of an Article III appellate panel"); Letter from Judge
Alex Kozinski, to Judge Samuel A. Alito, Jr. 3 (Jan. I6,2004), availableat http://www.nonpublication
.com/kozinskiletter.pdf (stating that "[u]nlike law review articles, opinions of district courts and other
nonbinding authorities, unpublished dispositions of the circuit are seldom dismissed as inconsequential, yet they should be"); Letter from Judge William C. Canby, Jr., to Peter G. McCabe, Sec'y, Comm.
on Rules of Prac. & Proc. 2 (Jan. 8, 2004), availableat http://www.secretjustice.org/new-proposed-frap
_32_I.htm#complete-list-public comments (noting that "[t]o cite, even supposedly for persuasive
value, is to ask us to follow our decision").
104. Hart, 266 F.3d at 1169 (stating that when "ruling on a novel issue of law, [courts] will generally
consider" other authorities) (emphasis added). Of course, if an issue is truly novel, the court by definition has no precedent of its own to follow.
IO5. Id. at 1170.
io6. Id.
102. Id.

IO7. See supra text accompanying notes 58-62.
1o8. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED

39 tbl.S-3 (reporting Ninth Circuit's use of unpublished opinions or orders in 83.9% of cases terminated on the merits during the year ending on
September 30, 2002) [hereinafter 2002 ANNUAL REPORT].
STATES COURTS: 2002 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR
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THE APPLICATION OF THE PRIOR PANEL RULE

Both Anastasoff and Hart recite the court's duty to follow binding
precedent" (however that term is defined), and both acknowledge that,
for the courts of appeals, once a panel of the court has resolved an issue,
the decision can be overruled only by the en banc court or the Supreme
Court.' ° This apparent agreement dissolves, however, when one recalls
the two opinions' divergent definitions of "binding" precedent. The Anastasoff decision reveals Judge Arnold's view that the prior panel rule
binds subsequent panels in all cases controlling on the basis of identity of
facts and issues, regardless of whether the prior decision was published
or unpublished."' In fact, statements of the prior panel rule frequently
omit any qualification based on the type of opinion issued." 2 The Hart
opinion explicitly disagrees, characterizing the prior panel rule as applying only
when a panel has "resolve[d] an issue in a precedential opin3
ion."'1
F.

SUMMARY

Anastasoff and Hart articulate sharply divergent conceptions of the
nature and operation of precedent in the federal courts of appeals. Each
view is internally consistent. The system of precedent described in Anastasoff is one in which every decision of the court is an act of lawmaking,
and the creation of precedent is inherent in the act of decision. The decision of a case is, fundamentally, its result, and the result generally determines the scope of the precedent. Subsequent panels must follow prior
decisions in all cases where the identity of facts and issues between the
prior and subsequent cases makes the precedent "binding," regardless of
the publication or non-publication of the prior decision. Hart describes a
system of precedent in which the court decides for itself which cases call
for lawmaking (as opposed to simple review for error). The court intentionally determines which of its decisions create precedent. When the
court establishes a precedent, the precedent consists not only of the result, but also of the reasons given and the precise language the deciding
court employed. Subsequent panels are obliged to consider a range of au-

IO9. Anastasoff v. United States, 223 F.3d 898, goo (8th Cir. 2000); Hart, 266 F.3 d at

1170.

I5O.Anastasoff, 223 F.3d at 904: Hart, 266 F.3d at 1171. A third possibility, of course, is for the
decision to be overruled by statute. See, e.g.. Maine General Med. Ctr. v. Shalala, 205 F.3d 493, 499

(ist. Cir. 2000) (stating that case had not "been subsequently overruled by statute").
Iit. See 223 F.3d at 905 (stating that rule allowing the court to "depart from ... prior decisions
without any reason to differentiate the cases" is unconstitutional).
112. See, e.g., Hellman, supra note 75, at 935 (referring to Ninth Circuit's rule and stating that the
"rule of intracircuit stare decisis" provides that "panel decisions bind subsequent panels unless overruled by the court en banc").
113. 266 F. 3d at 1171 (emphasis added).
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thorities in deciding later cases, but are bound to follow the decisions of
prior panels only when they were originally designated as "precedential."
In Anastasoff and Hart, the Eighth and Ninth Circuits both analyzed
the merits of limited publication and no-citation rules, and came to different conclusions. Along the way, the two circuits disagreed about virtually every aspect of precedent as it operates in the federal courts of
appeals. Analysis of these rules must proceed within the context of the
system of precedent, which the rules explicitly invoke. The next step in
developing a better understanding of the rules is to examine how precedent works.
II. THE DOCTRINE OF PRECEDENT

A complete account of the modern doctrine of precedent, much less
of its historical roots, is outside the scope of this Article. But an understanding of how precedent works is critical to untangling the notion that
some decisions are "precedential" while others are not. Accordingly, this
Article draws on the literature of precedent to summarize a few key features.
Precedent serves multiple roles in our legal system, providing both
information and constraint. ' Chief among the difficulties in understanding precedent is that there is no single vantage point from which to examine it. Precedent is both backward-looking (when a court today looks to
the past for guidance)"' and forward-looking (when a court today con-6
templates the future ramifications of its decision in the instant case).1
The informational value of precedent looks backward."' The decisions of
the past provide information as to the likely consequences of actions undertaken today."8
Precedent's constraining effect operates in both directions. A rule of
precedent "direct[s] a decisionmaker to take prior decisions into account.""..9 The way earlier cases were decided limits the flexibility of the
current decisionmaker. 2 ° Relying on past decisions promotes fairness,
decisionmaking efficiency, and stability., On the other hand, a rule of
precedent requires today's decisionmaker "to commit [to] the future be114. See James Boyd White, What's an Opinion For?, 62 U. CHI. L. REv. 1363, 1367 (1995).
115. Schauer, supra note 96, at 572 (describing "use of yesterday's precedents in today's decisions").
I16. Id. at 572-73 (discussing need to "view today's decision as a precedent for tomorrow's decisionmakers").
117. Cf. id. at 572 (stating that traditional perspective on precedent looks backward).
i8. Id. at 597 (discussing justification of precedent on grounds of predictability).
119. ld. at 576.
120. Id. at 575; see also id. at 595-97 (discussing justification of precedent on grounds of fairness).
121. Id. at 595-6o2. (discussing fairness, efficiency, and stability).
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fore [he or she] get[s] there.' ' . As Llewellyn put it, "the opinion has
as ...its major office to show how like cases are properly to be decided
in the future. This ...affects the deciding of the cause in hand."'23 Today's judge must be willing to "stand to" today's result in future cases.' 24
Precedent's constraining influence promotes judicial accountability.'25 One of the most
familiar arguments for a system of precedent is
"public legitimacy. ,' 6 Precedent "fosters the appearanceof certainty and
impartiality by providing a seemingly neutral source of authority" to justify decisions and "[limiting] the actual impact which any single
judge.., has on the shape of the law."'2 . The system of precedent "standardizes" decisions, "dampen[ing] the variability that would otherwise
result from dissimilar decisionmakers. '' 28 By minimizing inconsistency in
decisions, the system of precedent "may generally strengthen [the] decisionmaking environment as an institution.' ' 9
The system of precedent does more than merely promote the appearance of just decisionmaking. Checks on the power of courts "come
from two principal sources" 3 ': the review power of superior courts, and
the ability of lawyers, scholars, and the public to comment on decisions.
The idea is that bad decisions will be rooted out either on review by a
higher court or as their quality is determined in a "free market" of decisions. Both mechanisms depend on the availability of a record of the decision. The general notion of decision according to precedent antedates
the regular publication of decisions, 3 ' and publication may "have nothing
to do with the authoritative effect of any court decision.'. 32 But given the
vast number of decisions rendered each year, the system of precedent today cannot function in the absence of generally available decisions."'
122. Id. at 573; see also id. at 590 (stating that "[a]ccepting the constraints of precedent thus entails
taking into account an array of instances broader than the one immediately before the decisionmaker"); Frederick Schauer, Giving Reasons, 47 STAN. L. REV. 633, 644 (1995) (discussing commitment
effect of giving reasons for a decision).
123. KARL LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADMON

26 (I96o).

.

124. Id. See also Schauer, supra note 96, at 590 Schauer has acknowledged the tension between

committing to a result in future cases and avoiding advisory opinions. Schauer, supra note 122, at 655.
125. See, e.g., Reynolds & Richman, supra note 12, at 120-24; Cappalli, supra note 8, at 789.
126. Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Stare Decisis and JudicialRestraint,N.Y. ST. B. J. I5, i8 (July 19o) (referring to decisions of United States Supreme Court).
127. Earl Maltz, The Nature of Precedent, 66 N.C. L. REv. 367, 371 (1988).
128. Schauer, supra note 96, at 6o0.
129.

Id.
Reynolds & Richman, supra note

12, at 1202.
131. Anastasoff v. United States, 223 F. 3d 898, 903 (8th Cir. 2000) (stating that the doctrine of
precedent was well-established in the late eighteenth century despite the absence of a reporting system).
132. Id. at 904.
133. Dragich, supra note 14, at 770-75 (discussing role of opinions in development of law).
53o.
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Unless decisions are available, the information required to hold courts
accountable for their decisions is lacking.
Precedent also imposes costs. Deciding according to precedent may
cause decisionmakers to "ignore fine but justifiable differences in the
pursuit of large similarities."' 34 It also ties the consideration of future
cases to the imperfect decisions of the past, 35 giving "undue weight to the
first case to raise a particular issue."' 3 In some cases, "the best decision
within a regime of precedent is nevertheless a suboptimal decision for
the case at hand."' 37 Nevertheless, "reliance on precedent is one of the39
distinctive features of the American judicial system."': Both Anastasoffand Hart" invoke the concept of precedent and assume that it shapes the
decisionmaking process of the courts of appeals. The limited publication
and no-citation rules, too, are rooted in the concept of precedent.' 4
This Part explores the nature of decision according to precedent to
lay the foundation for an argument that the courts of appeals, in adopting limited publication and no-citation rules, have taken an incomplete
view of the way precedent matters. Three relatively recent articles'42 consider the operation of precedent in broader terms and provide some
guidance for the present inquiry, though none considers the notion of
"non-precedential precedent."
A.

THE NATURE OF A "PRECEDENT"

As one scholar notes, the theory of precedent itself, although the
"core'' 4 3 of our judicial system, remains underdeveloped.'" The very
terminology used to describe the nature or effect of a precedent is confusing and often inconsistent.' 45 Contemporary usage tends to "conflate
134. Schauer, supra note 96, at 595.
135. Cooper & Berman, supra note 5, at 722-23.
136. Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155, 1175 (9th Cir. 2001).
137. Schauer, supra note 96, at 590.
138. Maltz, supra note 127, at 367.
139. 223 F. 3d at 900-04.
140. 266 F. 3 d at 1 6o, 1163-69.
141. See sources cited supra note 9.
142. Alexander, supra note 13;Maltz, supra note 127; Schauer, supra note 96.
143. Alexander, supra note 13, at 3 (stating "the notion that the courts ordinarily should follow

precedent in deciding cases is one of the core structural features of adjudication in common-law legal
systems"); see also Price, supra note 35, at io6-o7 (stating that the "core idea of common-law court
systems is that what courts have done in the past, to some extent and to some degree, must at least be
considered when a similar case comes along").
144. Alexander, supra, note 13, at 3 (noting that "theoretical understanding of the practice" of
precedent "is still at a very primitive stage").
145. See 3d CIR. I.O.P. 5.2 ("An opinion.., is designated as precedential ... when it has preceden-

tial
or institutional value."); see also Barnett, supra note 35, at 9-12 (describing "binding precedent,"
"overrulable precedent," "precedent" or "precedential value," "persuasive value," and "citable prece-

May 20041

UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS

the ideas of precedent and stare decisis," though the two "are not entirely the same.' ' ' 46 This "conflation" of ideas may help to explain the
courts of 47appeals' adherence to no-citation rules despite long-standing
criticism. 1
I.

Precedent as Fact

In its simplest conception, a "precedent" is nothing more than a historical fact. As Price puts it, "precedent is simply the record of how
courts have decided prior cases.' ' 4498 Boggs and Brooks call this the
"common-law sense" of precedent. In this sense of the word, "'precedent' merely means that a particular case was once decided a particular
way," and no later court can change that fact.'5 ° Judge Arnold's account
of precedent as inherent in every decision is an expression of this view. "'
Read against this conception of precedent, no-citation rules seem
especially offensive. None of these rules forbids outright the citation of a
decision for preclusive effect, and to that very limited extent the rules acknowledge precedent as fact. But several of the rules prohibit citation for
than preclusive effect, or generally prohibit citation
any purpose other
"as precedent.' ' .2 These rules, it appears, concede the fact of a precedent
only within the same or closely related litigation; beyond that context the
fact of the precedent disappears. The essence of Judge Arnold's complaint in Anastasoff is that parties cannot inform the court of the fact of a
prior decision.
2.
Precedentas Rule
A broader conception of precedent regards it as a rule. On this view,
precedent is more than a simple fact; it is a fact that calls for a particular
Frederick Schauer describes precedent as a
type of response. Professor
"rule of relevance."'' 3 Deciding according to precedent "presupposes an

dent"); Robel, supra note 18, at 400 (describing practice of precedent as broader than linguistic formulations of rule).
146. Price, supra note 35, at tO5. "Stare decisis" refers to "a strict sense of the degree to which
courts are to be bound by precedent." Id. (emphasis added). In Price's view, the more general doctrine
of precedent requires, at a minimum, that courts consider what had been done in the past. Id. See also
Dragich, supra note 14, at 773 nn.8o-86 and sources cited therein (discussing orthodox and general
theories).
147. See supra notes 17-25 and accompanying text.

148. Price, supra note 35, at 88 (citing Judge Arnold in Anastasoff) (emphasis omitted).
149. Boggs & Brooks, supra note 26, at 23.
i5o. Id.

151. See supra text accompanying notes 53-55.
152. See sources cited supra note 9.
153. Schauer, supra note 96, at 576-79. Similarly, Harrison likens rules of precedent to "rules of
evidence for questions of law rather than fact." John Harrison, The Power of Congress over the Rules
of Precedent, 5o DUKE L. J. 503,512 (2000).
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ability to identify the relevant precedent."'54 Though all prior decisions
are precedents in fact, not all are relevant precedents for a given later
decision. Instead, prior decisions are "precedent" for a later decision
only if the "past [decision] is sufficiently similar to the present facts to
justify assimilation" of the two. 5s Thus, precedent in this sense depends
on the characterization of the earlier case.' 56
In this conception, precedent provides both information and (at least
potentially) constraint. Stare decisis is the narrowest and most constraining form of the rule of precedent. It dictates that once a matter is decided, it should stand undisturbed.'57 As distinguished from the general
doctrine of precedent, stare decisis makes a single decision "'binding' authority."'' 8 Stare decisis applies "to any subsequent case that is 'on all
fours' with the prior decision.

'

59

Thus, within a very narrow range of

cases (assuming that the same facts very rarely arise again' 6° ) stare decisis
exerts a powerful constraint. Looking backwards, it requires that today's
decision come out the same as the prior one, even if the prior decision is
believed to be erroneous, 6 ' unless the present court chooses (and has the
power) to overrule the prior decision. 6 ' Looking forward, it requires today's decisionmaker to commit to the same result in future, indistinguishable cases.
As just noted, identical cases are rare. But Anastasoff involved just
such a situation.' 63 Because the two cases could not be distinguished,
Judge Arnold regarded Christie as binding on Anastasoff. Commentators,' 64 including Judge Kozinski,' 65 seem to read more into Anastasoff

154.
155.
156.
157.

Schauer, supra note 96, at 576-77.
Id. at 577.
Id.

i8 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 134.01()
3d ed. 2004) [herinafter MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE].

(Coquillette et al. eds.,

158. Frederick G. Kempin, Jr., Precedentand Stare Decisis: The CriticalYears, i8oo-1850, 3 AM. J.

LEO. HIsT. 28, 29 (i959); see also Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155, II68 (9th Cir. 2001); Dragich, supra
note 14, at 773 (discussing evolution of precedent and stare decisis); Price, supra note 35, at io5 (stare
decisis refers to a "strict sense of the degree to which courts are to be bound" by precedent).
159. 18 MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 157, § 134.03(1) (citing cases).
16o. Schauer, supra note 96, at 578.
161. Cf. Caleb Nelson, Stare Decisis and Demonstrably Erroneous Precedents, 87 VA. L. REV. 1,
103 (2001) (considering whether more than mere demonstration of error should be required for Supreme Court to overrule its prior decisions).
162. Anastasoff v. United States, 223 F. 3d 898, 904 (8th Cir. 2000); Hart, 266 F.3d at t17o; see also
18 MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 157, § 134.02(i)(a).
163. 223 F. 3d at 899 (describing the Christiedecision).
164. See, e.g., Cooper & Berman, supra note 5, at 748 (suggesting that Anastasoff precludes "any
treatment of unpublished opinions as other than binding precedent") (emphasis added).
165. Hart,266 F. 3d at I163 (suggesting that, "to adopt Anastasoffs position, we would have to be
satisfied ... that all judicial decisions necessarily served as binding authority on later courts" (empha-
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than is really there. Anastasoff rejects courts' power to deny, in advance,
that the case is a "precedent" even if an identical case arises later. In
other words, Anastasoff reads the limited publication and no-citation
rules as an attempt to evade the constraint of precedent,'6 and holds
them unconstitutional on that ground.'6
Defenders of the rules seem to assume that if a decision is acknowledged at the time it is issued to have "precedential effect," the decision
becomes "binding" in an unusually broad or strict way.'6 This is one way
the no-citation rules reflect an inaccurate understanding of precedent.'
No decision of the courts of appeals (or any other court), no matter what
the court calls it, is anything more than potentially or "presumptively""'7
binding upon subsequent courts at the time it is issued. Indeed, only the
later court can make that determination.'
B.

THE INFLUENCE OF A "PRECEDENT"

The doctrine of precedent merely establishes a presumption that the
decision matters in similar cases that may arise later.'72 How, and how
much, it matters is a separate question governed by the analysis that delineates the actual influence of a precedent: the identity between the
cases. This section explores that concept."'
sis added)). Nowhere does Judge Kozinski acknowledge the effect of identity (or lack thereof ) between the cases.
i66. Cf. Schauer, supra note 96, at 589 (discussing "presumptively binding" nature of today's decisions on future decisionmakers).
167. See Price, supra note 35, at 1 17 (noting that Anastasoff leaves courts "free to overrule precedent" (i.e., looking backward at a prior case) but not to "assert" (i.e., looking forward) "that their decisions are not precedent").
I68. See, e.g., Hart,266 F. 3d at 1 18o (dismissing the idea that courts must "make binding law every
time [they] issue a merits decision"); id. at 1175-76 (reciting problematic consequences of creating
binding precedent).
169. See, e.g., supra notes 8-9 (citing the rules describing precedential value and limiting or prohibiting citation in future cases); see also Hart, 266 F. 3d at i8o (asserting that deciding court can, and
should decide in advance which of its decisions will bind future panels); id. at 1179 n.39 (describing
Anastasoff as suggesting that "appointment of more judges would enable courts to write binding opinions in every case" (emphases added)).
170. Schauer, supra note 96, at 589.
171. See, e.g., Oona A. Hathaway, Path Dependence in the Law: The Course and Pattern of Legal
Change in a Common Law System, 86 IOWA L. REv. 6OI, 624 (2ooi); Maltz, supra note 127, at 372.
172. See, e.g., Harrison, supra note 153, at 512 (comparing precedent to evidentiary presumptions);
Hathaway, supra note 171, at 624 (stating that precedents "fix the point of departure"); Nelson, supra
note 16i, at i (stating that "American courts of last resort recognize a rebuttable presumption against
overruling their own past decisions"); Price, supra note 35, at io5 (stating that precedent is a "beginning point" in analysis); see also Robel, supra note i8, at 4oo (describing precedent as imposing a
"burden of justification"); Schauer, supra note 96, at 589 (discussing notion of precedent as "presumptively binding").
173. The relationship between the courts is also an important factor in determining the influence
of a "precedent." See infra Part III.B for an examination of this factor. A third factor, critical to de-
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i.
The Identity Between the Cases
Schauer explains that "[i]n order to assess what is a precedent for
what, we must engage in some determination of the relevant similarities
between the two [cases]." 74 He elaborates:
No two events are exactly alike. For a decision to be precedent for
another decision does not require that the facts of the earlier and the
later cases be absolutely identical. Were that required, nothing would
be a precedent for anything else.... [T]he relevance of an earlier
precedent depends upon how we characterize the facts arising in the
earlier case.
Thus, the "power of a precedent" is an "issue... of assimilation." ,76The
constraint of precedent is "not... an all-or-nothing affair.""'

For a precedent to exert a constraining influence, we must be able to
group the prior decision and the subsequent case together into some
meaningful category. I" 8 The smaller the category into which the two
events fit (or the greater the similarity between the two cases), the
stronger the influence of the prior decision over the later case.'79 This
concept finds expression in the notion that a precedent is "binding" when
the cases are "on all fours ' ' ""'but otherwise may be distinguished away.""
If the system of precedent operates this way, one thing that matters is
how the precedent court characterizes its decision.'s It is harder to distinguish a precedent described in broad, general terms (i.e., encompassing a larger category of events) and easier to distinguish one described
more narrowly.' Likewise, it is easier to expand a narrow decision later
than to contract the reach of a broader one."
termining the actual influence of a precedent, involves the scope of the precedent. See supra Part I.C.
The question is whether it is the result of the decision alone, or the result plus the reasons or the rule
formulated by the decision, that binds later cases. This factor sometimes is expressed in terms of identifying the holding of a case, and the ratio decidendi, and isolating them from "mere dictum." See generally 18 MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 157, § 134.03(2)-(5). Consideration of this factor is
outside the scope of this Article. For a thorough analysis, see Alexander, supra note 13.
174. Schauer, supra note 96, at 577.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 579.
177. Id. at 591. See also Mitu Gulati & C.M.A. McCauliff, On Not Making Law, L. & CONTEMP.
PROB. 157. 162 (Summer 1998) (noting that "real distinction ... is the distinction between those opinions having substantialprecedential value and those that do not").
178. Schauer, supra note 96, at 591.
179. Id. at 596; see also id. at 591, 594-95 (explaining that weight or strength of a precedent depends on the size or generality of the category).
18o. See Schauer, supra note 96, at 577.
181. Id. at 594 (stating that when a later case is "simply different ... there is actually no relevant
precedent to follow").
182.

Id.

183. Id. at 594-95.
184. Id. at 58o n.i9.
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These ideas form the basis for determining the separate roles of the
precedent court ' and the subsequent court '86 in the operation of the system of precedent. For simplicity, assume that the precedent court confronts a true case of first impression. The court's obligation is to decide
the case, looking to whatever external sources of law may be available
and likely exercising considerable discretion.' The court may justify its
result in an opinion,' articulating a characterization of its decision.' 9 Before it does so, "no single authoritative characterization presents itself."'" Rather, many alternative characterizations are possible. 9'
Articulating a characterization is like formulating a rule.9 So is giving
reasons.'93 In so doing, decisionmakers "commit themselves"'94 to "act in
conformity"'9 " with the characterization or the reasons in cases "encompassed" by them.9 This is the forward-looking commitment the courts of
appeals apparently wish to avoid making when they label their decisions
"not precedential." But the no-citation rules seemingly disavow the constraining influence even of the bare result 97 by forbidding litigants to inform the court of its prior decisions." In this respect, the rules overstate
the proper role of the precedent court. The precedent court is entitled to
choose whether and how to characterize its decision; it may choose a
characterization that is likely to constrain future courts very broadly or
very narrowly."9 But the precedent court may not, consistent with the
doctrine of precedent, decide "for one place and time only."2"
185. I use the term "precedent court" to refer to a court that has decided a particular matter. The
"precedent court" is not necessarily the first court ever to have decided the issue, but its decision is
earlier in time than those of other courts that subsequently address the same issue.
186. I use the term "subsequent court" to refer to a court that decides an issue already addressed
by prior panels or courts. The subsequent court does not start with a blank slate; at least one decision
already exists regarding the issue at bar.
187. Cf. Nelson, supra note 161, at 4 (describing discretion available to judges deciding cases of
first impression).
188. See Dragich, supra note 14, at 776 (discussing role of opinions).
189. Schauer, supra note 96, at 579.
19o. Id. at 581.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Schauer, supra note 122, at 651; see also id. at 641 (stating that "to provide a reason for a decision is to include that decision within a principle of greater generality than the decision itself").
194. Id. at 657.
195. Id. at 645.
196. Id. at 644.
197. Cf. Schauer, supra note 96, at 572 n.4, 573 (discussing difficulty of separating decision from
canonical language surrounding it).
198. This is clearly the import of Judge Arnold's complaint in Anastasoff. See Anastasoff v. United
States, 223 F.3d 898, 904 (8th Cir. 2000).
199. Cf. Schauer, supra note 96, at 579 (explaining how one who wishes to set a precedent, or to
avoid setting one, can determine how to characterize the decision). "Even a mere statement of facts
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The condition of identity between the cases creates an important
role for the subsequent court as well. Though the simplest description of
the subsequent court's role is to follow precedent, the task is more complex."' The condition upon which the "bindingness" of precedent rests is
similarity;"' "some decisions, even within a given jurisdictional ambit,
must be followed while others.., might carry with them some lesser
force. 2.3 Thus, the "idea of precedent as a constraint" is distinct from the
"idea of precedent as absolutely binding."2 4 Precedent provides the subsequent court with "one" reason (perhaps a very powerful one") for deciding the later case a particular way, but it may not provide a
"conclusive" reason."06
2.
The Role of the Subsequent Court
Precedent is the starting point for the subsequent court." The subsequent court is obligated, at a minimum, to "acknowledge[] and consider[]" relevant authorities.8 But as Maltz forcefully puts it, "[aIn
uncontrovertible answer to the question of which factual differences are
relevant to a case's precedential impact cannot be obtained until the
precedent case is actually interpreted by later courts."" 9
The characterization of the prior decision by the precedent court
sets some boundaries of constraint.2 "0 Within these boundaries, it is up to
the subsequent court to recharacterize the earlier decision in light of the
subtle differences presented by the instant case."' Accordingly, it is the
subsequent court, not the precedent court, that ultimately determines the

is... a characterization," albeit of the narrowest, least-constraining kind. Id. at 581; see also PHILIP C.
KiSSAM, THE DISCIPLINE OF LAW SCHOOLS: THE MAKING OF MODERN LAWYERS 8 n.23 (2003) and sources

cited therein (discussing ability to interpret precedents broadly or narrowly); Schauer, supra note 96 at
574 (stating that "even an uncharacterized precedent can influence the future").
200. Anastasoff, 223 F. 3d at 904.

201. Maltz, supra note 127, at 372.
202. Schauer, supra note 96, at 594.
203. Id. at 592.
204. Id. at 593.
205. Id. at 575 (stating that the mere "fact that something was decided before gives it present
value" even if we now "belie[ve] that the previous decision was erroneous").
206. Id. at 592.
207. See sources cited supra note 172.
o
208. Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155, 1169-7 (9th Cir. 2001) (discussing courts ruling on "novel

issues of law").
209. Maltz, supra note 127, at 372; see also Cappalli, supra note 8, at 773.

2io. Cf. Schauer, supra note 96, at 580.
211. See, e.g., Cappalli, supra note 8, at 768-69; Hathaway, supra note 171, at 624 (describing ways
courts may interpret a prior decision); id. at 574 (stating that "the process of characterizing a decision
does not end with its first formulation" but rather it is "necessarily and continuously reinterpret[ed]").
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extent to which it is bound by the earlier decision.Y Put another way, the
subsequent court can often know at the time of decision that a particular
case will establish a new precedent, but it cannot know which decisions
will not prove useful in the future.
The limited publication and no-citation rules seem to deny the subsequent court's role. Two reasons seem to be at work. The first is an implicit premise of the rules, that large numbers of cases are identical (or at
least indistinguishable). Many of the rules speak in terms of decisions
that add nothing to the law."' Defenders of the rules assert that opinions
that merely decide cases, correct lower courts, and explain results to the
parties "have [no] value... to the public at large." ' 4 Judge Kozinski describes unpublished opinions as a "torrent" of decisions "materially indistinguishable from.., prior published opinions. ' 15 If required to be
published, they would "clutter up" the law with "redundant and unhelpful authority.,,,6
Commentators refute the contention that purely "dispute-settling"
opinions have no value. On the contrary, unpublished opinions are relevant to attorneys and judges attempting to work within a system of
precedent. Reynolds and Richman assert that even these opinions are
"important" elaborations of the law, contributing to the "vital" process
of "fleshing out [the law] by application of principle to different facts.... 7
Indeed, as Judge Kozinski admits, "small differences ... can have signifi-8
cantly different implications when read in light of future fact patterns.21
In fact, "unpublished decisions are a particularly useful means of deter-

212. Judge Kozinski admits this much. Hart,266 F. 3d at 1172 (discussing "controlling" authority, a
status he denies to unpublished opinions).
213. See, e.g., 5ST CIR. R. 36(b)(i) (allows nonpublication of case that does not articulate a new
rule of law); 3D CIR. I.O.P. 5.3 (allows opinions that have value only to the parties to be designated not
precedential); 4TH CIR. R. 36(a) (requires opinion to be published only if it establishes, alters, or modifies a rule of law); 5TH CIR. R. 47 (same); 6TH CIR. R. 206 (same); 7TH CIR. R. 53(c)(I) (same); 8TH CIR.
I.O.P. Appx. i (similar); 9TH CIR. R. 36-2 (similar); IITH CIR. R. 36-3 I.O.P. 5 (states policy that unlimited proliferation of published opinions is undesirable); D.C. CIR. R. 36(a)(2) (requiring publication of
opinions in cases of first impression, cases that alter or modify existing law, etc.). Three circuits allow
disposition without written opinion in certain circumstances, but do not speak directly in terms of redundancy in the law. See 2D CIR. R. 0.23 (written opinion not required if no jurisprudential purpose
would be served by it); IOTH CIR. R. 36.1 (need not write opinions in cases that do not require application of new points of law); FED. CIR. R. 36 (opinion not required when judgment below is based on
findings that are not clearly erroneous, etc.).
214. Kirt Shuldberg, Comment, Digital Influence: Technology and Unpublished Opinions in the
Federal Courts of Appeals, 85 CAL. L. REV. 541, 550 (1997).
215. Hart,266 F. 3 d at 1179.
216. Id.
217. Reynolds & Richman, supra note 12, at i i9o; see also Cappalli, supra note 8, at 768-69.
218. Hart,266 F. 3d at 1179.
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mining [the] actual practice" of a court. 219 Robel's" ° and Hannon's findings22' clearly demonstrate that attorneys and judges ascribe value to unpublished decisions. The recent actions of groups including the American
Bar Association... and the American College of Trial Lawyers2 3 confirm
these findings.
The second reason why no-citation rules deny the subsequent court
its role in the operation of precedent is a mistaken notion of the forwardlooking responsibilities of the precedent court. The rules are based on
the notion that the precedent court is entitled to fix the future "bindingness" (or lack thereof) of its decisions. This idea perverts the notion of
precedent as constraint. One way precedent constrains today's decisionmakers is by requiring the current decisionmaker to "take into account
what would be best for some different but assimilable events yet to occur.
The decisionmaker must then decide on the basis of what is best for all of
the cases falling within the appropriate category of assimilation.2 2 4. As
Schauer puts it, today's decisionmaker makes a "commitment" to the future." 5 Looking to the future constrains by helping decisionmakers appreciate the reliance their decisions will generate and by making it less
likely that they will decide on the basis of such "illegitimate reasons" as
bias, self-interest, or haste226 The limited publication and no-citation

rules take the forward-looking constraint of precedent off the table by
removing any need to consider or commit to the future.
C.

SUMMARY

To summarize, "precedent" is in one sense a fact and in another
sense a rule. Limited publication and no-citation rules deny even the fact
of certain decisions as precedent, and they deny the application of precedent as rule even in identical cases where it cannot be avoided. The operation of precedent depends on the identity of the facts between the
prior and subsequent cases. The question of the identity between the
cases is one in which both the precedent court and the subsequent court
have important roles to play. The limited publication and no-citation
,
2I9. Powell v. Lambert, 357 F.3d 871 879 ( 9 th Cir. 2004) (emphasis added).
220. See Robel, supra note I8.

See Hannon, infra note 432.
222. See ABA MINIMUM STANDARDS, supra note 24, at 2 (calling for decisions which "at a mini221.

mum" set out the "operative facts of the case, the issues presented, and the legal basis for the ruling"
in all except wholly non-meritorious appeals).
223. ACTL Report, supra note 24, at 647 (stating that "all circuits should release their opinions for
publication" at least to online sources).
224. Schauer, supra note 96, at 589.
225. Schauer, supra note 122, at 657-58. Professor Schauer acknowledges the tension between this
notion of committing to the future and deciding only the present case. Id. at 655.
226. Id. at 657-58.
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rules overstate the role of the precedent court and understate the role of
the subsequent court.
III. THE REGIME OF PRECEDENT IN THE COURTS OF APPEALS
This Part explores features of the federal courts of appeals that directly affect the operation of precedent: the dual functions of these
courts, their division into independent circuits, and their "tradition" of
sitting in panels of three judges. 227The relationship between the precedent court and the subsequent court is ordinarily a straightforward matter,22 but is complicated in the federal courts of appeals because of their

complex structure. This structure has led to the adoption of strictures
such as the "law of the circuit" doctrine and "prior panel" rules that
shape the operation of precedent within the courts of appeals. The historical development of the courts of appeals, along with other changes in
the federal court system, have tended gradually to magnify the significance of courts of appeals decisions. This tendency contrasts with the circuits' limited publication and no-citation rules, which diminish (if not
nullify) the precedential effect of the vast majority of today's courts of
appeals decisions.
A.

DUAL FUNCTIONS

It is well established that the courts of appeals serve two distinct
functions: to review lower court decisions for error, and to make law." 9
Given the courts of appeals' mandatory jurisdiction,23 it is clear that the
error-correction function arises in every appeal filed. Part L.A above described a lively disagreement, however, about whether the lawmaking
function arises in all cases or only some. Many commentators have noted
the inherent tension between the two roles,23 ' a tension made more acute

227. W. Pac. R.R. Corp. v. W. Pac. R.R. Co., 345 U.S. 247 (1952) (quoting Reviser's Note to 28
U.S.C. § 46(c)). The Reviser's Note can be found at the end of 28 U.S.C. § 46 (946 ed., Suppl. V, vol.
1, p. 1576). The "tradition" is now codified in 28 U.S.C. § 46(c).
228. Alexander speaks in terms of three possible relationships. Vis-a-vis the "precedent" court, the
subsequent court may be a "constrained court of lower rank," a "constrained court of equal rank," or
an "unconstrained court" (one of higher rank than or outside the jurisdiction of the precedent court).
Alexander, supra note 13, at 53-54.
229. See, e.g., PAUL D. CARRINGTON ET AL., JUSTICE ON APPEAL 2-4 (1976); Cooper & Berman, supra
note 5, at 712.
230. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2000).
231. See, e.g., Cooper & Berman, supra note 5, at 717, 722. Cooper and Berman argue that the
courts of appeals are forced to accept the lawmaking role in cases that are atypical or poorly developed, again by virtue of their mandatory jurisdiction. Id. at 722. Reynolds and Richman state in a recent article that "circuit judges are minimizing their historic role as error correctors and emphasizing
their role as law makers." William M. Richman & William L. Reynolds, Elitism, Expediency, and the
New Certiorari:Requiem for the Learned Hand Tradition, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 273.293 (1996) (lament-
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by the increased caseload.232 This tension is further exacerbated by the
increasingly "remote" Supreme Court. 233But neither Congress nor the
Court has clearly defined the contours of the lawmaking function of the
courts of appeals.
i.

The Lawmaking Role

The Constitution makes the Supreme Court "supreme" and leaves it
to Congress to establish lower federal courts.2 34 The courts of appeals
trace their history to the Evarts Act of 189 i , which created the intermediate tier of federal appellate courts to relieve enormous backlog in the
Supreme Court.235 As a result of this legislation, the Supreme Court was
"transform[ed] from a law-declaring and error-correcting court into a
court almost exclusively for law declaring." 236 At the time of their creation, it seemed clear that the courts of appeals would serve primarily, if
not exclusively, the error-correction function.2 37 But later changes in the
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, eliminating almost all of that court's
mandatory appellate jurisdiction, have clouded the picture.23 Congress
has never defined the balance between the dual functions of the courts of
appeals, nor delineated the boundary (except hierarchically) between the
lawmaking roles of the courts of appeals and the Supreme Court. Congress has ratified developments within the courts of appeals that have
tended to solidify their lawmaking role, such as the power to decide cases
en banc.239

The Supreme Court famously declared that "[i]t is emphatically the
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is,""24
but like Congress, it has done little to clarify the division of lawmaking
responsibility between the Supreme Court and lower federal appellate
courts. It is clear that when the Supreme Court addresses an issue, the
courts of appeals' lawmaking role on that precise issue comes to an

ing the demise, despite courts of appeals' mandatory jurisdiction, of full traditional appellate process
in vast majority of appeals).
232. Dragich, supra note 50, at 28-29.
233. Amy Coney Barrett, Stare Decisis and Due Process, 74 U. COLO. L. REV. 101, 1047 (2003).
234. U.S. CONST. Art. III, §§ i,8. Congress has done so: 28 U.S.C. §41 currently constitutes the

circuits; 28 U.S.C. §43 establishes a "court of appeals" in each circuit; and 28 U.S.C.
courts jurisdiction over "all final decisions of the district courts."
235. Evarts Act, ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826 (189i); see Dragich, supra note 5o, at 20-21.

§1291

gives these

236. STRUCTURAL ALTERNATIVES REPORT, supra note 1, at 12.
237. Id.
238. Id. (citing Supreme Court Case Selection Act, Pub. L. No. 100-352, § 2, 102 Stat. 662 (1988)

(codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1254 (1988)).
239. See sources cited infra note 246.
240. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 177 (18o3).
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end.24 I What is less clear is the scope of the lawmaking role of the courts
of appeals when the Supreme Court has not resolved a particular issue.
In this situation, the lawmaking role of the courts of appeals is described
as provisional242 but often long-lasting. 43
The Supreme Court admits that the courts of appeals are effectively
the courts of last resort in the federal system and explicitly acknowledges
their lawmaking role. In Textile Mills,2" the Supreme Court emphasized
the importance of avoiding intra-circuit conflicts and promoting finality
of decisions. 45 The resolution of conflicts, in particular, is a law-making
function. Textile Mills held that it was permissible (despite the lack of
clear authorization in the statute) for a circuit to sit en banc to hear (or
rehear) and decide cases4 6 In United States v. American-ForeignSteamship Corp.,247 the Court described the function of en banc courts as providing "authoritative consideration and decision by those charged with
the.., development of the law of the circuit."" 8 The Court stressed that
en banc proceedings
enable the court to maintain its integrity as an institution by making it
possible for a majority of its judges always to control and thereby to
secure uniformity and continuity in its decisions, while enabling the
court at the same time to follow the efficient ... procedure of having
panels of three judges hear and decide the
249 vast majority of cases as to
which no division exists within the court.

This passage clearly recognizes the lawmaking role of the courts of
appeals. The question it raises is whether the lawmaking role arises only
in cases heard en banc. The Court stressed that en banc proceedings "are
241. U.S. CONST. Art. III, § i (making Supreme Court supreme); 28 U.S.C. § 1254 (providing for
review by Supreme Court of courts of appeals decisions). Cf. Appellate Procedure-Force of Prece-

dent- Ninth Circuit Holds that Three-Judge Panels May Declare Prior Cases Overruled When Intervening Supreme Court Precedent Undercuts Theory of Earlier Decisions- Miller v. Gammie, 335 F.3d 889
(9th Cir. 2003) (en banc), 117 HARV. L. REV. 719, 719 (2003) ("When the Court directly overrules a

decision of a court of appeals, it is agreed that the overruled decision loses the force of law.").
242. See, e.g., Henry J. Friendly, Foreward: The "Law of the Circuit" and All That, 46 ST. JOHN'S L.
REV. 406, 412 (1972) (describing circuit as making law "at least for a short time," unless and until the

Supreme Court rules).
243. Id. (discussing examples where circuit lawmaking endured for a long time in absence of any
further review).
244. Textile Mills Sec. Corp. v. Comm'r, 314 U.S. 326 (1949).

245. Id. at 335. On the other hand, the Textile Mills Court describes the "hearing and decision of
appeals" as the "most important function" of the courts of appeals. This function serves the errorcorrection role. Id. at 333.
246. Id. Congress ratified this interpretation in 1948 when it adopted 28 U.S.C. § 46(c). See supra
note 227.

247. 363 U.S. 685 (960).
248. Id. at 689.
249. Id. at 689-9o (quoting Albert B. Maris, Hearing & Rehearing Cases in Banc, 14 F.R.D. 91, 96
(1954)).
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the exception, not the rule" and are ordered "only [in] extraordinary circumstances.""25
The limited publication and no-citation rules rest on the premise
that not all decisions in fact make law. 5 ' If that is the case, one of the
most important functions of the courts of appeals is, as Judge Kozinski
suggests, separating lawmaking cases from the rest. Others question
whether it is proper for the courts of appeals to differentiate cases in this
manner. Reynolds and Richman wrote in 1978 that limited publication
rules effectively "transform[] the courts of appeals into certiorari courts,
a step hardly consistent with common understanding of congressional design."25 ' They predicted that the rules would "effect a pernicious diminu'
tion in both judicial responsibility and judicial accountability." 53
Those who promulgate and defend the rules must believe that the
courts of appeals sometimes-and at the discretion of the panel assigned
to hear the case-exercise only the error-correction function. The belief
that many cases are not even potentially lawmaking, and that their "precedential value" (or lack thereof) is properly determined at the time of
decision, is hard to reconcile with the operation of a system of precedent
as described above. In the first place, to the extent that precedent is simply an historical fact,254 the result in a purely error-correcting case would
be a precedent, though the rules deny it. Furthermore, to the extent that
precedent is described as a rule of relevance, 55 decisions are only potentially binding on future cases. Their actual influence is determined only
later, when they serve as the measure for later decisions. But the potential "bindingness" of today's decision is what constrains the decisionmaker. To declare in advance that a decision will have no "precedential
value," no matter how assimilable a later case may be, is to flout the notion of constraint by precedent under the guise of expediency in handling
cases deemed in advance as not of the lawmaking ilk.
2.
Identifying Lawmaking Cases
A critical premise in the argument for limited publication rules is
that judges can determine, before writing an opinion, whether the opinion would be "lawmaking. ' 2" Judge Kozinski clearly believes it is possi250. Id.at 689.
251. See supra note 253.

252. Reynolds & Richman, supra note 12, at 1201. The authors elaborate on this view in a recent
article. Richman & Reynolds, supra note 231.
253. Reynolds & Richman, supra note 12, at 1 199; see also id. at 1200-02 (discussing requirements

that courts decide cases consistently, develop and elaborate the law, and consider each case fully regardless of its apparently "routine" nature).
254. See supra Part II.A.i.
255. See supra Part II.A.2.
256. Reynolds & Richman, supra note 12, at 1191-92.
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ble to do so.257 Reynolds and Richman reject this premise, citing both the
views of judges who doubt their ability to make this determination"' and
evidence that "many lawmaking opinions are in fact going unpub-6 °
' That evidence has mounted in the years since they wrote.
lished."259
The Eighth Circuit panel's decision not to publish Christie, the unpublished case at issue in Anastasoff is just one example of a court's failure6
to identify a "lawmaking" decision that should have been published. ,
There are at least three reasons why "lawmaking" opinions may go unpublished.
First, in some circuits the publication rule itself may be at fault. Several circuits have articulated a presumption against publication; this presumption may cause judges to take a very narrow view of what is a
"lawmaking" case.'62 In addition, the rules of some circuits provide only
the most general guidance about which opinions should be published,
generally referring to those that "are lawmaking" or "have precedential
value" without defining those terms or providing more specific criteria.'63
Recently, two circuits have moved from very general publication rules to
highly specific ones264 These circuits may be acknowledging that the general criteria did not work well because it is difficult to determine which
opinions are "lawmaking." Moreover, Merritt and Brudney have found a
257. Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155, 118o (9th Cir. 2001).
258. Reynolds & Richman, supra note 12, at 1192 (quoting Justice Stevens, among others).
259. Id. at 1 192-93; see also Cappalli, supra note 8, at 797 (noting that "great numbers of appeals
have mistakenly been assigned to the fast track"); Gulati & McCauliff, supra note 177, at 162 (stating
that Third Circuit "may have used the [without-comment disposition] in some of its hardest cases").
26o. See, e.g., Robel, supra note 18, at 405-o8; Donald R. Songer, Nonpublication in the Eleventh
Circuit: An Empirical Analysis, 16 FLA. ST. L. REV. 963, 984 (1989) (concluding there is "serious
doubt" that "the official criteria [for publication] of opinions provide a meaningful guide to the
judges").
261. See 223 F. 3d at 899 (describing Christie as the only case on point and as indistinguishable
from Anastasoff itself); see also Murphy, supra note 18, at 1156 (describing courts' mistaken categorization of cases "as nonprecedents even though they are actually cases of first impression within [the]
circuit"); Robel, supra note 19, at 948-49 (detailing higher number of concurrences and dissents in
unpublished immigration opinions than in published ones, suggesting that unpublished cases were neither easy nor routine).
262. See 3DCIR. I.O.P. 5.3; 9TH CIR. R. 36-2; 1ITH CIR. R. 36-3 I.O.P. 5. The Fourth Circuit rule calls
for publication only in cases fully briefed and presented at oral argument, if additional criteria are met.
4TH CIR. R. 36(a). These circuits tend to be among the lowest in terms of percentage of opinions published. See 2002 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note io8, at 39 tbl.S-3. But the Fifth Circuit, with no stated
presumption against publication, is also a low publisher. Id. See also infra notes 417-419 and accompanying text.
263. See IST CIR. R. 36; 2D CIR. R. 0.23; 3D CIR. I.O.P. 5.2; IOTH CIR. R. 36.1; ItTH CIR. R. 36. Of
these circuits, the Third and Eleventh are low publishers, but the First and Second have tended to be
among the highest publishers. See 2002 ANNUAL REPORT, supranote io8, at 39 tbl.S-3.
264. See 5TH CIR. R. 47; 6TH CIR. R. 206. See also infra note 422. According to Reynolds and
Richman, the evolution of the rules since their inception has been in the direction of greater specificity. Reynolds & Richman, supra note 12, at 1176.
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correlation between publication rate and the rule's provision regarding
who makes the publication decision.6 They report that cases "resolved
in circuits requiring a majority consensus for publication.., were significantly more likely to be published than cases decided in circuits neglect-66
ing to specify the number of judges needed" to decide on publication?
*Reynolds and Richman forecast some of these effects.267
Second, even if the rules sufficiently guide publication decisions,
judges do not always apply them correctly.26 This would seem to have
been the case in Christie, which, as a case of first impression"' merited
publication under the Eighth Circuit's rule."' Commentators have recounted numerous other examples. 72
Third, in many cases the "precedential value" of a decision emerges
only later, when subsequent cases are measured against it.273 "Precedent
rests on similarity, 274 and the similarity of the instant decision to an asyet-unknown future case cannot be determined until the later case arises.
B.

STRUCTURE AND STRICTURES

It is well known that "under the norms of precedent with which we
are familiar, the authority of a judicial decision depends in part on the
appellate structure of the courts. 2 75 Precedent exerts its strongest influ-

265. Merritt & Brudney, supra note 15, at 89.
266. Id. at 89 n.66.
267. Reynolds & Richman, supra note 12, at 1176-79 (discussing publication criteria and decision
procedures).
268. See, e.g., Cappalli, supra note 8, at 791-92 (describing several empirical studies all showing
that significant number of reversals, dissents, and concurrences go unpublished, despite the fact that
disagreement on the panel indicates the cases are "controversial"); Dragich, supra note 14, at 790-91
(discussing unpublished opinions with dissents or concurrences, or reversing the lower court); Gulati
& McCauliff, supra note 177, at 165 (noting that non-publication and no-citation rules lack both policing mechanism and sanctions).
269. No. 91-2375MN, 1992 U.S. App. Lexis 38446 (8th Cir. Mar. 20, 1992) (per curiam).
270. 223 F. 3d at 899 (describing Christie as the only Eighth Circuit case directly on point).
27I. See 8th CIR. I.O.P. Appx. 1, § 4(A) (requiring publication of opinions that establish a new rule
of law). Indeed, "Christie... is ... a textbook example of an unpublished opinion that in fact ... does

announce a new rule of law." Williams v. Dallas Area Rapid Transit, 256 F.3d 260, 262 (5th Cir. 2001)
(Smith, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
272. See, e.g., Dragich, supra note 14, at 788-89; Robel, supra note i8, at 413-14 n.87.
273. See, e.g., Hathaway, supra note 171, at 624 (stating that determination of the "application of
precedent ... is solely the function of the court in the [subsequent] case"); Robel, supra note i8, at 410
(future value of opinions is "determined by consumers").
274. Schauer, supra note 96, at 587.
275. Harrison, supra note 153, at 511. Alexander speaks in terms of three possible relationships.

Vis-d-vis the "precedent" court or the "constraining" court, the subsequent court may be a "constrained court of lower rank," a "constrained court of equal rank," or an "unconstrained court" (one
of higher rank than or outside the jurisdiction of the precedent court). Alexander, supra note 13, at
53-54.
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ence when the subsequent court is of lower rank than the precedent
court.27 6 So, for example, federal district courts must follow the decisions
of the court of appeals,2" which are "binding" on lower federal courts
within their geographic or subject matter reach 8 This is the "vertical"
dimension of precedent." 9
Precedent also operates along a horizontal axis, requiring the same
court in subsequent cases to follow its own prior decisions. This "horzontal dimension" 18, is an "extremely complex" relationship, posing
more difficulties than the vertical dimension."" The horizontal dimension
of precedent helps ensure that a court rules consistently in similar cases.
Indeed, the uniformity justification for the doctrine of precedent is
thought to "appl[y] especially to horizontal ...precedent." ' 3 As Harrison notes, understanding the operation of horizontal precedent in the
courts of appeals is not easy.8 4 Two structural features of the courts of
appeals shape the regime of precedent: their division into thirteen independent circuits,8' and the provision that within each circuit the court sits
either in panels of three judges or en banc.26 Two questions require
analysis: whether the doctrine of precedent "operates throughout each
level" of the federal courts,"7 and how it operates on a multi-member
court that sits in smaller panels to decide cases. These questions, particularly the second one, play an important role in the debate over unpublished opinions and no-citation rules.•8
Horizontal precedent depends on the definition of the "court." The
general rule for a court confronting its own prior ruling is that while the
276. Cf. Hart v. Massanari, 266 F. 3d 1155, 1170 (9th Cir. 2001) (discussing federal district courts).
277. Id.
278. Id. See also Schauer, supra note 96, at 576.
279. Harrison, supra note 153, at 513 n.25. See generally Evan H. Caminker, Why Must Inferior
Courts Obey Superior Court Precedents?, 46 STAN. L. REV. 817 (1994). The vertical dimension of
precedent comes with a qualification in the case of the federal courts, such that federal district courts
are bound only by the decisions of the court of appeals of the circuit in which they are located. Harrison, supra note 153, at 51I. 28 U.S.C. § 41 (2000) establishes the number and composition of the circuits and specifies which states and territories are assigned to each.
28o. Harrison, supra note 153, at 513 n.25; see also Schauer, supra note 96, at 576 (differentiating
obligation of a court to follow its own prior decisions from the obligation of lower courts to follow the
decision of superior courts).
281. Id. at 513, n.25 (defining "horizontal stare decisis" as rule that a court must follow its own
precedents).
282. Michael C. Dorf, Dicta and Article 111, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1997, 2025 (1994).
283. Harrison, supra note 153, at 513.
284. Id. at 516-17.

285.
286.
287.
288.
289.

28 U.S.C. §§ 41. 43 (2o0o).
Id. § 46.
Harrison, supra note 153, at 516.
Id. at517.
See supra Part I.E.
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precedent is not absolutely binding, the court should "give considerable
weight to [its previous] decisions. 2 . This rule is easy to apply in the case
of a "unitary" court like the Supreme Court where all the judges participate in all the decisions. The situation is somewhat more complicated
when the court is divided into sub-units for decision. "Coordinate" or coequal courts operate independently and are not bound by each other's
decisions.29 ' As section III.B.i explains, the various circuits have been
treated as "coordinate" courts for purposes of the horizontal operation
of precedent within the federal intermediate appellate tier. Section
III.B.2 explains that while individual circuits ordinarily sit in panels, circuit panel decisions are treated as decisions of the whole "court."
i. Independent Circuits and the "Law of the Circuit"
Federal "circuits" have existed ever since Congress first provided for
inferior federal courts in the Judiciary Act of 1789,292 but their relevance
to the operation of precedent at the intermediate appellate level began
to emerge only when the courts of appeals were created in I89I.293 Only
then did circuit boundaries "define[] the territorial reach of appellate
court jurisdiction." 2 The details of how these courts would operate were
worked out over several decades after their creation.
As the new courts of appeals developed, they followed a model of
independence from each other. 95 Though they speak respectfully of their
"sister" circuits,9' these courts are firmly committed to the notion that
"the decisions of one circuit are not binding on other circuits."' 97 Early
on, federal appellate judges asserted that "it was their duty to independently examine questions of federal law even if the precise point had already been decided by another circuit court of appeals. ' ':9 The

290. Colby v. J.C. Penny Co., 8i F.2d 1119, 123 ( 7 th Cir. 1987).

291. Caminker, supra note 279, at 824-25 (describing the situation of the courts of appeals as follows: "[A] court can ignore precedents established by other courts so long as they lack revisory jurisdiction over it. Thus, a circuit court of appeals is not bound by decisions of coordinate circuit courts of
appeals.... ). See also Joseph F. Weis, Jr., Disconnecting the Overloaded Circuits-A Plug for a Unified Courtof Appeals, 39 ST. Louis U. L.J. 455, 459-60 (1995) (citing cases).
292. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § i, s Stat. 73. See STRUCTURAL ALTERNATIvES REPORT, supra note

i, at 7-28, for a history of the federal courts of appeals.
293. Id. at io-I I (describing creation of courts of appeals by Act of Mar. 3, 189I, 26 Stat. 826).
294. Id. at ii. The newest circuit, the Federal Circuit, is defined not geographically but by subjectmatter jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 41 (2ooo).
295. See Arthur D. Hellman, Precedent, Predictability,and FederalAppellate Structure, 6o U. Prir.
L. REV. 1029, 1039 (999) (describing "defining characteristics" of federal appellate structure, includ-

ing "jurisprudential[] independen[cej).
296. See, e.g., Walker v. O'Brien, 26 F.3d 626,634 (7th Cir. 2000).
297. Bonner v. City of Prichard, 66I F. 2d 12o6, 120 9 (1Ith Cir. 198i) (emphasis added).
298. Weis, supra note 291, at 459 (citing Heckendom v. United States., 162 F. I41, 143 (7th Cir.
19o8)).
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Heckendorn court relied on the Supreme Court's earlier statement that
judges must decide cases according to their own convictions, at least absent contrary Supreme Court precedent.' Though each circuit "draws to
some extent on other circuits' cases,"3" it is not at all uncommon for a
court of appeals decision to note that it is creating a conflict with the ruling of another circuit.3"' This is so even though the result may be that the
various circuits "will at times interpret the same statute in different
ways"3 ' or create other serious conflicts in federal law. 3
One consequence of the independence of the circuits is that they are
treated as "coordinate" courts not bound to follow each others' decisions." In fact, according to Judge Weis, the courts of appeals now focus
on circuit law, not federal law.3" 5 The doctrine of precedent applies within
each circuit, but not across circuit boundaries. Each circuit's decisions,
then, constitute the body of precedent for that circuit."' The "law of the
circuit" doctrine treats "decisions of the same circuit as authoritative,"
while treating "decisions of other circuits as no more than persuasive. '
As Judge Posner describes them, "the thirteen courts of appeals constitute at best a loose confederacy, brought under some semblance of unity
subjection to the ultimate authority of the Suonly by their 3common
8
preme Court."

This arrangement allows one circuit to regard its own panel decision
as more authoritative than the decision of another circuit, even if the latter were an en banc decision. 31 Consequently, inter-circuit conflicts de-

299. Id. (citing Mast, Foos & Co. v. Stover Mfg. Co., 177 U.S. 485, 488-89 (I9oo) (upholding Seventh Circuit's refusal to follow earlier decision by Eighth Circuit)).
300. Stephen L. Wasby, Intercircuit Conflicts in the Courts of Appeals, 63 MONT. L. REV. 119, 120
(2002).

301. See, e.g., Walker, 216 F.3d at 639 n.6; Midlantic Nat. Bank v. Hansen, 48 F.3d 693, 696-97 (3d
Cir. 1995); United States v. Stouffer, 986 F.2d 916, 929 (5th Cir. 1993); United States v. Rivieccio, 919
F.2d 812, 815 n.3 (2d Cir. i99o); see also Mary Garvey Algero, A Step in the Right Direction: Reducing
Intercircuit Conflicts by Strengthening the Value of Federal Appellate Court Decisions, 70 TENN. L. REV.
605, 607 (2003).

302. Critical Mass Energy Proj. v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 975 F.2d 871, 876 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
303. See generally Wasby, supra note 300; Weis, supra note 291, at 46o-61.
304. Cf. LaShawn A. v. Barry, 87 F.3d 1389, 1395 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (stating that "the-law-of-the-

circuit doctrine is derived from ... the structure of the federal courts of appeals"); see also supra note
291, and accompanying text.
305. Weis, supra note 291, at 460 (citing cases).

306. United States Supreme Court decisions are also precedent in every circuit, and so are state
supreme court decisions from states within the circuit in diversity cases. See Caminker, supra note 279,
at 824-25.
307. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM 380 (1996).

308. Id.
309. Cf. Cooper & Berman, supra note 5, at 721-22 (contrasting enduring significance of panel
decisions, even if rendered with participation of only one active judge of the circuit, with rarity of en
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velop, though the extent and consequences of such conflicts are debatable.310 Commentators have suggested a variety of ways to alleviate intercircuit conflicts, including adjusting the operation of precedent in the
courts of appeals so as to apply, at least in some circumstances, across
circuit boundaries."' For now, however, precedent operates horizontally
within each circuit, not across circuits. Implicit in this arrangement is the
obligation (confirmed by recognition of the power to sit en banc) to
maintain a body of circuit law to serve as precedent for future decisions.
That fact leads us to examine the internal decisional structure of the circuits.
2.

InternalStructure of the Courts of Appeals

Current federal statutes allow the courts of appeals to hear and decide cases sitting either in panels of three judges" ' or en banc.3 3 Neither
mode was ordained by the Evarts Act, which provided for three judges
on each newly constituted circuit court of appeals."4 At their inception,
these courts were unitary courts-all three judges participated in deciding each case." 5 Neither panels (to distribute the caseload) nor en banc
courts (to reconcile conflicting panel decisions) were necessary. Before
long, however, Congress added a fourth judge to some circuits.3' 6 At that
point, a statutory "anomal[y]" thus defined the "court" as having three
members, while authorizing four (or more) judges of the court." 7 This in-

advertent ambiguity 318 raised questions about how the courts of appeals
should be constituted to hear and decide cases.
banc review, involving participation of all (or many) active judges of the circuit, and implying that en
banc determinations are stronger authority by virtue of wider participation).
310. Professor Arthur Heilman has studied the matter extensively and reports little correlation
between circuit structure and unpredictability in federal law, for example. See Hellman, supra note
295, at Io86 (expressing doubt that "regime of national stare decisis ... would reduce contingency in
appellate outcomes").
311. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 307, at 38o-81.

312. 28 U.S.C. § 46(b) (2000). The panel may include the circuit Justice, active or retired judges of
the circuit, or judges of other circuits or of district courts, sitting by assignment. Id. at § 46(c).
313. Id. § 46(c). Circuits with more than 15 authorized active judges may sit en banc with "such
number of members" of the court participating "as may be prescribed by rule" of the court. Pub. L.
No. 95-486, § 6,92 Stat. 1633 (Oct. 20, 1978). The Ninth Circuit has established a limited en banc court
by rule. See 9TH C. R. 35-3.
314. Act of Mar. 3, i89i, ch. 5t7, § 2, 26 Stat. 826. For a brief history, see Steven Bennett & Christine Pembroke, "Mini" In Banc Proceedings:A Survey of Circuit Practices,34 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 531,
533-36 (1986).
315. See Textile Mills Sec. Corp. v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 314 U.S. 326, 328-30 (1941).

316. Bennett & Pembroke, supra note 314, at 534 (citing Act of Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, 36 Stat.
io87). The trend of adding judges as caseloads increased has continued without any modification in
the courts' structure (other than dividing the old Fifth Circuit into the new Fifth and Eleventh Circuits,
and creating the Federal Circuit). Cf Dragich, supranote 5o, at 46.
317. Textile Mills Sec. Corp., 314 U.S. at 329-30.
318. Id. at 333.

May 20041

UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS

a. Decision by Panels
In 1948, Congress enacted revisions to the statutes constituting the
courts of appeals, including a provision allowing the courts of appeals to
sit in panels.31 9 The Reviser's Note describes this provision as "continu[ing] the tradition of a three-judge appellate court and mak[ing] the
decision of a [panel], the decision of the court, unless rehearing in banc is
32
ordered.""
Whenever a multi-member court sits in panels or divisions,
"
the potential for conflicting decisions arises.32
' The consequences of the
panel structure of the federal courts of appeals were described recently
as follows:
The ...fact that only a small percentage of the active judges of a circuit actually hear any individual case has a profound impact on both
the error-correction and law-making functions of the courts of appeals.
Both when looking backward to correct claimed errors and when looking forward to develop the law, the courts of appeals necessarily operate in a fractured manner and thus necessarily assess claims of errors
with a fractured viewpoint and speak with a fractured voice. Only
when a court of appeals considers a case en banc can the litigant seeking correction of an error below, or the actors and courts seeking future legal guidance, be confident that the views, insights, and
judgments of all the members of the circuit court were brought to bear
on a particular case.322
The authors go on to state that because of the prior panel rules,
panel decisions "have, in a sense, more precedential weight than deci3 3
sions rendered by other courts within the federal judiciary""
even
324
though rendered by only a few of the active judges of a circuit.
Such comments highlight the importance of maintaining the consistency and coherence in the law of the circuit. Professor Hellman labels
32
intra-circuit conflict a "pernicious phenomenon,""
more troubling than
inter-circuit conflicts, presumably because the law of the circuit doctrine

319. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, § 46(c), 62 Stat. 871 (using term "divisions" in place of "panels").
320. See W. Pac. R.R. Corp. v. W. Pac. R.R. Co., 345 U.S. 247, 256 n.13 (953) (emphasis added)
(quoting Reviser's Note ). The Supreme Court in the Western Pacificcase endorsed this model for the
courts of appeals. Id.
321. See, e.g., Paul D. Carrington, The Obsolescence of the United States Courts of Appeals: Roscoe
Pound's StructuralSolution, 15 J.L. & POL. 515, 518-19 (1999) (describing "law of the circuit" as "illu-

sory" in view of rotating panels, infrequent en banc review, and unpublished decisions); Daniel
Meador, Afterword, 15 J. L. &POL. 567, 568-69 (1999) (describing similar).
322. Cooper & Berman, supra note 5,at 720.
323. Id. at 721 (comparing panel decisions to district court and Supreme Court decisions).
324. Id. at 720 (stating that it is "not uncommon for only two or even just one active judge of the
circuit to participate" on a given panel).
325. Arthur D. Hellman, Jumboism and Jurisprudence:The Theory and Practiceof Precedent in the
,
Large Appellate Court,56 U. CIH. L. REV. 541 543 (1989).
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gives rise to an expectation of uniformity of law within the circuit but not
beyond it.326 The en banc power is the only statutory mechanism allowing
the full court to control the law of the circuit.3"7 No other procedures for
maintaining intra-circuit consistency are required, although most circuits
have adopted one or more such mechanisms. 8 The en banc power and
other mechanisms to promote consistency are described in the following
sections.
b. En Banc Decisions
The courts of appeals occasionally sit en banc rather than in panels,
often to resolve inconsistencies in panel decisions. In 1941, the Court upheld the Third Circuit's rule allowing that court to sit en banc when the
court so directs by special order.329 Ordinarily, the Court said, a
"court... will consist of all the judges appointed to it, ' as the new
courts of appeals originally had. Providing for en banc review when the
court usually sits in panels "makes for more effective judicial administration"33' by establishing a means for resolving conflicts, among other
things. Congress ratified this result in 1948.332 En banc hearings or rehearings are allowed but never required, and now may be conducted by less
than the full complement of active circuit judges on large courts.333
The Court has made it clear that litigants have no right to appeal a
panel's decision.334 The Court gave wide latitude to the courts of appeals
to determine their en banc procedures, not even requiring these courts to
allow litigants to move for en banc rehearing.33 The en banc power is
seldom exercised. 336 Circuit judges express distaste for the procedure and
doubts as to its effectiveness,337 describing en banc hearings as "un-

wieldy," "time-consuming," "cumbersome," "expensive," and even as a

326. Cf. id. at 542 (discussing structure of federal courts and ascendancy of law of the circuit doctrine).
327. See supra text accompanying notes 242-249.
328. See Bennett & Pembroke, supra note 314, at 544-57 (describing mechanisms such as circulation of draft opinions).
329. Textile Mills Sec. Corp. v. Commissioner, 314 U.S. 326,334-35 (194).
330. Id. at 333.
331. Id. at 334-35.
332. See West. Pac. R.R. Corp. v. W. Pac. R.R. Co., 345 U.S. 247, 250-51 (953)

(citing 28 U.S.C.

§ 46(c) (948)).
333. 28 U.S.C. § 46(c) (2oo0).

334. 345 U.S. at 258 (denying that a horizontal appeal to en banc court is implicit in 28 U.S.C.
§ 46(c)).
335. Id. at 252.

336. Bennett & Pembroke, supra note 314, at 540; see also George, supra note 43, at 215 ("[The
courts of appeals resolve fewer than one percent of their cases en banc.").
337. See Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155, 1171-72, 1172 n.29 (9th Cir. 2001).
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"damned nuisance. ' 338 Importantly, the courts of appeals have stated that
they "do not take cases en banc merely because of disagreement with a
'
As
panel's decision," nor merely "to review a panel opinion for error."339
34
a result, panel decisions are significant and enduring, ' and unlikely to be
reviewed.34 '
c. PriorPanelRules
The courts of appeals have adopted rules making the decision of a
panel the decision of the court, absent en banc review.342 Prior panel rules
vest great power in three-judge panels, as can be seen in the AmericanForeign Steamship case.343 The Second Circuit panel hearing the case expressed considerable doubt as to the correctness of earlier Second Circuit
decisions that the district court had held controlling. 34 But the later panel
stated categorically that it would "not overrule these recent decisions of
other panels of the court."345 This has become the classic statement of the
"prior panel" rule.
Against the "assumption that the authority to develop doctrine is
vested in the court as a whole,' 46 prior panel rules reflect the view that
panels "are agents of the full court" and that "inaction by the full court
constitutes endorsement" of the panel's decision.347 When we speak of
circuit precedent we speak almost always of panel decisions. It is these
decisions to which the notion of horizontal precedent applies most often
in the courts of appeals. The prior panel rules strengthen the sense that
338. Id.
339. Id. (citing EEOC v. Ind. Bell Tel Co., 256 F. 3 d 516 ( 7 th Cir. 2001)).

340. Cf id. (arguing that use of unpublished opinions promotes institutional orderliness by reducing need for en banc review); see also Bennett & Pembroke, supra note 314, at 540. But see Carrington,
supra note 321, at 517 (law of the circuit is "transitory" because "the range of legal issues arising
within the appellate jurisdiction of the courts of appeals is limited," consisting mostly of cases requiring interpretation of "transitory texts" such as federal statutes and administrative regulations).
341. Dragich, supra note 14, at 767-68; George, supra note 43, at 272.

342. See, e.g., Anastasoff v. United States, 223 F.3d 898,905 (8th Cir. 2000); Hart, 266 F.3d, at 1171.
The need for such rules was explained by then-Judge Benjamin Cardozo as follows:
We have had ten judges, of whom only seven sit at a time. It happens again and
again, where the question is a close one, that a case which one week is decided
one way might be decided another way the next if it were then heard for the first
time. The situation would, however, be intolerable if the weekly changes in the
composition of the court were accompanied by changes in its rulings.
BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 149-150 (1921). See also Hellman, supra

note 325. at 545 n.

343.
344.
345346.
lated in

3 , 549.

United States v. American-Foreign Steamship Corp., 363 U.S. 685,688-9ot (I96O).
American-Foreign Steamship Corp. v. United States, 265 F.2d 136, 142 (2d Cir. 1958).
Id.
Harrison, supra note 153, at 536. This certainly is the assumption the Supreme Court articuTextile Mills Securities Corp. v. Commissioner, 314 U.S. 326, 333 (194). See George, supra

note 43, at 272.

347. Harrison, supra note 153, at 536.
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there is a "law of the circuit" even though the full court has not participated-at least formally--in most of the decisions. 8
d. Other Mechanisms to Promote Consistency
Most circuits have adopted one or more mechanisms to ensure
awareness of and to seek broader participation in panel decisions, so as
to promote uniformity in circuit law."4 These mechanisms may be described in local rules or internal operating procedures,35 or may simply
"
be practices of the court.35
' Generally, these mechanisms involve circulation of opinions, prior to issuance, to the full court,352 particularly where
an intra-circuit or inter-circuit conflict may be created or where the panel
wishes to overrule the decision of a prior panel.353 The Ninth Circuit has
adopted an elaborate inventory system that attempts to minimize intracircuit conflicts by assigning cases presenting the same issues to the same
panel.354 The rotation of judges on panels was also devised as a mechanism to promote continuity and consistency in circuit law.35 Now, however, the vast number of panel combinations may threaten coherent
development of circuit law."'

How effective these mechanisms are in securing broader participation in panel decisions357 or in avoiding conflicts"' s is uncertain. In earlier

days, these mechanisms would have been unnecessary because all (or
nearly all) opinions would have been published."9 Moreover, citation of
any opinion by the parties was allowed and could inform the court of
conflicting or persuasive cases.

348. See Carrington, supra note 321, at 518-19; Meador, supra note 321, at 568.

349. Bennett & Pembroke, supra note 314, at 544. Bennett and Pembroke term these procedures
"'mini' en banc proceedings." Id. I dislike that term because these mechanisms are not, in fact, "proceedings" of any kind but rather internal review processes, usually quite informal. See id. at 547 (describing mechanism used by Second Circuit); Cooper & Berman, supra note 5, at 691.
350. See, e.g., Bennett & Pembroke, supra note 314, at 544 (describing the Seventh Circuit).
351. See, e.g., id. at 552 (describing the Tenth Circuit).
352. Id. at 544 (describing Seventh Circuit's review process).
353. Id.
354. Hellman, supranote 325, at 547.
355. Cf. W. Pac. R.R. Corp. v. W. Pac. R.R. Co., 345 U.S. 247, 255-56 n.13 (I953); see also STRUCTURAL ALTERNATIVES REPORT, supra note I, at 30.

356. Hellman re-ounts discussions on this point, quoting Judge Kleinfeld as saying that "there are
over 3,000 combinations of judges who may wind up on panels" together in the Ninth Circuit. Hellman, supra note 295, at 1091-92.

357. See Bennett & Pembroke, supra note 314, at 565 (finding mechanisms for broader review effective).
358. See Hellman, supra note 325, at 548 (finding conflict-avoidance mechanisms not entirely effective).
359. See Richman & Reynolds, supra note 231, at 274-75.
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SUMMARY

As the effective courts of last resort in the federal court system, the
courts of appeals shoulder enormous responsibility for both correcting
error and developing federal law. At present, the Supreme Court is so
remote as to provide little guidance on most questions. The courts of appeals are under no obligation to follow each others' decisions; each circuit develops its own law. Yet the courts of appeals almost never sit en
banc to develop or reconcile circuit law. Prior panel rules require that a
subsequent panel within a circuit follow the ruling of a prior panel, even
if the precedent is believed erroneous. Thus, panel decisions have taken
on enormous significance.
At the same time, the vast majority of panel decisions are "unpublished," a status which in most circuits seriously undermines their precedential value. Limited publication and no-citation rules remove
unpublished decisions from the body of precedent in many circuits regardless of their similarity to future cases. Citizens are left with little
guidance from the Supreme Court, the en banc courts of appeals, or precedential decisions of circuit panels. The publication and citation rules
also interfere with the circuit's ability to maintain coherence and consistency in the law of the circuit, which in turn are required for the operation of horizontal precedent in the courts of appeals. The next Part of
this Article analyzes the proper place of unpublished opinions in a system based on precedent.
IV.

UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS AS PRECEDENT

Professor Schauer identified three questions as central to understanding a system of precedent36:
"What does it mean for a past event to be precedent for a current decision."'
"[H]ow does something we do today establish a precedent for the future? ' 362 and
' '363
When precedent matters, just how much should it matter?

The answers to these questions establish a basis for assessing the legitimacy and effectiveness of limited publication and, especially, no-citation
rules.

360. Schauer, supra note 96, at 571.
361. Id. See also Robel, supra note 18, at 400, for a similar discussion.
362. Schauer, supra note 96, at 571.
363. Id.
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A.

PAST EVENTS AS PRECEDENT FOR CURRENT DECISIONS

64

Schauer writes that "if we are truly arguing from precedent, then the
fact that something was decided before gives it present value despite our
current belief that the previous decision was erroneous."' ' The "earlier
' 66
decision has a status that must be respected by a later decisionmaker."
A rule of precedent that requires a current decisionmaker to consider its
own prior decisions constrains by limiting the decisionmaker's flexibility
in the later case or by requiring him or her to overcome a burden of justifying a departure from the precedent decision.367
Limited publication and no-citation rules deny the present value of
past decisions. The no-citation rules forbid parties to refer to the earlier
decision and prevent later panels from taking it into account (at least
openly). In so doing, the rules eliminate the backward-looking constraint
of precedent, which urges current decisionmakers to consider past decisions and to issue rulings that validate litigants' interests in consistency
and reliance on settled law. 368
The elimination of this constraint is particularly problematic in the
courts of appeals, whose structure and place in the federal judicial hierarchy impose little other constraint. Review by the Supreme Court or the
en banc court of appeals is extremely unlikely. 69 And internal mechanisms by which the full court of appeals can oversee the decisional output
of all its panels do not inspire confidence that consistency, predictability,
and stability will be maintained in the law of the circuit.37" Furthermore,
so long as Congress provides litigants an appeal as of right and does not
differentiate between cases deserving greater or lesser appellate process,
rules removing some cases from the stream of precedent are misguided.
If Schauer is right about how past events constrain current decisions, it
would seem that a system of precedent either is in place or is not. The
courts of appeals' limited publication and no-citation rules try to have it
both ways by declaring some decisions "precedential" and rendering
others nullities from their inception.
Finally, the no-citation rules "significantly diminish the accountability" 37 ' of the courts of appeals by decreasing the prospect of en banc or
364. Id.
365. Id. at 575.
366. Id. at 576.
367. Id. at 574, 580, 6oo.
368. See generally Schauer, supra note 96, at 596.
369. See supra Part III.B.2.b; see also Barrett, supra note 233, at 1046 (noting that "courts of ap-

peals resolve fewer than one percent of their cases en hanc" and that "[t]he chances that the Supreme
Court will grant certiorari are similarly low").
370. See supra Part llI.B.2.d.
371. Reynolds & Richman, supra note 12, at 1202; see also Cappalli, supra note 8, at 789.
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Supreme Court review and diminishing critical commentary.372 The accountability point is at the heart of the AnastasoffiHart debate. Judge
Arnold is, above all, concerned with accountability to the public, a value
he believes is advanced by allowing citation to the court of "what [it de' Anastasoff
cided] yesterday."373
held only that the portion of the rule
allowing the court to declare opinions "not precedent" was unconstitutional.374 The no-citation aspect of the rule was not squarely at issue. In
Hart, however, the question presented was whether an attorney should
be sanctioned for citing an unpublished decision.375 The accountability
question is directly invoked when litigants are forbidden to point out to
the court what it has decided in the past.376 Judge Kozinski does not ad-

dress this question directly but appears to believe accountability is served
when the court of appeals "maintain[s] a coherent, consistent and intelligible body of caselaw" by producing the most "lucid and consistent
'
[opinions] as humanly possible."377
He believes this end is achieved by

careful selection of "lawmaking" cases to become precedents for future
decisions. Commentators appear to favor Judge Arnold's view. 378
B.

PRESENT ACTIONS AS PRECEDENT FOR THE FUTURE379

According to Schauer, a "system of precedent.., involves the special responsibility accompanying the power to commit to the future
before we get there.""" Judges contemplating a decision "must acknowledge its many possible subsequent characterizations, and thus the many
directions in which it might be extended.""' In other words, decisionmakers must consider future situations to the extent possible and issue
rulings they would be willing to "stand to" in future cases.382 This forward-looking aspect of constraint is necessary to ensure careful decisionmaking3 and to reduce the possibility that decisions are based on
bias or other impermissible factors. :' 4 It also promotes predictability in

372. Reynolds & Richman, supra note 12, at 1203.
373. Anastasoff v. United States, 223 F.3d 898, 904 (8th Cir. 2000).

374. Id. at 905.
375. Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3 d 1155, 1159 (9th Cir. 2001).
376. Barnett, supranote 35, at 13-14.
377. 266 F.3d at 1179.
378. See, e.g., Barnett, supra note 35, at 25-26; Greenwald & Schwartz, supra note 21, at 1I74;
Katsh & Chachkes, supra note 14, at 322-23.

379. Schauer, supra note 96, at 571.
380. Id. at 573.
381. Id. at 574.
382. See supra note

124.

383. Schauer, supra note 96, at 589.
384. Cf.Cappalli, supra note 8, at 787 (noting that judges "freed from the constraints of precedent... may let their biases and personal preferences decide" cases).
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the law because citizens can order their affairs around precedents issued
today with a commitment to the future. 3s5

Current decisions sometimes set precedent and sometimes do not,
but this is not a function of the precedent court's declaration of the decision's future effect. Rather, the eventual "precedential value" of a decision turns on the subsequent court's judgment about the assimilability of
the precedent case to the instant case.""' Limited publication and nocitation rules allow the courts of appeals to issue some decisions absent
any commitment to the future."' 7 By denying the future effect of decisions, these rules eliminate the obliation of judges to consider the future
ramifications of current decisions.3 The loss of this constraining influence, again, is especially troubling considering the absence of other constraints, such as en banc or Supreme Court review, on most courts of
appeals decisions.
Limited publication and no-citation rules impair the ability of future
decisionmakers to treat today's unpublished decisions as precedent, thus
interfering with consistency and decisionmaking efficiency. The rules are
premised on the notion that cases given the "unpublished" treatment are
easy,389 and that the same easy question arising over and over again will

generate consistent results because the answers are obvious.3" But the
3 91

experience of thirty years shows that many of the cases are not easy
and some of the results are in conflict.392

385. Schauer, supra note 96, at 597.
386. Cf id. at 577 (discussing existence of precedent to govern present case).
387. See Robel, supra note I8, at 410 (describing no-citation rules as attempt to "strip" opinions of
their future value "by fiat").
388. Most courts of appeals judges probably consider the future ramifications of their decisions
even in cases receiving abbreviated consideration, but they are not constrained to do so. Cf.Schauer,
supra note 96, at 589 (discussing tendency of conscientious decisionmakers to treat past decisions as
precedent even absent the "pull" of precedent).
389. See generally Kenneth Anthony Laretto, Precedent,Judicial Power, and the Constitutionality
of "No-Citation" Rules in the Federal Courts of Appeals, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1037, 1039-41 (2002) (dis-

cussing "easy" cases and unpublished opinions).
390. Cf.Friendly, supra note 242, at 412 (dismissing as "wishful thinking" the notion that all circuits will decide a question of federal law the same way); Schauer, supra note 96, at 578 (noting that in
fact, "rarely" does a decisionmaker "think that almost the exact same facts will arise again"). Yet the
rules themselves and defenses of them seem to assume a large number of all-but-identical cases. See,
e.g., Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155, 1179 (9th Cir. 2001). This premise holds up better in some cate-

gories of cases than others, see Robel. supra note I9,at 952-53, but probably underestimates case-tocase variation even in those categories.
391. Judge Jerry E. Smith notes that in the first half of 2001 alone, the Fifth Circuit "has declined
to publish at least four opinions in which a judge dissented, indicating that at least one [judge] felt that
each of these cases was not an easy application of existing law to indistinguishable facts." Williams v.
dissenting from denial of reDallas Area Rapid Transit, 256 F.3d 26o, 262 (5th Cir. 2001) (Smith, J.,
hearing en banc) (emphasis added); see also Merritt & Brudney supra note 15, at I IO-i i (concluding
that unpublished opinions are "not as straightforward as some judges maintain" and "may represent
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UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS
MUCH PRECEDENT MATTERS39 3

Schauer recognizes that the fact that something is a "precedent"
raises new questions, namely, how tightly the precedent binds future decisionmakers, and what it should take to loosen the bond.394 Precedent, as
noted earlier, can be described as a rule of relevance.395 As such it depends on assimilation between past and current events (or assimilability
of contemplated future events to current ones). 96 "Only by looking to the
[precedent] can we determine if that source constrains." 3" Even when
precedent constrains, it does not do so "absolutely. ' ' 0 Rather, "precedent can matter even if it has less [than controlling] weight." 3" The
weight or strength of precedent depends, simply, on the degree of similarity between the two cases."
The limited publication and no-citation rules, by contrast, depend on
the idea of precedent as an all-or-nothing proposition. A decision is declared at the outset (by virtue of its publication) to be precedent, or (by
more discretionary application of legal principles than the publication rules contemplate"). But see id.
at 116(acknowledging that even if law is well-settled, judges may disagree about how to apply law to
facts of case).
392. A recent Fifth Circuit case provides a good example. In Williams v. Dallas Area Rapid Tran-

sit, 242 F.3d 315, 322 (5th Cir. 2001), the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's determination that
DART is a governmental entity entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. On petition for rehearing
en banc, judges dissenting from denial of the petition described the background of the case as follows:
[DART] is told, in May 1999, by a panel of this court in Anderson [a case also involving DART as defendant], that it is immune, on the basis of a "comprehensive and
well-reasoned opinion." Competent counsel [for DART] reasonably would have concluded, and advised his or her client, that it could count on Eleventh Amendment
immunity. Then, in March 2ooo, in the instant case, a federal district judge, understandably citing and relying on the circuit's decision in Anderson, holds that "it is
firmly established that DART is a governmental unit...." In February 2oo1, however, a panel, containing one of the judges who was on the Anderson panel, reverses
and tells DART that, on the basis of well-established Fifth Circuit law from 1986, it
has no such immunity.
256 F.3 d at 261 (Smith, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc). The 1986 decision was published, see Clark v. Tarrant County, 798 F.2d 736 (5th Cir. 1986), causing one to wonder why the
Anderson panel did not rely on it. Anderson is unpublished and unavailable on Westlaw; therefore, it
is unknown whether the panel cited the 1986 case. As an unpublished decision issued after January i,
1996, Anderson is "not precedent" under 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4. Id. It seems odd (not, as the dissenters
state, "understandabl[e]") that the district court in Williams relied on the unpublished Anderson decision (even though Anderson involved the very same defendant as Williams) and not on the published
decision from 1986.
393. Schauer, supra note 96, at 57I .
394. Id.
395. See supra text accompanying notes 153-156.
396. Schauer, supra note 96, at 579.
397. Id.
398. Id. at 58o.
399. Id. at 592.
400. Id. at 594.
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virtue of being labeled "unpublished") not to be precedent. Under the
rules, unpublished decisions are not "precedent" even in virtually identical cases (like Anastasoff), despite the fact that precedent should apply
with particular strength in such cases to ensure fairness and consistency.
The no-citation rules forbid parties even to refer to unpublished decisions, apparently on the theory that if cited, these decisions will "bind"
the subsequent court.4"'
This makes little sense. The courts of appeals, when they adopted
limited publication and no-citation rules, seem to have thrown timehonored modes of decisionmaking out the window. A precedent case is
no more than a "point of departure"4 2 that provides an "indicator of
what the law requires."4 3 Its actual effect is for the subsequent court to
determine. In making that determination, the subsequent court considers
the similarity of the cases, the applicability of analogical reasoning,4 4 and
the familiar rules about the hierarchy of authorities.4 " As the Anastasoff
opinion sto6ggests, courts of appeals could continue to issue "unpublished"
decisions4 (probably signaling that these cases received abbreviated review) without declaring such decisions "not precedential" or forbidding
their citation. It would still fall to the subsequent court to determine the
decision's actual strength or value, using all the techniques it ordinarily
would to deal with a precedent.' Indeed, "no version of stare decisis that
might plausibly be followed in America comes anywhere close to an
ironclad rule." 8 A court faced with an erroneous or unworkable precedent of its own may overrule it, subject to the requirement that it provide
a justification for doing so." The structure and strictures of the courts of

401. The Hart opinion seems to say exactly that. Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155, 1179 (9th Cir.
2001).

402.

See Hathaway, supra note 171, at 624 (quoting

BENJAMIN

N.

CARDOZO,

THE NATURE OF THE

JUDICIAL PROCESS, 20 (1921)).

403. Harrison, supra note 153, at 512. Recently, Professor Schauer has offered a
reminder that even those who subscribe to the possibility of strong constraint by ...legal
precedents must acknowledge that those ... precedents can only take us so far....
[Liegal
precedents may determine the boundaries of plausible legal decision without determining
precisely what is to be done within those boundaries.
Frederick Schauer, The Dilemma of Ignorance:PGA Tour, Inc. v. Casey Martin, 2oo SuP. CT. REV.
267,267-68.
404. See Boggs & Brooks, supra note 26, at 24.
405. See Harrison, supra note 153, at 5o6-07. The Hart opinion likewise discusses a variety of case
and "non-case" authorities that courts consult for guidance. 266 F.3d at 5169-7o.
4o6. Anastasoff v. United States, 223 F.3d 898, 904 (8th Cir. 2o0o).
407. See KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: ON OUR LAW AND ITS STUDY 72-76 (i96o).
4o8. Nelson, supra note 16i, at 82; see also Price, supra note 35, at 114-15 (comparing American
practice to the rigid rule formerly followed by the British House of Lords).
409. Anastasoff, 223 F.3d at 904-05; see also Robel, supra note 18, at 400.
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appeals make overruling prior panel decisions difficult, but that is no excuse for avoiding the rule of precedent altogether.
V. JUSTIFYING THE RULES ON ECONOMY GROUNDS

Judge Arnold notes in Anastasoff that "[m]odern legal scholars tend
to justify the authority of precedents on equitable or prudential
grounds. '41. The same characterization holds true for much of the literature on unpublished opinions and no-citation rules, which until recently
focused mainly on issues of judicial economy,"' equal access,4" ' and the
like rather than on constitutional grounds413 or other, more fundamental
issues.4"4 The best overall analysis of early arguments surrounding these
rules is Reynolds and Richman's 1978 article, Non-Precedential Precedent-Limited Publication and No-Citation Rules in the United States
Courts of Appeals.4"5 The authors concluded that flawed premises and
powerful counter-arguments subject the rules to "serious question."' 6
Much of their analysis depends on how the courts of appeals actually operate with respect to precedent. The starkly contrasting accounts presented in Anastasoff and Hart invite reexamination of the rules using
Reynolds and Richman's framework. This Part briefly reviews the current status and effects of the rules, and then considers whether the rules
can be justified on grounds of economy despite their incompatibility with
the rule of precedent.
A.

CURRENT STATUS OF RULES

Each circuit has a rule limiting publication of opinions and specifying the conditions under which an unpublished opinion may be cited." 7
Appendix A provides a chart comparing the rules as they stand today. 4,'
A comparison of the rules thirty years ago and today reveals a few trends
that may be relevant in re-assessing the rules. Fewer rules today include
a presumption against publication. Five of twelve circuits (41.6%) today

410. Anastasoff, 223 F.3d at 9oi (citing Schauer, supra note 96, at 595-602) (distinguishing modern
treatment from "eighteenth-century view" that duty to follow precedent "derives from the nature of
the judicial power itself").
4t1.

See, e.g., Kozinski & Reinhardt, supra note 5.

See, e.g., Robel, supra note i9.
413. See, e.g., Katsh & Chachkes, supra note 14 (analyzing constitutional issues).
414. See, e.g., Cooper & Berman, supra note 5 (examining selective publication and no-citation
rules in light of the dual functions and complex structure of the courts of appeals).
415. Reynolds & Richman, supra note 12.
412.

416. Id. at 1205.

417. See sources cited supra notes 7-8.
418. This chart is based on the one Reynolds and Richman used to compare the rules soon after
their adoption. Reynolds & Richman, supra note 12, at 1206 tbl.I (publication and citation rules); id. at
t207 tbl.II (criteria for publication).
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include such a presumption in their rules," 9 with the position of the Third
Circuit unclear.42 ° Reynolds and Richman reported in 1978 that six of the
then-existing eleven circuits (54.5%) had adopted a presumption against
publication.4 ' The current rules provide more specific guidance about
when to publish than did earlier versions. Today, nine of thirteen circuits
(69.2%) provide relatively specific criteria for publication.4 2 Five of the
eleven circuits (45.5%) in 1978 provided only the most general criteria
for publication; six circuits' rules were more detailed. 3 Currently, seven
of the thirteen circuits (53.8%) provide a procedure for requesting publication of an otherwise unpublished disposition,424 compared with two of
eleven circuits (19.2%) in 1978.425 Finally, today's non-citation rules are
somewhat more liberal than in the past. Only four of thirteen circuits
current4y (30.8%) forbid the citation of unpublished decisions in all but

the most limited circumstances.

In 1978, seven of eleven circuits did so

(63.6%)427

Clearly, the courts of appeals have modified their publication and citation rules in light of experience."" The courts of appeals today show

slightly more caution about limiting publication and significantly more
willingness to allow citation of unpublished dispositions. 9 In fact, given
the trends just described, the debate about non-publication and nocitation rules is beginning to look like simply another facet of the debate

419. See Appendix A.
420. See 3D CIR. I.O.P. 5.1-5.3.
421. Reynolds & Richman, supra note 12, at 12o6.
422. The First, Fifth, Sixth and D.C. circuits have expanded their publication criteria. The rules of
the Fourth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth and D.C. circuits always included several specific criteria. The rules
of the Second, Third, Tenth, Eleventh, and Federal circuits remain quite general.
423. Reynolds & Richman, supra note 12, at i2o7.
424. See Appendix A. For example, on Jan. I, 2002, the D.C. Circuit abandoned its no-citation
rule, permitting citation of unpublished opinions as precedent. See D.C. CIR. R. 28(c)(i)(B). Similarly,
according to a press release dated Dec. 5, 2001, the Third Circuit itself still follows its no-citation rule,
but now allows lawyers to cite unpublished decisions to the court. The Internal Operating Procedures,
3D CIR. I.O.P. 5.7 now state that the Third Circuit "by tradition" does not cite to its unpublished decisions "as authority."
425. Reynolds & Richman, supra note 12, at 12o6.
426. See Appendix A; see also Stephen R. Barnett, No-Citation Rules Under Siege: A Battlefield
Report and Analysis, 5 J. App. PRAC. & PROCESS 473, 474-76 (2003) (discussing trends in citation rules
and publication practices of the federal courts of appeals). The First Circuit has just modified its rule.
That court now "disfavor[s]" citation of unpublished opinions, but permits such citation "only
if... the opinion persuasively addresses a material issue ... and ... there is no published opinion of
[the] court that adequately addresses the issue." Letter from Chief Judge Michael Boudin, to Peter G.
McCabe, Sec'y, Comm. on Rules of Prac. & Proc. (Jan. 21, 2004), availableat http://www.secretjustice
.org/new proposedjfrap_32_I.htm (discussing and attaching new rule 32.3(a)(2)).
427. Reynolds & Richman, supra note 12, at 12o6.
428. See Barnett, supra note 426, at 474-76 (discussing recent developments in various circuits).
429. See Cooper & Berman, supra note 5, at 432.
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about how to deal with the huge caseload of the Ninth Circuit. Though
three other circuits join the Ninth in continuing to prohibit citation of
unpublished opinions, Ninth Circuit judges seem to be most passionate

about the issue,43 and their comments without exception stress the crush-

ing burden that court currently bears.
B.

CURRENT PRACTICES AND CONSEQUENCES

Given the trends just described in the evolution of limited publication and no-citation rules, it is perhaps surprising that publication rates
continue to decline sharply. Today, the average publication rate across
all circuits but the Federal Circuit is I9.5%."' As recently as 1984, the
overall average publication rate was 61.2%.432 At the same time, "[1]arge
numbers of participants in the federal appellate system, including judges,
use unpublished opinions in ways not contemplated" by the limited publication and no-citation rules.433 Specifically, both attorneys4 ' and federal
judges 435 regularly read unpublished decisions, suggesting that these opinions "provide useful information, ' '46 contrary to the assumptions underlying the rules.437 Both Robel and Hannon present data showing that
federal court judges have cited unpublished dispositions thousands of
times.

438

430. About 285 individuals and organizations submitted comments on proposed rule 32.1. See
http://www.secretjustice.org/new-proposed-frap--32-.htm#complete-list-public-comments. At least
twenty-seven of these are Ninth Circuit judges. The Seventh and Federal Circuits, which also prohibit
citation, each submitted one comment, in the case of the Seventh Circuit on behalf of a majority of
judges and in the case of the Federal Circuit expressing unanimous opposition to the proposed rule.
See Letter from Judge John L. Coffey, to Judge Samuel A. Alito (Feb. I s, 2004) (expressing opposition of majority of judges of the Seventh Circuit to proposed Rule 32.), available at http://
wwwi.law.ucla.edu/-volokhblog-data/judges7cir.pdf; Letter of Chief Judge Haldane Robert Mayer,
to Peter McCabe, Sec'y, Comm. on Rules of Prac. & Proc. (expressing unanimous opposition of Federal Circuit judges to proposed Rule 32.1), availableat http://www.fedcir.gov/pdf/fedcir.pdf.
431. 2002 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note lo8, at 39 tbl.S- 3 . This Table omits the Federal Circuit.
432. Michael Hannon, A Closer Look at Unpublished Opinions in the United States Courts of Appeals, 3 J. APP.PRAC. & PROCESS 199, 204 tbl.2 (2001).
433. Robel, supra note 18, at 414.
434. Id. at 405 and 419-20 tbl.2.
435. Id. at 407-08 and 421-22 tbl. 3 (discussing federal district and circuit judges).
436. Id. at 406.
437. Id. at 4o4; see also Cappalli, supra note 8, at 768 (describing process by which the "actual
scope of a doctrinal formulation is learned through its applications").
438. Hannon, supra note 432, at 224-37; Robel, supra note 18, at 406-o7. In one interesting example, a Tenth Circuit panel described the law as "well settled" on a particular issue. It did so in an unpublished opinion, and cited as authority another unpublished decision of the Tenth Circuit, which in
turn cited a published decision of the Seventh Circuit. See Florez v. Johnson, No. 02-2131, 2003 WL
16o5857, at *2 (ioth Cir. March 28, 2003) (citing Poulos v. McKinna, 21o F.3d 390 (Ioth Cir. 2000) (unpublished opinion) (citing Pischke v. Litscher, 178 F. 3d 497 ( 7 th Cir. 1999))). If these citations accurately represent the state of the law, lawyers and citizens in the Tenth Circuit must look either to nonprecedential Tenth Circuit decisions, or to decisions of other circuits, to find the law.
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Certain effects of the limited publication and no-citation rules are
demonstrable.439 For example, given the tendency of attorneys to monitor
unpublished decisions (and their belief that it is incumbent upon them to
do so"o), it is not surprising that attorneys sometimes cite unpublished
dispositions in apparent violation of the rules."' Beyond the temptation
to cite favorable but "forbidden" authority,"2 non-publication and nocitation rules may create or mask intra-circuit conflicts." 3 Anastasoff involved an open invitation to the Eighth Circuit to create a conflict. The
only case on point was unpublished and contrary to appellant's position;
she urged the court to ignore that decision and rule in her favor. 4 Had
the court done so in an unpublished decision, under its rule non-binding
decisions would have pointed both ways." 5 Had it done so in a published
opinion, but without overruling the earlier decision, a "conflict" of sorts
might still have existed."6 One commentator notes that the Ninth Circuit
"issued twenty separate, unpublished panel decisions that [took] a total
439. Here I discuss only a few of the possible effects of the rules. Many other consequencesactual or potential-have been discussed elsewhere. See, e.g., Greenwald & Schwartz, supra note 25
(discussing constitutional issues, confidence in adjudication, and government waste, among others);
Maria Brooke Tusk, No-Citation Rules as a Prior Restraint on Attorney Speech, 503 COLUM. L. Rgv.
1202 (2003); see also sources cited supra note 35.
44o. Robel, supra note I8, at 406.
441. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
442. The term comes from the title of the ACTL Report, supra note 24.
443. Richard S. Arnold, Irving L. Goldberg Lecture, Southern Methodist University, Dedman
School of Law: The Federal Courts: Causes of Discontent, 56 S.M.U. L. REV. 767,779 (2003).
444. Anastasoff v. United States, 223 F. 3d 898, 899 (8th Cir. 2000).
445. 8TH CIR. R. 28A(i) makes unpublished decisions "not precedent."
446. This was the situation in the Fifth Circuit's DART cases. See supra notes 391-392. In 1999, the
Fifth Circuit ruled in an unpublished opinion that DART was entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. In 2001, a different panel ruled the opposite way in a published opinion. Williams v. Dallas
Area Rapid Transit, 242 F.3d 315 (5th Cir. 2001). The 2001 opinion discussed at some length the errors
of the 1999 panel, but did not explicitly overrule the unpublished decision. Id. at 318-i9 n.i(explaining that the immunity finding in the 1999 decision was merely dictum). The Fifth Circuit declined to
rehear the 2001 case en banc to resolve whatever conflict may have remained. Williams v. Dallas Area
Rapid Transit, 256 F.3 d 260 (5th Cir. 2001). Thus, at least for less than careful researchers, the presence of the two conflicting decisions continues to present a danger. See Arnold, supra note 443, at 779
(describing conflicting Fifth Circuit decisions in the DART cases). The same conflict is discussed in
Sinclair, supra note 26, at 702. The leading study of intra-circuit conflicts took unpublished decisions
out of the calculus, accepting the premise that such decisions are "irrelevant" to the question of intracircuit conflicts "because [they] cannot be cited as precedent." Hellman, supra note 325, at 599. This is
the other side of the same coin examined supra Part LE, involving the proper application of the prior
panel rules. If the later panel is obliged to follow all decisions of prior panels, it creates a conflict when
it fails to do so even if the prior panel's decision was unpublished (Anastasoff position). But if later
panels are bound to follow only "precedential" decisions of prior panels and if the circuit's rule makes
unpublished decisions not "precedential," then the later panel creates no conflict (applying the term
strictly) when it fails to follow the unpublished decision of a prior panel (Hart position). I use the term
"conflict" more broadly to include such uncertainty in circuit law and hence would include unpublished decisions within the realm of intra-circuit conflicts.
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of three different approaches" to a technical sentencing issue before issuing one published decision." 7 Intra-circuit conflicts, particularly those involving unpublished decisions, pose real difficulty for analyses that
depend on knowing whether the law was "clear," for example in cases
involving procedural bars to habeas petitions" or claims of official immunity.44
C.

CURRENT STATUS OF ARGUMENTS FOR THE RULES

Professors Reynolds and Richman in 1978 succinctly summarized45"
and evaluated45' arguments for the rules. This section briefly re-examines
some of those arguments in light of changes in the rules and the practices
of attorneys and judges since 1978. The divergent accounts of the operation of precedent in the Anastasoff and Hart opinions also bear upon the
current status of arguments for the rules.
i. Limited PublicationRules
One premise of the argument for limited publication is that publication of all appellate opinions is "excessively costly" both to the courts
who produce the opinions and to attorneys and court personnel as "consumers" of opinions.452 This premise in turn depends on the assumption
that a great deal of judges' time is "spent in opinion writing" and that
much time could be saved if brief, unpolished opinions not destined for

447. Laretto, supra note 389, at 1042.
448. See Powell v. Lambert, 357 F.3d 871 (9th Cir. 2004) (discussing Washington state courts' opinion publication practices). The Powell panel held that "[it is the actual practice of the state courts, not
merely the precedents contained in their published opinions, that determine the adequacy of procedural bars preventing the assertion of federal rights." Id. at 879. In other words, unpublished decisions
are "not irrelevant to a determination of a court's actual practice," id., under the United States Supreme Court's rule that "state courts must follow a firmly established and regularly followed state
practice in order for an asserted procedural bar to be adequate." Id. at 872. Because several unpublished state decisions were "flatly inconsistent" with the rule announced in the published decision
upon which the Washington courts relied, the state's actual practice was not consistent and could not
bar Powell's petition, notwithstanding the state courts' rule that "unpublished decisions have no precedential value and cannot be cited to the Washington state courts .. "Id. at 879.
449. Officials are liable for illegal acts when the law was clear but immune from liability when they
could not have been expected to know what the law demanded. See Jonathan M. Stemerman, Unclearly Establishing Qualified Immunity: What Sources of Authority May Be Used to Determine
Whether the Law Is "Clearly Established" in the Third Circuit?, 47 VILL. L. REV. 1225, 1228 (2002)
(noting that "courts of appeals 'have disagreed on ...the extent to which [non-binding] kinds of decisional law should be considered' in determining whether a legal rule is "clearly established" but focusing on district court decisions and other circuits' decisions, not on unpublished opinions) (citation
omitted).
450. Reynolds & Richman, supra note 12, at I188-89.
I
45 . Id. at 1189-1204.
452. Id. at I 88.
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publication would suffice in many cases.453 Reynolds and Richman noted
that while intuitively appealing, the "link between limited publication
and increased productivity... ha[d] yet to be established by careful
' Judge Kozinski
study."454
clearly accepts that premise. He discusses the
opinion-writing process at length in Hart55 and concludes that judges'
time is better spent "fulfill[ing] their paramount duties: producing wellreasoned published decisions and keeping the law of the circuit consistent through the en banc process." ' 6 Judge Arnold acknowledges this argument but rejects it.457
It is not clear how significantly unpublished opinions differ from
published ones. Some have labeled unpublished opinions "junk," 5 while
others describe them as similar to published opinions.45' In fact, "on occasion, the length and intellectual rigor of an unpublished opinion may rival those of opinions that appear in the Federal Reporter."' 6 A recent
review of opinions in the FederalAppendix found that many unpublished
opinions appearing in its pages "are longer than five pages or have more
than [ten] headnotes." 6 ' Moreover, opinions in this reporter include controversial opinions and opinions with dissents, "rendering absurd [the]
fiction.., that there is something categorically different about unpublished opinions. ' 4,2 On the other hand, some judges commenting on a
proposed new rule that would liberalize citation rules in all the circuits
describe unpublished opinions as quite different from published opinions
in both the manner of preparation and the nature of the resulting document. 6 3
453. Id. Discussing this line of argument, Cappalli suggests that "[tihe opinion writing task of
judges is not that of the treatise writer," but rather should be geared toward "singular determinations
on singular issues reasoned narrowly." Cappalli, supra note 8, at 783. He also denounces "discursive,
endless federal appellate opinion[s]" and calling on judges to write "practical, focused opinions." Id. at
789.
454. Reynolds & Richman, supra note 12, at 1 191.

455. Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 155,176-79 (9th Cir. 2001).
456. Id. at 1178.
457. Anastasoff v. United States, 223 F. 3d 898, 904 (8th Cir. 2000) (calling instead for increase of
judges).
458. See, e.g., Reynolds & Richman, supra note 231, at 284 (quoting remarks of former Chief
Judge Markey of the Federal Circuit). Richman and Reynolds describe unpublished opinions as
"dreadful in quality," but as "Cardozoesque in comparison" to one-word dispositions. Id. at 284-85.
459. See, e.g., Hannon, supra note 432, at 212-13 (quoting Robel, supra note I9, at 943). The district court in Williams described the unpublished Fifth Circuit opinion upon which it relied as "comprehensive and well-reasoned." See Williams v. Dallas Area Rapid Transit, 256 F.3d 260, 260 (5th Cir.
2001) (Smith, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
460. Cooper & Berman, supra note 5, at 702.
461. Brian P. Brooks, Publishing UnpublishedOpinions, 5 GREEN BAG 259, 26o (2OO2).

462. Id. at 263.
463. See, e.g., Letter from Judge William C. Canby, Jr., to Peter G. McCabe, Sec'y, Comm. on
Rules of Prac. & Proc. (Jan. 8, 2004) (noting that when preparing a memorandum disposition (as the
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If unpublished opinions do not differ significantly in length or complexity from published opinions, one wonders how much time is actually
saved in their preparation. Moreover, the underlying assumptions about
the nature of unpublished opinions are puzzling. Many commentators focus on the diminished need to recite the facts in opinions destined only
for the parties, who already know the facts.464 Reciting the facts should
not be all that difficult in the routine cases for which unpublished opinions are theoretically appropriate because in most cases the facts are well
documented in the lower court's findings or in discovery documents
submitted under oath. 46' "Easy" cases are easy, at least in part, because
their facts are relatively uncomplicated; '66 summarizing the relevant facts
in such cases should not take much time. Another possibility is that the
facts of the instant case are indistinguishable from the facts in one or
more previously published cases. If precedent depends on similarity, as
discussed above, similarity of facts is an essential element of what the
court of appeals must mean when it claims that the instant case falls
Ninth Circuit terms unpublished opinions), the judge checks to make sure the result is correct and
"do[es] not concern [himself] greatly with how we describe our reasons"); Letter from Judge Barry G.
Silverman, to Peter G. McCabe, Sec'y, Comm. on Rules of Prac. & Proc. (Dec. 17, 2003) (pointing out
that a "mem dispo can be knocked out in an hour or less"), available at http://www.secretjustice.org/
new-proposed-frap_32_I.htm#complete-list publiccomments; Letter from Judge William A.
Fletcher, to Peter G. McCabe, Sec'y, Comm. on Rules of Prac. & Proc. (Dec. 12, 2003) (noting that
unpublished opinions may be only "a page or two" in length, though sometimes longer), available at
http://www.secretjustice.org/new-proposed-frap-32-I.htm#complete-list-public-comments;
Letter
from Judge Procter Hug. Jr., to Peter G. McCabe, Sec'y, Comm. on Rules of Prac. & Proc. (Dec. 16,
2003) (stating that "unpublished opinions are specifically not intended" to present arguments for particular points of law), availableat http://www.secretjustice.org/new-proposed-frap-32-1.htm#complete
_list.publiccomments.; Letter from Judge Kim McLane Wardlaw, to Peter G. McCabe, Sec'y, Comm.
on Rules of Prac. & Proc. (Jan. 7, 2004) (noting that unpublished decisions "are designed to quickly
and concisely deliver a decision to the litigants in a particular case" and therefore "largely omit[-" discussion of the facts and procedural posture of the case), available at http://www.secretjustice.org/
new proposed-frap_32-t.htm#complete-list-public.comments. See infra text accompanying notes
532-541 for discussion of the proposed rule.
464. See, e.g., Letter from Judge Procter Hug, Jr., to Peter G. McCabe, Sec'y, Comm. on Rules of
Prac. & Proc., supra note 463; Letter from Judge Kim McLane Wardlaw, to Peter G. McCabe, supra
note 463; Letter from Judge Dorothy W. Nelson, to Peter G. McCabe, Sec'y, Comm. on Rules of Prac.
& Proc. (Jan. 7, 2004), available at http://www.secretjustice.org/new-proposedfrap-32-I
.htm#completejlistpublicscomments; see also Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155, 1177-78 (9th Cir.
2001).

465. The courts of appeals ordinarily do not review the lower court's factual findings (in cases that
have reached that stage) for correctness, but rather accept the facts as found below. See Frank B.
Cross, Decisionmaking in the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals, 91 CAL. L. REV. 1457, I5OO n.277 (2003)

(stating that "it is well established that circuit courts are to defer to district court findings regarding the
facts of the case") (citations omitted). Of course, review in some cases is de novo. STEVEN ALAN CHILDRESS & MARTHA S. DAVIS, FEDERAL STANDARDS OF REVIEW § 2.14 (describing de novo review as requiring "no particular deference" to the trial court but not as amounting to "retrying the entire case").
466. Or as Cappalli, supra note 8, at 768, puts it, an "easy case occurs when the factual variations in
the current case plainly do not demand a different outcome" from that of the precedent case.
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squarely within existing law. If that is true, the opinion in the later case
could simply state that the facts of the case at bar are the same in all
relevant respects as those of the controlling case. 6 ' Treating the facts in
this manner would not allow future attorneys or litigants independently
to assess the facts of a large sample of previous cases (unless they had access to the facts through district court opinions, court filings, or other accounts). Litigants would, however, have an opportunity to point out
factual distinctions to the court of appeals in seeking rehearing (by comparing the facts of their own case to those of the cited case). 4"
By the same token, in routine cases that pose no new issues, the law
is, by definition, settled. 469 It should be a relatively simple matter in such
a case to state and cite the controlling law. If the instant case is on all
fours with the controlling case, nothing more is needed. Thus, "easy"
cases should require little opinion-writing time regardless of publication
or citation rules.470
Commentators are skeptical that time is saved primarily in the writing process. 47' The Hart opinion states that when "drafting a precedential
opinion" (but apparently only then), a judge must "envision the countless permutations of facts that might arise in the universe of future
cases."472 In fact, constraint by precedent imposes this obligation in all
cases. Circuit judges seem to have convinced themselves that they do justice to the parties (for example, by deciding according to law) even in
cases where the appellate process is abbreviated.473 The limited publication and no-citation rules reflect, at least in part, a concern that appellate
467. As noted above, it is true that no two cases are exactly alike. See supra note 175.
468. Cf. Letter from Judge William A. Fletcher, to Peter G. McCabe, Sec'y, Comm. on Rules of
Prac. & Proc. (Dec. I2, 2003) (stating that unpublished decisions, in contrast to summary dispositions,
give litigants "a basis from which to argue in a petition for rehearing that we misunderstood their
case"), available at http://www.secretjustice.org/new-proposed-frap.32

I.htm#complete-list-public

_comments.
469. See Boggs & Brooks, supra note 26, at 20-21(discussing difficulty of determining, in the abstract, which cases or issues will be "easy" even if what we mean by that term is that the result is dictated by precedent); Schauer, supra note 96, at 599. The "easy case" premise underlies of all the
limited publication rules. Boggs & Brooks, supra note 26, at 20; see also Gulati & McCauliff, supra
note 177, at i6t.
470. Cappalli, supra note 8, at 768, notes that calling the "resolution of a legal issue under existing
case law easy is quite different from saying that the resolution is non-precedential, yet this distinction
is not made in the non-precedent debate." Gulati & McCauliff, supra note I77, at i6o, note that "the
harder the case, the greater the saving in judicial resources" one would expect.
47I. See, e.g., ACTL Report, supra note 24, at 68o-8i; Boggs & Brooks, supra note 26, at I9-2I;

Cappalli, supra note 8,at 785, 788 (noting that writing process cannot be divorced from reasoning
process and expressing skepticism that non-precedent cases are fully considered by judges). Comments
of Ninth Circuit judges to proposed rule 32.A dispute these claims. See Public Comments re FRAP
32.

1,

at http://www.secretjustice.org/new-proposed-frap-32_i .htm#complete-list_public comments.

472, 266 F. 3d at 1176.
473. See ACTL Report, supra note 24, at 68o-8i.
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shortcuts will lead to mistakes that are hard to undo.474 That is the appeal
of the "non-precedential precedent." But as argued above, this notion is
incompatible with the rule of precedent.
Arguments about the costs of producing publishable opinions overlook the time savings created by relying on precedent. Schauer puts it
bluntly: "when a precedent has no decisional significance as a precedent,
the conscientious decisionmaker must look at each case in its own fullness."475 Conversely, the decisionmaker in a case indistinguishable from a
prior, precedential case need go no further" than invoking the prior
case. , 6 Relying on a precedent allows the decisionmaker to "'relax,' in
the sense of engaging in less scrutiny of the [instant] case."477 But if the
body of "precedential" decisions contains no matching case, the decisionmaker must either search through non-precedential decisions"" or
start from scratch. Even if a non-precedential but relevant case is found,
the later court (in a circuit that limits citation) may rely on it only in contravention of its own rules.479 Alternatively, the later court may decide
(and, ideally, explain its decision) to go the other way.as° Surely the

Eighth Circuit panel in Anastasoff spent more time deciding what to do
with the allegedly non-precedential Christie decision than would have
otherwise been required to decide the case." '
As for the costs of consumption, Judge Kozinski writes that the publication of additional opinions will "muddy the water, '' 482 "clutter up" law
474. See, e.g., Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d II55, 1171-73 (9th Cir. 2001) (discussing resolution of
conflicts).
475. Schauer, supra note 96, at 599. But see Maltz, supra note 127, at 370 (stating that "closer
analysis undermines [the] persuasive force of arguments that reliance on precedent promotes judicial
efficiency"); Thomas R. Lee, Stare Decisis in Economic Perspective: An Economic Analysis of the Supreme Court's Doctrine of Precedent, 78 N.C.L. REV. 643, 649 (20oo).
476. Schauer, supra note 96, at 599.
477. Id.
478. Such a case often exists, as the Christiedecision did for the Anastasoffpanel.
479. For example, a Fifth Circuit panel recently noted that it had "not found any published opinions [on the precise issue]." However, three unpublished Ninth Circuit opinions did address the issue:
United States v. Cuyler, 298 F.3 d 387, 390 (5th Cir. 2002) (citing United States v. Luna-Moreno, to Fed.
Appx. 638, 639 (9th Cir. 2001)), United States v. Reyes-Maro, 238 F.3d 433 (9th Cir. 200), and United
States v. Luna, 152 F.3d 93o (9th Cir. 1998). If the Ninth Circuit itself wished to cite these unpublished
decisions, it could do so only by violating 9TH CIR. R. 36-3 (b), which prohibits citation "to or by the
courts of this circuit" (emphasis added).
480. See Robel, supra note 18, at 414. See also Williams, 242 F.3d 315 (ruling opposite way from
previous, unpublished decision).
481. Cf. Boggs & Brooks, supra note 26, at 24 (noting that publication of Christie decision "would
have resolved the issue once and for all" because the case called for selection of one rule over another
and once selected, there would be "no opportunity for future panels to use analogical reasoning to
distinguish Christie");see also Cappalli, supra note 8, at 769-70 (describing a possible "adverse effect
on the courts' workload" resulting from limited publication and no-citation rules).
482. Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155, 1179 (9 th Cir. 2001) (citing Martin, supra note 23, at 192).
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books and databases,"' "multiply... the number of inadvertent and unnecessary conflicts," ' and "materially increase[e] the costs" to clients. 4"'
Reynolds and Richman note that "cumulative opinions" should instead
"make research and discernment of principle easier.""" Uncertain precedent, conversely, drives up the cost and volume of litigation. 48' Robel's
findings demonstrate that attorneys believe the costs of monitoring or researching unpublished decisions are less than the potential costs of failing
to do so.m And unpublished decisions are more widely available, and at
lower cost, than ever before. 4s9
To summarize, Reynolds and Richman initially concluded that arguments in favor of limited publication underestimated the value of opinions and overestimated the costs of production and consumption. In
I98I, having conducted an empirical study of limited publication, they
found "no support for the hypothesis that limited publication enhances
productivity."4" Rule changes, empirical evidence of lawyers' and judges'
practices, and recent scholarship all tend to support these conclusions.
2.
No-Citation Rules
The argument for no-citation rules rests on the premise that the cost
savings associated with limited publication would vanish if citation to unpublished opinions were allowed.49 ' A second premise is that allowing citation of unpublished opinions "would unfairly advantage certain
litigants over others" because institutional litigants and wealthy private
litigants would compile unpublished decisions for their own use, while
ordinary litigants would have no means of researching them. 492 The latter
premise has largely been undercut by developments in print and online
publishing. Many unpublished opinions are available online, both in
commercial databases4 93 and on the courts of appeals' own web sites.4'

483. Id.
484. Id.
485. Id.

486. Reynolds & Richman, supra note 12, at II91.
487. Cf.Lee, supra note 475, at 670-72 (discussing Supreme Court).
488. Robel, supra note i8, at 405-06.

489. See Barnett, supra note 35, at 19-20 (discussing availability of unpublished opinions on Lexis
and Westlaw, on the Internet, and in West's Federal Appendix, a new print reporter of unpublished
opinions).
490. William L. Reynolds & William M. Richman, An Evaluation of Limited Publication in the
United States Courts of Appeals: The Price of Reform, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 573, 596 (1981).
491. Reynolds & Richman, supra note 12, at 1185.
492. Id. In 1978, this premise assumed the then-existing world of traditional legal research sources
and methods, without free or low-cost online research databases.
493. Hannon, supra note 432, at 2o6-13 (presenting data on unpublished opinions available
through Lexis or Westlaw).
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The practice of posting unpublished opinions on court web sites obviates
earlier concerns 495 that only wealthy, powerful litigants could afford to research such opinions. 49" Congress recently passed a law that requires all
federal appellate courts to make unpublished decisions available over the
Internet.497 In addition, in 2001 West Publishing Company introduced the
Federal Appendix, a "published reporter of unpublished opinions, '
further weakening concerns of unequal access to unpublished decisions
are weakened. If all litigants now have reasonable access to unpublished
decisions, the no-citation rule is not necessary to prevent unfairness.
Even when these concerns were more salient, however, Reynolds and
Richman argued that the unequal access point was actually a "powerful
argument against the whole notion of limited publication.49
As for the premise that no-citation rules are necessary if the courts
of appeals are to realize the cost savings promised by limited publication
plans, disagreement remains. If the cost savings of limited publication are
illusory,5" this premise becomes nonsensical. But many federal circuit
judges continue to assert its validity. Judge Kozinski wrote in Hart that if
a court "allow[s] parties to cite to [unpublished] dispositions,... much of
the time gained would likely vanish."5 ' Judges "would have to pay much
closer attention to the way they word their unpublished rulings" and
"would feel obligated to clarify" differences among the panel judges."2
"The quality of published opinions would sink ...

.""

Judges might be

forced to the unwelcome choice "between preparing but not publishing
opinions... and preparing no opinions" at all in routine cases.5 4 On the
other hand, making unpublished opinions citable "add[s] endlessly to the
body of precedent... lead[ing] to confusion and unnecessary conflict.""
494. See Barnett, supra note 35, at 4 n.12 (discussing recent actions of Third and Fifth circuits regarding posting unpublished decisions on court web sites); See also Anastasoff v. United States, 223 F.
3d 898, 904 (8th Cir. 2000) (stating that most courts make opinions available online, whether or not
they are designated as "published").
495. See, e.g., Robel, supranote i9, at 946.
496. See, e.g., Price, supra note 35, at 112; Robel, supra note 18, at 414.
497. E-Government Act of 2002, Pub. L. 507-347, § 205(a)(5), 116 Stat. 2899, 2913. This require-

ment takes effect two years after the effective date of the act, or by about the end of 2004. Id. § 205(f).
498. Barnett, supra note 35, at 25;see also id. at 23 (describing coverage of Federal Appendix).
499. Reynolds & Richman, supra note 12, at II96.
500. See supra text accompanying notes 448-480.
501. 266F. 3dat I 7 8.
502. Id. This comment is echoed in the comments of virtually all judges commenting on proposed
new Rule 32.1, available at http://www.secretjustice.org/new-proposed-frap-32-i.htm#complete-list

-public comments.
503. Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155, 1178 (9th Cir. 2001).
504- Id. at 1 177 n.33 (quoting RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS:
168-69 (5996)).
505. Id. at 1179.
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Confusion and conflict, in turn, demand the time and attention of already
overburdened judges. Comments of Ninth Circuit judges to proposed
rule 32.1 stress this point. One judge writes
Our need to maintain consistency with our own decisions, or to justify
departure, is what makes citation of our own memorandum dispositions different from citation of all other material that may be offered
for its persuasive value. If our own disposition may be cited to us, we
must distinguish it or explain why we may decide inconsistently. The
burden will be on us to show why we are not following the disposition,
and the tendency will be to follow it.o6
That burden may be a heavy one, but it is what a system based on the
rule of precedent requires in all cases, not only novel or difficult ones.
This cost-saving premise does not hold up well in the face of evidence accumulated over the thirty years of the rules' existence. As noted
earlier, unpublished opinions are widely available: °7 contrary to the state
of affairs that prevailed when the rules were adopted. Empirical evidence
shows that attorneys-and federaljudges themselves-regularly monitor
and use unpublished dispositions! They do so despite the fact that such
opinions are written, according to Judge Kozinski's account, with far less
care than published opinions receive." Even if the courts derive cost savings from producing lesser opinions, these dispositions still have value.
Rather than too much precedent, attorneys and judges often find too little precedent."' And despite litigants' regular use of unpublished dispositions, the courts of appeals continue to issue them at increasing rates."'
The experience of the District of Columbia Circuit suggests that liberalizing citation rules had no discernable effect."2 Thus, it appears that the
no-citation rules are "irrelevan[t]""5 ' to the time savings associated with
unpublished opinions.
In sum, no-citation rules no longer are (if they ever were) necessary
to redress unequal access of litigants to unpublished decisions. They are
also unnecessary to allow courts to realize cost savings by producing un506. Letter from Judge William C. Canby, Jr., to Peter G. McCabe, supra note 463.
507. See supra notes 493-499.
508. Robel, supra note i8, at 405-o8; see also Hannon, supra note 432, at 224-38.
509. Hart, 266 F.3d at I178 (describing unpublished dispositions as "letter[s] from the court to parties"). In his letter commenting on the proposed rule, Judge Kozinski goes so far as to describe "unpublished dispositions [as] thin on the facts, and written in loose, sloppy language." Letter from Judge
Alex Kozinski, to Judge Samuel A. Alito (Jan. 16, 2004) (opposing proposed Rule 32.1), available at
http://www.nonpublication.com/kozinskiletter.pdf.
5io. Robel, supra note 18, at 405,4o8 (discussing attorneys and judges).
51i. See supra notes 431-432.
512. See Barnett, supra note 426, at 475 n.2o (2003) (citing newspaper account that D.C. Circuit
"has not noticed any problems with lawyers' use of unpublished ... rulings").
513. Robel, supra note 18, at 414.
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published opinions. Perhaps implicitly acknowledging these defects, a
few of the circuits 5have
amended their rules to liberalize citation of un14
published opinions.
VI. RECASTING PUBLICATION/CITATION RULES IN LIGHT OF PRECEDENT
Lawmakers, professional organizations and commentators have proposed various solutions to the perceived problems posed by limited publication and no-citation rules. And as noted earlier, several circuits have
recently modified their rules to eliminate presumptions against publication, incorporate more specific criteria warranting publication, provide
procedures for requesting publication of an opinion, and allow more liberal citation of unpublished opinions.5 Commentators have called for
other circuits to follow this lead.' 6 It would seem beneficial, as some have
argued, for the courts of appeals to follow uniform rules on publication
and citation,517 though this would depart from the growing tradition of local control over procedural rules.' Recently, the Advisory Committee
on Appellate Rules approved Proposed New Rule 32.1, which would, if
adopted, establish a uniform rule for all circuits regarding citation of unpublished opinions."9
This Part briefly reviews recent proposals to further modify the
rules. It then presents a model for abbreviated opinions that would allow
the courts of appeals to function within their existing structure and strictures (neither of which is likely to be changed soon) while comporting
with the overarching precepts of the rule of precedent. This Part also ad-

514. See supra text accompanying notes 417-427; see also Barnett, supra note 35, at 3-5 (discussing
rule change by District of Columbia Circuit in 2002 and noting that majority of circuits no longer
strictly ban citation); Cappalli, supra note 8, at 758 (noting "movement... away from the practice of
using non-precedent"). Professor Cappalli describes such developments in several state courts in addition to the federal courts of appeals.
515. See supra text accompanying notes 417-427.
516. Boggs & Brooks, supra note 26, at 25.
517. See ACTL Report, supra note 24. at 652-63 (describing practical effects of rule variations).
5 18. See Gregory C. Sisk, The Balkanization of Appellate Justice: The Proliferationof Local Rules
in the Federal Circuits,68 U. COLO. L. REV. t, 1 (1997) (describing "growing disunity in practice and
fragmentation in rules" as a result of circuits' "separate procedural regimes"). The ACTL Report
notes that local control over procedural rules in the federal district courts has been abandoned in favor
of uniform rules for some aspects of civil procedure. ACTL Report, supra note 24, at 652. See also
SUBMISSION OF THE U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE TO THE COMMISSION ON STRUCTURAL ALTERNATIVES FOR THE

June t, 1998, at IV.C, available at www.library.unt.edu/gpo/csafca/
hearings/submittedtUSDOJ.htm [hereinafter D.O.J. SUBMISSION].
519. See Memorandum from Judge Samuel A. Alito, Chair, Advisory Comm. on App. Rules, to
Judge Anthony J. Sirica, Chair, Standing Comm. on Rules of Prac. & Proc., available at http://www
.uscourts.gov/rules/newrulesi.html [hereinafter Alito Memorandum]. This proposed rule, however,
expressly leaves to each circuit the determination of the status to be accorded to unpublished opinions.
FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS,
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vocates a return to the "free market" of precedents, characterized by liberalized citation rules.
A.

MODIFYING THE RULES

If Congress chooses not to relieve the "crisis" in the courts of appeals by reducing jurisdiction, 2 ° enacting structural modifications"' or
providing more judges," ' it seems likely that the courts of appeals will
continue to try to sort cases into two tracks for decisionmaking. "' Relatively modest proposals suggest a variety of ways to improve this process.
One way is to require "written" (perhaps not "published") opinions in
certain cases.524 A congressional bill introduced on February Ii, 2003 by
Rep. Paul would add such a rule to the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure.525 The bill identifies broad categories of cases in which written
opinions would be required 2 The coverage of this proposal is peculiar,527
520. See, e.g., Edith H. Jones, Back to the Future for FederalAppeals Courts: Rationing Federal
Justice by Recovering Limited Jurisdiction, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1485, 1486 (1995) (reviewing THOMAS E.
BAKER, RATIONING JUSTICE ON APPEAL: THE PROBLEMS OF THE U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS (I994)) (noting
"lack of political will" to limit federal subject matter jurisdiction).
521. See, e.g., Dragich, supra note 5o, at 58-73 (advocating structural reform of federal courts).
522. See, e.g., Richman & Reynolds, supra note 231, at 297 (advocating more circuits and more
judges).
523. For a thorough recent treatment of the broader issue of the propriety of a two-track system of
appellate justice in the federal courts, see id. Cappalli, supra note 8, clearly suspects that the two tracks
really involve a different distinction: the attention of judges (to cases thought to have "precedential
value") as opposed to the attention of clerks and staff attorneys (to cases deemed not to have "precedential value").
524. Such proposals may be addressed more to the problem of summary dispositions than to the
problem of unpublished opinions. But there is a connection: one argument against requiring all "opinions" to be published is that the overburdened courts would cease to write opinions at all in many
cases. See POSNER, supra note 307, at 168-69; see also Letter from Judge Alex Kozinski to Judge Samuel A. Alito, supra note 509. Most other federal appellate judges commenting on the proposed rule
repeat this same concern. A complete list of comments can be found at http://www.secretjustice
.org/new-proposed-frap._32_I .htm#completejlistpublic comments.
525. Openness in Justice Act, H.R. 700, lo8th Congress (2003).

526. The "Openness in Justice Act," if enacted, would read:
RULE 49. WRrTEN OPINIONS

(a)WHEN REQUIRED-A written opinion that expounds on the law as applied to
the facts of the case, and explains the judicial reasons upon which the judgment is
based, shall be issued in connection with a judgment entered in each of the following
cases:

(I) A civil action removed from State court.
(2) A civil action wherein jurisdiction is founded solely upon diversity of citizenship,
in which the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $1oo,ooo.
(3) Any appeal regarding the use of a court's inherent powers.
(b)PARTIES' RIGHT TO REQUEST-Each party on direct appeal may request a
written opinion referred to in subsection (a).
Id.
527. H.R. 700 covers removal and diversity cases and inherent powers issues but not, apparently,
federal question cases. To the extent that we are concerned with the federal courts' law-making re-
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but its provisions reflect both an understanding of the importance of
opinions in a system of precedent and a desire for openness and accountability in the federal courts.
Other proposals address deficiencies in the current rules which cause
the courts of appeals to do a poor job of separating decisions that should
be published from those that need not be.52 In an earlier article I argued,
for example, that the courts of appeals "should operate under a strong
presumption favoring.., publication" and should publish opinions in "all
cases reversing the district court and all cases in which the panel's deci' The work of Merritt and
sion is not unanimous."529
Brudney may suggest
modifications to the rules about who makes the publication decision. 30
Additional empirical research may suggest other modifications to the
current rules.53' Such modifications may improve publication decisions in
some cases, but they do nothing to address the rules' fundamental misunderstanding of the system of precedent.
Finally, the Advisory Committee on Appellate Rules has approved a
proposed new rule governing the citation of unpublished opinions. 32 New
sponsibilities, federal question cases would seem to be among those in which opinions should be required. In diversity cases, on the other hand, federal courts are expected to apply state law. Erie R.R.
Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2004). They are not expected to make
or develop state law except in the sense of predicting how the state's highest court would rule. See, e.g.,
Salve Regina College v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 226-27 (t99). And to the extent that diversity cases are
often considered culprits in the caseload explosion, it seems strange to require fuller opinions in these
cases than in others considered the mainstay of federal courts' proper jurisdiction. See generally Judith
Resnik, Trial as Error, Jurisdictionas Injury: Transforming the Meaning of Article III, 113 HARv. L.
REV. 924, ioo8-io (discussing plausibility of eliminating diversity cases from federal docket on grounds
that such cases, which do not involve federal lawmaking, "have a weaker claim for a place on the
docket than do other issues," but also describing benefits of including diversity cases in federal
caseload mix).
528. See supra text accompanying notes 254-272, and sources cited therein; see also ACTL Report,
supra note 24, at 68o-84 (describing examples): id. at 674 (pointing out that "40% of unpublished decisions arguably should have been published under the court's governing criteria") (quoting Nat'l Class.
Comm'n. v. U.S., 765 F.2d 164, 173 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (separate opinion of Wald, J.)).
529. Dragich, supra note 14, at 8oi; see also Brooks, supra note 461, at 261 (stating that a "corollary to the 'easy cases' justification for unpublished opinions should be that unpublished opinions will
generally be unanimous opinions"); Merritt & Brudney, supra note I5,at 120 (noting significant number of unpublished decisions involving reversals or accompanied by dissenting or concurring opinions);
id. at 87-88 (stating that circuits whose rules encourage publication of reversals publish more opinions
that other circuits); Songer et al., supra note 260, at 970 (stating hypothesis that "virtually all of the
unpublished decisions will be unanimous affirmances of the decision below").
530. Their study revealed that "specifying the number of judges needed to authorize publication... may be associated with higher publication rates." Merritt & Brudney, supra note i5,
at 89 n.66.
531. For example, the work of Songer, supra note 260, at 984, suggests that one reason for the very
low publication rates in the Eleventh Circuit may be that the applicable rule "is stated in very broad,
general language' and lacks "precise, objective guidelines." Id.
532. See Alito Memorandum, supra note 519, at 28-36. On April 13, 2004, the Advisory Committee on Appellate Rules held a hearing on proposed new Rule 32.J. After consideration, the Commit-

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[VOL. 55:1235

Rule 32.1 would prevent the courts of appeals from imposing any "prohibition or restriction.., upon the citation of judicial opinions, orders,
judgments, or other written dispositions" despite their designation as
'unpublished' or non-precedential. '5 33 The proposed rule is "extremely
limited," taking "no position" on the question whether unpublished opinions may constitutionally be denied precedential status.534 If adopted, the
proposed rule would take effect no sooner than December 2005."3'
The Advisory Committee Notes to the proposed rule indicate a concern with the hardship practitioners face under the current, inconsistent
no-citation rules of the various circuits, and note that the courts of appeals have long permitted parties to cite an "infinite variety of sources
solely for their persuasive value. ' ,,, 6 The modest scope of the proposed
new rule has not precluded heated opposition from courts of appeals

judges.537 Broadly speaking, federal appellate judes commenting on the
proposed rule doubt the need for a uniform rule,53 forecast greater use of
summary dispositions if the rule is adopted,539 differentiate unpublished
tee approved the proposed new rule without modification. See

ADVISORY RULES COMMrITEE AcTIONS:
SPRING 2004 MEETINGS, APPELLATE RULES COMMITrEE APPROVES PROPOSED RULES AND AMENDMENTS

PUBLISHED FOR COMMENT IN AUGUST 2003, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/index.html. At its
June 2004 meeting, the Judicial Conference's Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure
sent the proposed rule back to the Advisory Committee on Appellate Rules for further study. See
Standing Committee Action: June 2004 Meeting, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/index
.html#standingo6o4.
533. Alito Memorandum, supra note 519, at 28.
534. Id. at 30.
535. See Barnett, supra note 426, at 488.

536. Id. at 31-32.

537. See Letter from Judge John L. Coffey, to Judge Samuel A. Alito (Feb. it, 2004) (expressing
opposition of majority of judges of the Seventh Circuit to proposed Rule 32.1), available at
http://wwwi.law.ucla.edu/-volokhlblog-dataljudges7cir.pdf; Letter from Judge Alex Kozinski, to
Judge Samuel A. Alito, supra note 51o (opposing proposed Rule 32.1); Letter from Chief Judge
Haldane Robert Mayer, to Peter G. McCabe, Sec'y, Comm. on Rules of Prac. And Proc. (Jan. 6, 2004)
(expressing unanimous opposition of Federal Circuit judges to proposed Rule 32.J), available at
http://www.fedcir.gov/pdf/fedcir.pdf. A complete list of comments can be found at http://www
.secretjustice.org/new-proposed-frap-32_I.htm#complete-listpubliccomments. The proposed rule
faced "a barrage of opposition from hundreds of federal judges and lawyers." Tony Mauro, Judicial
Conference Group Backs Citing of Unpublished Opinions, LEGAL TIMES, Apr. 15, 2004, available at

http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=Io8I792928522.
538. See Letter from Judge J. Clifford Wallace, to Peter G. McCabe, Sec'y, Comm. on Rules of
Prac. & Proc. (Dec. 23, 2003) (noting that fact that the circuits "have some variation in application of
the non-citation rule is irrelevant. Each circuit has its unique problems. Indeed, we learn from each
other as we encounter different experiences. But this is no reason for a national rule."), available at
Judge
http://www.secretjustice.org/new-proposed-frap-32-I.htm#complete-list-publiccomments.
Kozinski notes that "circuits differ in size, legal culture and approachto precedent." Letter from Judge
Alex Kozinski, to Judge Samuel A. Alito, supra note 509. I would argue that although differences in
size are obvious, and differences in legal culture are apparent and accepted, differences in approach to
precedent among the circuits are suspect.

539. See Letter from Judge Kim McLane Wardlaw, to Peter G. McCabe, supra note 463.
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opinions from other non-binding sources that may be cited," and vigorously dispute the proposition that citation can be divorced from precedential status.54'
B.

RETHINKING ABBREVIATED OPINIONS

Unpublished opinions have been defended on grounds of efficiency,
in that judges spend less time reciting the facts, selecting the rule of decision, and explaining "with precision" why the rule was selected, giving
"due regard to how it will be applied in future cases.""' Given their widespread availability, labeling certain opinions "unpublished" no longer
makes sense.5 43 Declaring certain opinions "not precedential" is antithetical to the operation of a system of precedent. This section describes what
I shall refer to as "abbreviated opinions," which I suggest may be the appropriate record of decisions in cases receiving somewhat abbreviated
consideration on appeal.5"
Limited publication and no-citation rules are premised, as noted earlier, on the perceived redundancy of cases.545 This "redundancy" apparently involves both law and facts. Discussions emphasize that many cases
540. See Letter from Judge Procter Hug, Jr., to Peter McCabe, supra note 463 (noting that law review articles, treatises, and district court opinions "are intended to present arguments for particular
points of law, whereas unpublished opinions are specifically not intended for that purpose").
541. See Letter from Judge Diarmuid F. O'Scannlain, to Peter G. McCabe, Sec'y, Comm. on Rules
of Prac. & Proc. (Feb. 5, 2004) (stating that any distinction between the citability and the precedential
effect of unpublished decisions is "illusory"), available at http://www.secretjustice.org/new-proposed
_frap-32_I.htm#complete-list-publicscomments. See also Twenty Questionsfor Circuit Judge Richard
Posner of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, at http://2oq-appellateblog.blogspot.com

(Dec. 2003) (stating that the combination of allowing designation of decisions as nonprecedential but
allowing their citation "make[s] no sense").
542. Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d uI55, 1176 (9th Cir. 2001).
543. See, e.g., Boggs & Brooks, supra note 26, at 18; Barnett, supra note 535.
544. Cappalli, supra note 8, at 793-96, recently offered a proposal for "short opinions" as a compromise solution to the unpublished opinion practice. His proposal identifies categories of cases for
which such opinions would be appropriate, focusing on cases unlikely to be replicated in the future.
His categories include summary judgment motions, new trial motions, reviews for prejudicial error in
evidentiary matters, and sanctioning and sentencing decisions. The common theme is that these cases
provide meaningful information about how a legal rule applied to specific facts (for example, whether
specific evidence was sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact requiring a trial), but the facts
themselves need not be recounted in copious detail because the same evidence is unlikely to be presented in a future case. Similarly, Chief Judge Tacha of the Tenth Circuit recently stated a "personal
'gripe' about unpublished opinions. Unpublished decisions should be very short and limited strictly to
the facts of that particular case. To the extent that they add any new gloss to the law.... the opinion
should be published." See Twenty Questionsfor Chief Judge Deanell Reece Tacha of the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit,at http://2oq-appellateblog.blogspot.com (Jan. 5, 2004).
545. See supra text accompanying note 213; see also ACTL Report, supra note 24, at 68o; Boggs &

Brooks, supra note 26, at I9 (describing theory behind rules); Hart, 266 F.3d at 1179 (stating that opinions "in the same area of law, based on materially indistinguishable facts" are "at best ... redundant
and thus unhelpful authority").
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are decided on the basis of well-settled law1 46 or are "clearly dictated by
' A related claim is that
existing precedent."547
"easy" cases need not be
published 8 These statements are reflected in rules that require publication only when a decision makes new law or alters existing law.549 The redundancy premise, as noted earlier, conflicts with empirical studies
showing that judges and lawyers often think there is too little law, not too
much.5 In fact, the doctrine of precedent teaches that the application of
settled law to the facts of the case may introduce some variation.5 ' As for
the facts themselves, the Hart opinion suggests that many cases reaching
a given court of appeals are "materially indistinguishable" from earlier
cases.5 52 Such statements implicitly incorporate a claim that the law is already settled; here, not even the facts introduce any relevant variation. It
may be that in a few categories of cases553 factual patterns recur frequently and with minimal variation, but in general this notion contradicts
the intuition that no two cases (or events) are ever exactly alike. 54
The solution may lie in the taking full advantage of both settled law
' In "easy" or "redundant"
and the "countless permutations of facts."555
cases, the use of abbreviated opinions should yield some time savings. In
"easy" cases the law is, by definition, well-settled. If the redundancy
premise holds up, there should already exist multiple decisions reaffirming the relevant rule in cases factually similar to the case at bar.
There should be no conflicting decisions and no difference of opinion
among the cases (or on the panel) about how established law applies to
the instant facts. In such situations, it should be relatively easy to state
the law briefly, citing the existing authorities that dictate the decision. s6
Intricate explanations of subtle permutations are not needed.

546. See, e.g., Laretto, supra note 389, at 1041.
547. Boggs & Brooks, supra note 26 (describing theory behind rules).
548. See, id. at 21 (describing theory behind rules).
549. See, e.g., D.C. CIR. R. 36(a)(2)(A) and (B); 4TH CIR. R. 36(a)(i); 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.i(a); 6TH CIR.
R. 206; 8TH CIR. I.O.P. ApPx. I, §4; 9TH CIR. R. 36-2(a).
550. See supra text accompanying note 509.

551. See Boggs & Brooks, supra note 26, at 19 (stating that, in fact, the "initial statement of a general legal rule [may] not settle the underlying legal question"); Cappalli, supra note 8, at 768-69 (describing development of law through application of rule to factual variations).
552. Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155, 1179 (9th Cir. 2001).

553. Cf. Robel, supra note i9, at 947 (discussing non-publication of immigration and disability
benefits cases but noting that non-publication of such cases obscures information important to attorneys); see also Gulati & McCauliff, supra note 177, at 163 n.23.

554. See Schauer, supra note 96, at 577.
555. Hart,266 F.3d at 1176.
556. See Johanna S. Schiavoni, Who's Afraid of Precedent? The Debate over the PrecedentialValue
of Unpublished Opinions, 49 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1859, 1882-83 (2o2) (proposing use of "summary dis-

positions"); Sinclair, supra note 26, at 742 (proposing use of "minimal opinions").
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Likewise, in many cases reaching the courts of appeals, the facts
have been determined and the court of appeals has little authority to review or alter those findings."' Often, a fairly complete account of the
facts already exists, for example, in the statement of findings of the district court. The courts of appeals should make liberal use of such existing
accounts rather than writing new ones. And even to those troubled by
the role of law clerks in drafting opinions, 558 allowing law clerks to sum
marize the facts may not seem improper.

The rub of precedent lies in the variations, however. If the constraining effect of precedent is fundamentally important to our legal system,
judges cannot be freed from it on grounds of efficiency. They cannot
simply refuse to contemplate future cases.559 But they can take a narrow
view of the cases that potentially are swept within the instant decision.
Doing so is perfectly consistent with the "one case at a time" method inherent in a common law system. 6° Judges cannot legitimately deny the
future effect of today's decisions, in other words, but they can circumscribe that effect.

557. U.S. CONST. amend. VII; see Frank B. Cross, Decisionmaking in the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals, 91 CAL. L. REV. 1457, 1500 (2003) (stating that it is "well established that circuit courts are to
defer to district court findings regarding the facts of the case"); cf Richman & Reynolds, supra note
231, at 289 (noting that requirement that district judges file findings of fact exists to promote careful
decisionmaking by district judges). The situation is somewhat more complicated, however. Cases decided on summary judgment call for a determination whether any material issue of fact exists. FED. R.
Civ. P. 56(c); see also Cross, supra, at i5O1 (noting that factual findings in summary judgment cases are
not due deference from the appellate court). Some cases call for a determination whether the verdict is
supported by the facts.
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§ 3.01 (I999) (stating that "there is no particular deference given to the trial court's assessment of the
sufficiency of the evidence"). Other appeals call for de novo review. Id. § 2.14 (describing de novo review as requiring "no particular deference" to the trial court but not as amounting to "retrying the
entire case"). The same general observation may underlie the comments of Judge Stephen S. Trott,
who notes that "a huge percentage of [the Ninth Circuit's] unpublished dispositions are decided based
upon a deferential standard of review" and that the "latitude given" first-round decisionmakers such
as "trial courts[,] administrative agencies and juries is appropriately broad" and therefore concludes
that "such dispositions are essentially worthless as precedent or as persuasive [sic] in other cases." Letter from Judge Stephen S. Trott, to Peter G. McCabe, Sec'y, Comm. on Rules of Prac. & Proc. (Jan. 8,
2004), available at http:l/www.secretjustice.orglnew-proposed-frap-32-i.htm#complete-list-public
comments.
558. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 307, at i40-41; Richman & Reynolds, supra note 231, at 288-89.

559. As noted earlier, Schauer argues that this step is essential to the forward-looking aspect of
precedent's constraint. See supra text accompanying notes 380-392. Cappalli, supra note 8, at 774-75,
argues that "[w]hen Judge Kozinski stated in Hart that the 'rule must be phrased with precision and
with due regard to how it will be applied in future cases,' he confused the judicial with the legislative
role." The common law, according to Cappalli, "accepts the impossibility" that judges can "envision
the countless permutations of facts" that may arise in the future. Id.
560. Boggs & Brooks, supra note 26, at 25-26.
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The way to do so is to return to Professor Schauer's insight that the
weight or strength of a precedent is really a question of the breadth of its
characterization. Schauer writes that
if the conclusions of one case apply to a sweepingly broad set of analogies.... then the constraints of precedent are likely to be substantial.
Not only will a broad set of subsequent decisionmakers feel the impact
of the original decision, but the original decisionmaker will feel a
greater obligation in making a decision with such broad application .... Conversely, if the categories of assimilation are comparatively
small, the decisionmaker need consider only a few cases beyond the instant case and56 the constraints of precedent will be comparatively inconsequential.
If Schauer is correct, the courts of appeals can decide easy cases expeditiously by confining them as closely as possible to the facts presented."' To the extent that "we see precedents as small units ....

we are

likely to find few cases in which the current small unit is like some small
unit of the past"563- or like some anticipated future case. In deciding today's case, the court can focus primarily on its particulars. Doing just that
is an important aspect of review for error, the very thing to which all litigants in the federal courts are entitled, at a minimum. Moreover, although today's decision is a "precedent" (whether or not published), if
narrowly characterized it does not create a rule that will affect a great
many future cases, imposing potentially bad results that would be difficult to change.' 6' The decision will bind future courts - but only in virtually identical cases.1 65 By dint of its narrow characterization, the decision
is unlikely to become the fertile source of analogies in dissimilar cases
that the Hart court dreads 66 The hypothesis that the instant case is an
"easy" one readily disposed of on the basis of existing law further limits
the likelihood that lawyers in a wide range of future cases will see fit to
cite it instead of stronger, pre-existing authorities s67

561. Schauer, supra note 96, at 591.
562. See Hathaway, supra note 17I, at 633.

563. Schauer, supra note 96, at 602.
564. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 307, at I68 (discussing "unreliability" of unpublished opinions).
565. The availability of the precedent case will allow subsequent courts to dispose of nearly identical cases expeditiously. Some types of cases, however, call for "assessment of a multiplicity of factors
or... consideration of the entire factual context." Cappalli, supra note 8, at 785. Professor Cappalli
notes that the guidance of precedent is "most needed" in such cases, where the "relevant legal standard provides weak decisional signals" but the "likelihood of the same constellation of facts recurring"
is low. Such cases often wind up unpublished. Id. at 786.
566. See Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155, 1178 (9th Cir. 2001).
567. See ACTL Report, supra note 24, at 69o. In fact, the current rules are based on the premise
that "there is no need for any one to cite [an unpublished] decision because other precedent exists to
establish the pertinent point." Cooper & Berman, supra note 5, at 703; see also Dean A. Morande,
Publication Plans in the United States Courts of Appeals: The Unattainable Paradigm, 31 Fla. St. U. L.
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On the other hand, Schauer writes that "precedent has its greatest
role to play" in cases presenting "a comparatively limited number of factors likely to be repeated over time. ' s If true, this insight, too, can promote efficient decisionmaking. In the categories of cases where
redundancy is common, it makes sense for the courts to gather together
"many conceivably distinguishing particulars ''9 in a larger or broader
category of assimilation, write an opinion characterizing the decision as
broadly as necessary to cover the anticipated, largely redundant future
cases, and allow that precedent to control future, assimilable cases. The
opinion in the first case, establishing the rule and characterizing its reach,
would take considerable care to produce, exactly as the Hart court suggests.570 But opinions in the future cases could be quite brief, as both the
facts and the law would be accounted for adequately in the earlier opinion.
If this proposal for abbreviated opinions seems either simplistic or
merely descriptive of unpublished opinions as they currently exist, it may
be worthwhile to return briefly to the comparison between published and
unpublished opinions."' The circuits' rules do not define or describe in
detail the nature of such opinions. Instead, the rules, and discussions
about the rules, speak in terms of the kinds of cases for which unpublished opinions are appropriate. As noted earlier, several writers find little difference between published and unpublished opinions as
documents.57
Judges' comments to proposed new rule 32.1 offer a fascinating
glimpse into the world of unpublished opinions. These comments suggest
that unpublished opinions differ only in manner of preparation, and not
in kind, from published opinions. For example, Judge O'Scannlain suggests that if unpublished decisions may be cited, the courts of appeals
"will be forced to sort out the well-reasoned from the under-reasoned by
comparing the 'holdings' (and-yes-even the 'dicta' ) of unpublished
dispositions to those of our published opinions, and to begin the long, arRev. 751, 758

(2004).

Isolated examples, however, may suggest that the courts themselves cite unpub-

lished opinions when there is no need to do so. See, for example, United States. v. Guzman, 318 F.3d
1191, 1195 (Ioth Cir. 2003), in which the court cites first an unpublished opinion, United States v.
Greenhaw, 2002 WL 205730 (ioth Cir. Feb. II,2002) and then a published opinion, United States v.
Atterbury, 144 F.3d 1299, 1229 n.3 (Ioth Cir. 1998). TENTH CIR. R. 3 6.3 (B) disfavors citation of unpub-

lished decisions but allows it if the case "has persuasive value with respect to a material issue that has
not been addressed in a published opinion" or "would assist the court in its disposition." Neither exception would seem to apply in this instance.
568. Schauer, supra note 96, at 602.
569. Id.
570. See Hart, 266 F. 3d at 1176-77.

571. See supra notes 458-463.
572. See supra notes 46o-46I.
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duous, and resource-draining process of declaring anew what is and what
' If unpublished decisions are used only in
is not the law."573
easy cases
whose results are determined by existing law and factual similarity to
previous cases, and if they are intended to do nothing more than provide
the parties a reason for the result imposed in their case, then why do they
contain any dicta at all? Similarly, Judge Kozinski worries that the language that "might be adequate when applied to a particular case might
well be unacceptable if applied to future cases raising different fact pat'
terns."574
If cases selected for abbreviated treatment, including nonpublication, are truly redundant, then it is prior published decisions that
should again come into play when future cases arise. But Judge Kozinski's comment implicitly recognizes that the constraining effect of considering possible future cases properly arises in the decision of every
case.
Remarks like Judge O'Scannlain's tend to confirm the notion that
unpublished opinions are not very different from published ones. The
only difference of which judges seem certain is that unpublished opinions
are rather hastily prepared, by law clerks or staff attorneys, with little
oversight by judges, and without attention to careful wording or possible
future implications. These opinions, however, apparently contain discussions of the law and facts that one would think unnecessary in truly easy
cases. If true, unpublished opinions are a remarkably poor solution to the
burgeoning caseload of the courts of appeals. If judges write unpublished
opinions that seem no different from published ones, they may have reason to fear having to confront such opinions in future cases. Schauer's
work suggests that it is the very characterization of the instant case as
broad enough to control some hypothetical future cases that increases its
scope or weight as a precedent for future decisions. Though the desire to
give parties a reason is powerful (and one I have advocated), 5 unpublished opinions as we know them may go well beyond what is necessary
to achieve this laudable goal.s76 And their very similarity to published
opinions may exacerbate the notion that it is unfair not to allow their citation. Most importantly, writing relatively full opinions (even if hastily)
may limit the true time savings the courts of appeals can realize.

573. Letter from Judge Diarmuid F. O'Scannlain, to Peter G. McCabe, supra note 541.
574. Letter from Judge Alex Kozinski, to Judge Samuel A. Alito, supra note 5o9, at to.

575. See Dragich, supranote 14, at 8oi.
576. Judge Kozinski rightly notes that writers of unpublished opinions may "restat[e] the rule of
law in slightly different language-language of no particular significance to the drafters-[and
thereby] raise[] new and unintended implications." Letter from Judge Alex Kozinski, to Judge Samuel
A. Alito, supra note 5o9, at to.
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A better approach may be to impose upon all who have a hand in
preparing opinions in cases receiving abbreviated treatment the discipline to prepare opinions that are fundamentally different from published opinions.577 Such opinions should be extremely brief. They should
discuss only the case at bar and cases that control its outcome. They
should not hypothesize about possible future cases. They can fulfill the
goal of providing parties with reasons by citing controlling cases without
extensively re-interpreting those cases. All these things should be possible if the cases receiving abbreviated review are in fact easy or redundant. Courts of appeals judges, who know their caseload better than
anyone else can, continue to insist that this is the case."' 8 If it is not the
case, then abbreviated review is itself inappropriate and some other solution to the caseload crisis is required. 79
The courts of appeals would be correct to conclude that different
types of cases require different kinds of opinions quite apart from the decision whether or not to publish. The opinion in a case of first impression
interpreting a federal statute, for example, understandably looks quite
different from an opinion reviewing the sufficiency of evidence on a Title
VII case that went to trial. But the difference has nothing to do with a
declaration of the decision's precedential status. Rather, the facts, law,
and applicable standards of review of the two cases simply call for different treatment. The deciding court's role is to determine how much discussion of the facts and law is required to decide the case and to explain
its result. Commentators typically frame the debate as if the question
were whether to strive for a handful of well-reasoned opinions (at the
expense of lots of poor-quality ones), or to adopt a uniform decisional
process for all cases (knowin that the quality of the best decisions of the
past cannot be maintained).5 The courts of appeals, operating in a zerosum game with respect to time and resources, may be forced to maintain
two decisional tracks. But differential tracks should be based on real differences, such as the difference between cases involving new as opposed
to well-settled law, or the difference between decisions the court charac577. One difficulty may be that "modem judicial opinions" in general "are longer than they need
be." POSNER, supra note 307, at 351.
578. See Letter from Judge Alfred T. Goodwin, to Peter G. McCabe, Sec'y, Comm. on Rules of
Prac. & Proc. (Dec. 2, 2004), available at http://www.secretjustice.org/new-proposed-frap_32-I
.htm#completelist-public comments (describing the "metastasis of appeals having little or no factual
differentiation, little or no legal merit, and requiring little or no legal research").
579. Cf Twenty Questionsfor Chief Judge Deanell Reece Tacha of the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Tenth Circuit,supra note 544 (stating that if decision adds "any new gloss to the law,... [it] should
be published").
58o. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 307, at 168-69 (discussing a similar argument about the quality of
opinions). This theme is echoed in many of the comments to proposed rule 32.1, available at
http://www.secretjustice.org/new proposed-frap-32-l .htm#complete-list-public-comments.
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terizes broadly and those it characterizes narrowly? 8' The decision to
spend less time on some cases, however, should not be used to evade the
dictates of precedent.

C.

RETURNING TO THE "FREE MARKET" OF PRECEDENTS

Unlike those who have suggested new ways to sort "lawmaking"
cases from the rest, the American Bar Association and other organizations have called for more "publication" and for elimination of the nocitation rules. In February 2000 the ABA adopted a resolution on Minimum Standards of Appellate Court Opinions, which "urges the courts of
appeals, federal, state, and territorial, to provide in case dispositions (except in those appeals the court determines to be wholly without merit), at
a minimum, reasoned explanation for their decisions."5 The accompanying report concludes that the "courts of appeals... should ensure that
there be reasoned consideration of the material facts and issues in all
cases and.... a decision which ... sets out the operative facts of the case,
the issues presented, and the legal basis for the ruling., 5 3 In 2001, several
ABA sections's4 recommended that the ABA "urge[] the federal courts
of appeals uniformly to... take all necessary steps to make their unpublished decisions available through print or electronic publications ... and/or Internet Websites; and. . . permit citation to relevant
unpublished opinion." 5 " The Department of Justice has expressed a similar view.?6 The American College of Trial Lawyers' Report argues that
"there should be no restriction upon litigants' citations to nonbinding
opinions for whatever persuasive merit they are thought to have."""8
These proposals stake out some common ground. All are concerned
with openness and accountability in the decisionmaking of the federal
581. In other words, "whether a decision is precedential should depend on what the decision says,
not on the label a three-judge panel decides to affix to it in advance of its issuance." Howard Bashman,
How Appealing Blog (Feb. 12, 20o4), availableat http://www.appellateblog.blogspot.com.
582. See ABA Minimum Standards, supra note 24.
583. Id. (emphasis added).
584. The Section of Litigation, the Criminal Justice Section, the Torts and Insurance Practice Section, and the Senior Lawyers Division issued a Draft Report to the House of Delegates on March 30,
2oo. American Bar Association, Section of Litigation et al., Report to the House of Delegates, available at www.abanet.org/leadership/2oo/i I5.pdf.
585. Id. Professor Joseph R. Weeks has written to the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference requesting that the Advisory Committee on Appellate Rules consider
a similar proposal. Letter from Joseph R. Weeks, to Peter G. McCabe, Sec'y, Comm. on Rules of Prac.
& Proc. (March 4, 2003), available at www.rule-of-law.info/Weeks%2oLetter%2oMcCabe%2oo3o4o3
.pdf. Professor Weeks' proposal would add a new rule, Rule 49, to the Federal Rules of Appellate
Procedure, as does H.R. 700, but in substance it is more like the ABA proposal.
586. See D.O.J. SUBMISSION, supra note 518, at IV.C (recommending that unpublished opinions be
made uniformly available and implying that such decisions should be citable).
587. ACTL Report, supra note 24, at 647.
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courts of appeals, and all attest to the value of opinions reciting the facts,
citing the law, and explaining the court's rationale. The recommendation
of the ABA sections explicitly calls for authorization to cite unpublished
decisions. The Report accompanying the ABA resolution makes clear
that judicial accountability depends on the ability to comment on the
court's decisions." The title of H.R. 700, the "Openness in Justice Act"
seems to suggest the same.
These proposals all implicitly rest on the notion that the nuances of
the doctrine of precedent are sufficient to govern the use of "unpublished" decisions. The courts need not pervert the doctrine of precedent
by trying to remove many cases from its reach. Instead, attorneys and
judges, applying familiar rules about the reach of a "precedent" and the
hierarchy of authorities, should be permitted to cite the authorities they
believe most strongly support their arguments. The courts remain free to
apply the same rules themselves, rejecting any precedents they find unpersuasive on the law or distinguishable on the facts.
The "value" of a "precedent" varies from one later case to the next
and depends on a number of factors, including the relationship of the
precedent and subsequent courts and the identity between the prior and
subsequent cases. This analysis is logically distinct from any assessment
of the treatment (abbreviated or otherwise) the precedent case received.
To the extent that the fact of abbreviated treatment is thought to affect
the weight of the precedent, citation rules or conventions could require
that citations to unpublished decisions carry a notation to that effect.""
The courts of appeals should permit citation of all their prior decisions
for whatever those decisions may be worth in a subsequent case.
CONCLUSION

The federal courts of appeals have a difficult juggling act to perform,
balancing increasing caseloads and perhaps too few judges"g against dual
(and conflicting) functions, an unenviable place in the judicial hierarchy,
and a structure and strictures that complicate their task. The courts of
588. ABA MINIMUM STANDARDS, supra note 24, at 2.

589. In the same fashion, decisions rendered by the en banc court must be designated as such according to citation rules. THE BLUEBOOK: A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION R. 10.6, at 67 (Columbia Law
Review Ass'n et al. eds., I7th ed. 2000) (regarding weight of authority). Presumably, this rule exists to
inform the parties of the special (stronger) weight of an en banc decision. The same principle could be
used to fashion a rule that would clearly mark unpublished decisions as inferior. In addition, Proposed
New Rule 32.1 requires that a person citing an unpublished decision provide a copy to all parties. See
Alito Memorandum, supra note 519.
590. See Anastasoff v. United States, 223 F. 3d 898, 904 (8th Cir. 2000); see also Richman & Rey-

nolds, supra note 231. I have previously argued against adding more judges to the federal courts of
appeals. See Dragich, supra note 50, at 49.
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appeals have responded to these pressures by adopting, among other
things, rules that limit the publication of appellate opinions and often
forbid their citation. These rules rest on flawed premises and have
proved difficult to apply.
This Article attempts to show that these rules are fundamentally at
odds with the actual operation of a system of precedent. "Precedent" is
not a label to be slapped on a decision on its way to the publisher or the
file room. It is, rather, a defining feature of our legal system that operates
according to well-established rules. The circuits' rules misconstrue what
it means for a past event to be precedent for a current decision; more
importantly, misunderstand how today's decisions establish (or do not
establish) precedents for the future; and take too narrow a view of how
precedent matters. Past events are "precedents" because they are historical facts consisting of results plus reasons. Their applicability to today's
decisions depends on identity of issues and identity or assimilability of
facts between the past and current cases. Likewise, today's decisions establish precedents for future cases by virtue of the fact of their imposition of a result, but their ability to bind future decisionmakers depends
on the degree to which today's court characterizes its decision as embracing unanticipated future cases. Finally, when precedent matters, it does
so in a wide variety of ways, not limited to a binary choice between
"binding" and "wholly irrelevant."
Limited publication and no-citation rules cannot be justified on
grounds of economy. In fact, the economy-based arguments reveal that
deeply flawed premises about the operation of precedent underlie the
rules. The courts of appeals, however, can take advantage of insights
about how precedent works to rethink the use of abbreviated opinions.
These opinions could be quite circumscribed in their future effect, but
that narrow effect would derive from the characterization of the decision,
not from a declaration of its unworthiness. The courts of appeals should
permit the citation of all opinions, abbreviated or otherwise, for whatever they may be worth in the "free market" of precedents. If the courts
of appeals adopt this precedent-based methodology, they will restore the
proper roles of the precedent court and subsequent courts, and likely
would restore some measure of their own legitimacy as well.
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